02036 1 MANITOBA CLEAN ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION 2 3 4 5 6 7 RED RIVER FLOODWAY EXPANSION PROJECT 8 9 10 11 12 ======================================= 13 Monday, February 28, 2005 14 Sheraton Hotel 161 Donald Street 15 Winnipeg, Manitoba 16 ======================================== 17 18 Volume 9 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02037 1 APPEARANCES: 2 Clean Environment Commission: 3 Mr. Terry Sargeant - Chairman Mr. Barrie Webster - Member 4 Mr. Wayne Motheral - Member Mr. Doug Abra - Counsel 5 Mr. Dave Farlinger - Technical consultant Ms. Cathy Johnson - Secretary to Commission 6 Ms. Joyce Mueller - Secretary 7 Manitoba Conservation: 8 Mr. Trent Hreno - Chair, Project Admin Team Mr. Bruce Webb - Chair, Tech Advisory 9 Committee Mr. Stewart Pierce - Counsel 10 11 Manitoba Floodway Authority: 12 Mr. Rick Handlon - Counsel Mr. Jim Thomson 13 Mr. Doug McNeil Mr. Doug Peterson 14 Mr. Cam Osler - Intergroup Consulting Mr. John Osler - Intergroup Consulting 15 Mr. David Morgan - TetrES Consulting Mr. George Rempel - TetrES Consulting 16 Mr. Robert Sinclair - KGS Ms. Marci Friedman-Hamm - KGS 17 18 Participants: 19 Mr. Bob Starr - Ritchot Concerned Citizens Mr. Bob Bodnaruk - RM of Springfield 20 Mr. Steve Strang - RM of St. Clements Mr. Orvel Currie - Counsel to Municipalities 21 Mr. Doug Chorney - Coalition for Flood Protection North 22 Mr. Kerry McLuhan - Coalition for Flood Protection North 23 Mr. Rob Loudfoot - 768 Association Mr. Y. Shumuk - 768 Association 24 Paul Clifton - Paul Clifton Mr. Jeff Frank - Rivers West 25 Gaile Whelan Enns - Manitoba Wildlands Earl Stevenson - Peguis Indian Band 02038 1 Participants: (continued) 2 3 Mr. Jake Buhler - Cooks Creek Conservation Mr. Lloyd Crooks - Cooks Creek Conservation 4 Mr. Jon Stefanson - Cooks Creek Conservation Mr. Daryl Chicoine - Counsel 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02039 1 INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS 2 3 Presentation by North Ritchot Action Committee Dr. Rob Stewart 4 Mr. Paul Clifton 2045 Cross-Examination by MFA 2068 5 Questions by Panel 2071 6 7 Presentation by Concerned Citizens of Ritchot Mr. Bob Starr 2090 8 Cross-examination by MFA 2145 Questions by Panel 2148 9 10 Presentation by Mayor Stefaniuk 2163 Questions by Panel 2185 11 12 Presentation by Maxine Clifton 2190 13 Presentation by Rita Bartmanovich 2216 14 Presentation by Jay Doering 2234 15 Presentation by James Shapiro 2243 16 Presentation by Cheryl Kennedy Courcelles 2262 17 Presentation Vaughan Baird 2285 18 Presentation by John Corp 2289 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02040 1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS 2 3 74 Submission by Dr. Stewart to CEC 2089 4 75 Presentation of Ritchot Concerned 2190 Citizen's Committee 5 76 Presentation of Mr. Stefaniuk 2190 6 77 Presentation of Maxine Clifton to 2215 7 CEC 8 78 Presentation of Mrs. Bartmanovich 2234 to CEC 9 79 Presentation by Dr. Jay Doering to 2243 10 the CEC 11 80 Presentation by Dr. Shapiro to the 2261 12 CEC 13 81 Presentation of Ms. Kennedy 2285 14 Courcelles to CEC 15 82 Presentation by Vaughan Baird to 2301 the CEC 16 17 83 Presentation by Mr. John Corp to 2301 the CEC 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02041 1 INDEX OF UNDERTAKINGS 2 UNDERTAKING NO. PAGE 3 No undertakings given 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02042 1 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2005 2 Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m. 3 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, 5 everybody. Can we come to order, please. I'd 6 like to welcome everybody back, day one of our 7 third week. And as always, we have a busy agenda 8 for today. We have two registered participant 9 groups making their presentations today, the North 10 Ritchot Action Committee followed by the Ritchot 11 Concerned Citizens Committee. And then following 12 that, probably in the afternoon, we will have 13 about 10 or 12 individuals making presentations. 14 Before we turn to that, though, I 15 would just like to report on some business that 16 has ensued since Thursday and which arises out of 17 Thursday's proceedings. You will recall that on 18 Thursday afternoon, Mr. Jim Moir, who was 19 contracted to the Coalition for Flood Protection 20 North of the Floodway testified in respect of ice 21 jamming and challenged the conclusions reached by 22 the Floodway Authority. And as those of you who 23 were there will recall, there was a very decided 24 difference of opinion between Mr. Moir and the 25 Floodway Authority. 02043 1 At the end of his cross-examination, 2 my colleague on the panel, Barrie Webster, asked 3 Mr. Moir whether he might meet with Mr. Carson of 4 KGS, one of the Floodway Authority's engineering 5 consultants, whether they might meet to discuss 6 the modeling used by the Authority with a mind to 7 perhaps hopefully coming to a meeting of the 8 minds. 9 On Friday morning, Mr. Carson, 10 Mr. Moir, Rick Bowering of the Department of Water 11 Stewardship, Ken Mills, one of our consultants, 12 and Brian Peter of the MFA met. The meeting, as 13 it turned out, was very short and no resolution 14 was achieved. 15 As a result, the public, and in 16 particular members of this panel are left with a 17 huge uncertainty as to just what role the floodway 18 operation might play in ice jamming. 19 I am of the view that it would not be 20 productive to ask Mr. Moir to return for further 21 cross-examination and I am of the further view 22 that we need a third opinion. 23 One of the consultants we have been 24 using, Mr. Wim Wenders does have considerable 25 experience in this area; however, I do not feel 02044 1 that it would be appropriate for him to give 2 testimony as well as to advise us on such matters. 3 So the Commission will contract with 4 an independent engineering consultant to review 5 the material and to testify before us. And he 6 would be available for cross-examination by the 7 Floodway Authority, the Clean Environment 8 Commission and registered participants. 9 In consultations between Doug McNeil 10 and Rick Carson of the Floodway Authority and Dave 11 Farlinger of the Clean Environment Commission, an 12 available consultant has been identified. I'm 13 sure it would come as no surprise that it was not 14 easy to find somebody on short notice who would be 15 able to come here next week. However, they have 16 identified a Mr. Dave Andress, a principal with 17 Northern Hydraulic Consultants in Edmonton, a firm 18 with a good reputation in this area. 19 Mr. Andress will be asked to review 20 the materials provided by the Floodway Authority 21 as well as the material presented by Mr. Moir on 22 Thursday and the transcript of Mr. Moir's 23 testimony and cross-examination. He will appear 24 before us either next Tuesday or Wednesday. 25 That's all I have to say on that matter. 02045 1 Mr. McNeil, you have a comment on a 2 previous undertaking? 3 MR. MCNEIL: Thanks, Mr. Chair. 4 Actually, I think I'll wait a day or so to make 5 that comment. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Thank you. Then 7 I'll call upon the representatives of the North 8 Ritchot Action Committee to come forward and make 9 their presentation. At the front table, please. 10 We'll pause for a moment while technology is taken 11 care of. 12 Could you please introduce yourselves 13 for the record and then we'll have the Commission 14 Secretary swear you in. 15 MR. STEWART: I'm Dr. Rob Stewart. I 16 am the Chair of the North Ritchot Action 17 Committee. 18 MR. CLIFTON: Paul Clifton, North 19 Ritchot Action Committee. 20 21 (ROB STEWART: SWORN) 22 (PAUL CLIFTON: SWORN) 23 24 THE CHAIRMAN: You may proceed. 25 MR. STEWART: Thank you. The North 02046 1 Ritchot Action Committee was nominated and elected 2 in a town hall meeting in November of 1997. It 3 represents residents in the area with respect to 4 flood issues. We have been active ever since, 5 advocating for fair treatment of upstream 6 residents and trying to educate residents through 7 a series of seminars presented by invited experts. 8 We have had speakers from PFRA, EMO and CEAA come 9 out to talk to our community. 10 North Ritchot Action Committee, which 11 I usually refer to as NRAC, has been widely 12 recognized by such organizations as the Manitoba 13 Water Commission, the International Joint 14 Commission and the Community University Research 15 Alliance known as CURA for representing community 16 needs. 17 NRAC has made many presentations. We 18 have appeared before Manitoba Water Commission. 19 We have appeared many times before the 20 International Joint Commission including three 21 presentations to the Red River Basin Task Force. 22 We have spoken to CEC before about options for 23 Winnipeg's flood protection and several other 24 forums. 25 NRAC believes that the interests of 02047 1 upstream residents have been ignored and denied 2 for too long and that a fair and open 3 comprehensive and inclusive environmental review 4 is one of the ways of dealing with those issues. 5 We are currently participating in the 6 environmental assessment of the proposal to expand 7 Winnipeg's floodway, and that's what of course 8 brings us here today. We are here as unfunded 9 intervenors to voice the concerns of upstream 10 residents that the current EIS and CEC review did 11 not meet those criteria of a fair, open, 12 comprehensive and inclusive review. 13 We have presented our concerns over 14 floodway expansion to the Project Administration 15 Team which is leading the environmental assessment 16 and CEC has copies of these. So I think you are 17 well aware of our main concerns. 18 Our issues with the EIS intersect with 19 our concerns about the CEC process because we are 20 not confident that the CEC process is addressing 21 the real issues in the EIS. 22 Manitoba and Canada have determined 23 that a cooperative environmental assessment under 24 the Canada/Manitoba agreement on environmental 25 assessment cooperation will be undertaken for the 02048 1 Red River Floodway Expansion Project. The 2 agreement stipulates that the environmental review 3 will include, "The factors listed in subsection 16 4 paragraph 1 and 16 paragraph 2 of the Federal 5 Act." Section 16 of CEAA, the Canadian 6 Environmental Assessment Act, states that every 7 environmental review -- sorry, CEAA states what 8 every environmental review shall include. I won't 9 read into the minutes what section 16 says. I 10 think we're all pretty familiar with them now. 11 But looking at 16 in CEAA, under the 12 Canada/Manitoba agreement, the environmental 13 review of this project shall include an 14 examination of purpose of floodway expansion, an 15 examination of the alternatives to floodway 16 expansion, consideration of the operation of the 17 expanded floodway including an examination of 18 operating rules that govern that operation, 19 examination of environmental effects of the 20 proposed project, or in the parlance of CEAA, any 21 change that this project may cause in the 22 environment including any effects on health or 23 socio-economic conditions. 24 It shall include an evaluation of 25 cumulative environmental effects of the project in 02049 1 combination with other projects or activities that 2 have been or will be carried out. 3 It would include an examination of the 4 measures that are technically and economically 5 feasible and that would mitigate any significant 6 environmental impacts. And a program to ensure 7 that any mitigation measures referred to are 8 implemented. And it would include the 9 determination of the significance of environmental 10 effects of the project and any follow-up or 11 mediation as required -- follow-up, review or 12 mediation. 13 The terms of reference for these 14 hearings state that, 15 "Assessment for the project will be 16 required pursuant to the requirements 17 of the Canadian Environmental 18 Assessment Act." 19 They go on to indicate that the CEC 20 hearings shall consider potential environmental, 21 socioeconomic and cultural effects of construction 22 and operation of the Red River Floodway Expansion 23 Project. 24 However the Clean Environment 25 Commission informed participants on June 1st that 02050 1 the CEC review would specifically exclude 2 discussion and analysis of the purpose of the 3 project, alternatives to the project, operating 4 rules for the project, provincial compensation 5 legislation and any issues stemming from the 1997 6 flood, the flood that was the catalyst for the 7 current floodway expansion. 8 This is the only statement CEC has 9 released to our knowledge stating the issues that 10 would be included or excluded. And it's NRAC's 11 considered opinion that the current CEC review 12 prejudiced its outcome by the exclusion of the 13 very issues of interest to affected residents. 14 That was where matters stood for eight 15 months and up until the time that we wrote this 16 submission. The CEC transcripts haven't helped 17 clarify the situation about what CEC considers to 18 be relevant. For example, you have indicated that 19 future floodway operations are clearly within this 20 purview in one part of the transcript, and another 21 place, but summer operations are out. And the 22 calculation of natural levels is out but the 23 baseline use for the environmental assessment is 24 in. 25 It's hard to see how some 02051 1 consideration of natural escapes the capture of 2 baseline. 3 Regardless of what may or may not be 4 considered by CEC, since these hearings have 5 begun, you have heard presentations from the 6 proponent and other participants about the 7 purpose, alternatives, operation and compensation. 8 Indeed, you have been very tolerant and you have 9 heard about a great many other things as well. 10 But hearing things and giving them 11 credence in your deliberations are two very 12 different things. And it's still not clear to 13 NRAC what you will consider to be relevant 14 testimony and what you will consider to be 15 irrelevant. It's not clear what is tolerance for 16 venting and what is being given away. It makes 17 presenting here a little bit like a piņata game 18 and NRAC sees no value in flailing away 19 blindfolded. 20 So we're still uncertain which of our 21 issues, if any, CEC will consider relevant. So 22 rather than address technical aspects of the EIS, 23 we want to concentrate on its role and adequacy in 24 the environmental review. 25 If CEC has left some uncertainty about 02052 1 what's on the table, the Manitoba Floodway 2 Expansion Authority has left no doubt at all. 3 They declare virtually all the issues relevant to 4 upstream residents to be outside the scope of the 5 EIS. Health Canada's comment on the EIS 6 definition of significance applies I think to the 7 whole EIS. Health Canada said it's the definition 8 of significance. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, pardon me, 10 Dr. Stewart, do you have written copies of this 11 presentation? It's quite different than the 12 material that was provided to us on January 31st. 13 MR. STEWART: It's not very different 14 actually, sir. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: It's very difficult to 16 follow. 17 MR. STEWART: It has been rearranged 18 slightly and I'm leaving parts out. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Well, if we have 20 difficulty following, you'll know why then. 21 MR. STEWART: There are also -- 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 23 MR. STEWART: This quote is in the 24 written submission. 25 "The definition of significance is 02053 1 biased towards highlighting the 2 benefits and minimizing adverse 3 impacts. The methods of application 4 of criteria for determination of 5 significance by the authors favours 6 the omission of important information 7 by considering a subset of only three 8 of the entire list of criteria for 9 determination of significance." 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Could we have order in 11 the room. No side conversations, please. Sorry. 12 MR. STEWART: And this is a comment 13 that isn't in the written submission. But the 14 proponent's selective and dismissive approach is a 15 constant theme from the consultations to 16 cumulative effects. 17 The current floodway proposal responds 18 only to the needs of the residents of Winnipeg and 19 purposefully responds only to those needs -- 20 sorry, purposefully and somewhat callously ignores 21 the interests of parties that have been most 22 affected by flooding in the past and will continue 23 to be affected in the future. 24 It's apparent that the design 25 philosophy for the floodway was fundamentally 02054 1 flawed from the outset as it did not consider the 2 protection of all residents living in the Red 3 River Valley, but rather started from the position 4 that it would only consider the protection of 5 Winnipeg, regardless of how that can be achieved. 6 Had the architects of the floodway 7 considered the protection of all residents, we 8 might not be here looking at a different project 9 and not be raising concerns. 10 We're back into the previous text. 11 The Floodway Expansion Authority maintains that 12 they undertook public consultations -- I'm sorry, 13 we're not. But consultation was only consistent 14 with their design philosophy and the options that 15 they are willing to address. As such, what was 16 supposed to be consultation amounted to a little 17 more than an unabashed promotion to the project 18 which they have already announced, designed and 19 evaluated in the EIS. 20 Under the subheading of cumulative 21 effects in the EIS now. The EIS pays lip service 22 only to the assessment of cumulative impacts. The 23 proponent maintains that the existing floodway in 24 its mode of operation, ancillary flood control 25 structures west of Winnipeg and Winnipeg's 02055 1 infrastructure are static features of the baseline 2 environment from which expansion can be assessed. 3 The MFA interprets this to mean the expanded 4 floodway has no impacts because all the nasty 5 things derive from the existing floodway. This is 6 a simple dodge to avoid dealing with those nasty 7 bits under cumulative impacts assessment. If one 8 were to take this argument to the absurd limits, 9 there never would be a need for a cumulative 10 effects assessment since all past projects and 11 activities will become part of the existing 12 baseline. 13 I don't know what the authors of CEAA 14 were thinking when they drafted the legislation 15 but I seriously doubt they would have spent so 16 much time outlining cumulative effects to have 17 them all wrapped up into baseline for future 18 activities. 19 The proponent's dodge doesn't actually 20 withstand any reasonable scrutiny. In simple 21 logic, regardless of whether it's cumulative 22 effects or defined some other way, there's only 23 two options for considering the floodway, the 24 current floodway. Either it ceases to exist and 25 is replaced by a new expanded floodway or it 02056 1 continues to somehow exist alongside of and 2 complementary to the expanded part of the 3 floodway. 4 If reason prevails and the expanded 5 floodway is seen as replacing the existing 6 floodway, then all environmental impacts arise 7 from the expanded floodway and all those impacts 8 must be included in any environmental assessment. 9 If reason does not prevail and we 10 accept the idea that one will be able to see a 11 division between the existing floodway and 12 expanded floodway and be able to ascribe various 13 impacts to the original component and the expanded 14 component, then the existing floodway and its 15 operation falls squarely under the requirement to 16 examine cumulative environmental effects that are 17 likely to result from the combination -- from the 18 project in combination with other projects that 19 have been or will be carried out. So the new 20 floodway operates either alone or in combination, 21 but in either case its impacts cannot be ignored. 22 Similarly, the Shellmouth Dam and 23 Portage Diversions are dismissed because the 24 expanded floodway does not impact on them, but 25 that dam and diversion impact on the need for and 02057 1 operation of an expanded floodway. Winnipeg's 2 infrastructure is entirely ignored although 3 changes are clearly planned for it, projects that 4 will be carried out. And they will impact on the 5 need for and operation of an expanded floodway. 6 Summer operation is dismissed even though it's 7 driven entirely by current weaknesses in 8 Winnipeg's infrastructure and clearly falls under 9 the consideration of alternatives to summer 10 operation of an expanded floodway. 11 The existing rules of operation states 12 specifically that upstream properties shall be 13 flooded both during some spring floods and during 14 summer operations. Ignoring the legal questions 15 about this premeditated assault, the rules of 16 operation are the direct cause of environmental 17 impacts on people living upstream. The rules were 18 changed in roughly 1999/2000 to further restrict 19 flows through Winnipeg. And the effect of that 20 change in light of a wider floodway needs to be 21 assessed. 22 But on top of this, the province is on 23 record as saying that these rules were only 24 guidelines meaning there's no statement enforcing 25 how the expanded floodway will be operated. It's 02058 1 unfathomable how an environmental licence can be 2 given to a project that has no legal obligation to 3 operate in a particular manner, especially when 4 that operation is stated to intend -- its stated 5 intent is to harm upstream residents. How can one 6 plan mitigation when the operation that causes the 7 impacts are so uncertain? 8 Section 20 you'll see it gives the 9 responsible federal authority to -- the 10 responsible federal authority to evaluate any 11 mitigation to ensure it is appropriate and, "Shall 12 ensure that any mitigation measurements are 13 implemented." The responsible minister cannot 14 possibly do that without secure knowledge about 15 how the floodway will be operated. 16 Exclusion of consideration of the 17 existing floodway and ancillary structures plan 18 changes to infrastructures and rules of operation 19 from the EIS contravenes the requirements of CEAA 20 and the intent of the cooperative environmental 21 assessment agreement. 22 In terms of alternatives, the EIS is 23 neither comprehensive nor rigorous in its review. 24 In the supplementary filing, the MFA states, 25 "Physical flood protection in the 02059 1 valley to the 1 in 700 year peak level 2 is not likely economically feasible." 3 In talking about other options, 4 Mr. Carson said during these hearings that we sort 5 of informally reviewed options. Mr. McNeil, in 6 response to a question about building better flood 7 protection upstream, said we did some very what we 8 call back of the envelope calculations, very very 9 rough. Clearly the possibility of engineered 10 technical mitigation for upstream residents is not 11 even considered. Any flood protection system for 12 the Red River needs to benefit all parties 13 affected. 14 Non-structural protection has also not 15 been considered. Mr. Paul Clifton and Mr. Rick 16 Bowering introduced data at these hearings and 17 figures that relate natural water levels to the 18 operation of the Shellmouth Dam and the Portage 19 Diversion. Mr. Bowering went on to say that 20 obviously we could target almost any kind of 21 relationship of sharing of the benefit of the 22 flood control works between residents south. The 23 reason given that this wasn't done, however, was 24 that the flood control works were built for the 25 City of Winnipeg. 02060 1 I don't want to debate the selfish and 2 outdated logic behind this reason, I only want to 3 demonstrate that alternatives were dismissed out 4 of hand or, at best, on the basis of true back of 5 the envelope calculations. These alternative 6 measures such as operation of the floodway for the 7 benefit of upstream residents without jeopardizing 8 the protection of the City of Winnipeg, that's 9 included in what has not been considered. And 10 again, it's a reflection of the design philosophy 11 built around having your cake and eating it too. 12 In terms of mitigation, I would just 13 reiterate that mitigation in the form of 14 structural or operational alternatives has not 15 been explored. Instead, the Manitoba Floodway 16 Authority relies on the Red River Floodway Act to 17 establish a provincial compensation program for 18 property damage and economic loss resulting from 19 artificial flooding associated with the operation 20 of the Red River Floodway. Here compensation for 21 damages is seen as mitigation. 22 Under the proposed legislation, the 23 government will determine if artificial flooding 24 occurred, how much flooding occurred, what damage 25 resulted and how much compensation is to be paid 02061 1 to the affected parties. The Act would remove or 2 severely restrict any recourse through the courts 3 for affected parties to challenge these provincial 4 actions. Any democracy, the courts are the final 5 arbitrators of injustice. One has to ask why such 6 a provision would be included in legislation 7 that's supposedly for the benefit of protected 8 parties. 9 Aside from being a breach of natural 10 justice, this fox and hen house arrangement does 11 not meet the requirements of CEAA. Under CEAA, 12 Section 20, the federal responsible authority must 13 ensure mitigation measures are appropriate and are 14 implemented but provincial legislation allows the 15 Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations 16 involving eligibility, appeals and reports. In 17 other words, nothing in this legislation is fixed 18 and there's no security offered to those who may 19 be damaged by floodway operation. 20 Clearly the responsible federal 21 minister has no control over provincial 22 legislation and cannot be assured that mitigative 23 measures will be implemented. 24 That leaves the EIS without a plan for 25 dealing with residual effects. From the 02062 1 perspective of upstream community, some of the 2 more obvious environmental impacts of the Red 3 River Floodway include perpetual anxiety about 4 what the next spring or next summer will bring in 5 terms of floodway operation, seen tangibly in 6 marriage dysfunction, physical illnesses such as 7 high blood pressure and sense of hopelessness 8 that's causing some people to leave the area. 9 It includes perpetual angst that we 10 are less deserving of protection from natural 11 flood levels of people living a few hundred metres 12 to the north. Perpetual anger that people living 13 upstream are required to sustain emotional, 14 physical and financial damage to benefit people 15 protected by the floodway. It includes economic 16 losses associated with both natural and artificial 17 flooding, physical losses associated with natural 18 and artificial flooding and social disruption 19 associated with both natural and artificial 20 flooding. 21 One purpose of an environmental 22 assessment under CEAA or under the Canada/Manitoba 23 agreement is it to ensure that the proponent has 24 adequately addressed these issues to ensure that a 25 credible review of the floodway project is being 02063 1 conducted. These minimum standards must be 2 satisfied. The review would examine the need and 3 purpose for this specific project including 4 increased flood protection upstream and 5 downstream. 6 It would examine alternatives to its 7 construction and to its operation. It would 8 examine alternatives to flooding some people to 9 save others. It would examine all cumulative 10 effects including other flood protection 11 structures existing and foreseen, and their 12 operations. It would ensure clear concise rules 13 of operation with input and buy-in from all 14 affected parties. It would ensure there are clear 15 consequences for breaching those rules and that 16 those consequences are binding for the duration of 17 the existence of the floodway. And it would 18 ensure negotiated land use rights which would 19 permit storage of water on private property. 20 NRAC's views on environmental 21 assessment provided in the EIS are documented in 22 our submissions to the PAT through the EIS review 23 overall -- I'm sorry, through the EIS review 24 process. Overall, NRAC's impression of the EIS 25 was that it did not even approach satisfying its 02064 1 intended purpose which should be to thoroughly 2 describe the environmental effects, mitigation, 3 significance from environmental effects of the 4 project such that decision makers and stakeholders 5 are fully apprised of the merits and shortcomings 6 of the project under consideration. 7 Instead, the environmental assessment 8 provided in the EIS spent more time ignoring and 9 obfuscating environmental effects of the project 10 or scoping them out of any meaningful 11 consideration than it did in attempting to 12 quantify or address the issues. 13 Overall, the environmental assessment 14 marginalizes every issue critical upstream 15 residents on the basis that any injustices of the 16 past operation of the floodway are somehow 17 immutable. This rationale is based on an 18 environmental assessment process so fundamentally 19 flawed that it renders the assessment of little 20 practical value. 21 It's critical to note that there's 22 never been an environmental assessment of the 23 environmental effects of the existing floodway, at 24 least with regard to impact on upstream residents. 25 The reason for such an omission is obvious. The 02065 1 floodway was never intended to flood upstream 2 residents. But somehow flooding upstream 3 residents was surreptitiously added to the program 4 operation, again without ever assessing the 5 environmental effects. 6 Now we find ourselves again facing the 7 prospect of flooding upstream residents without 8 addressing the environmental effects, without 9 meaningful dialogue, without acknowledging the 10 rights of those who would be flooded all through 11 some slight of hand. 12 CEC and the MFA are both guilty, we 13 think, of considering only certain aspects of 14 flood protection in Southern Manitoba. Certainly 15 the International Joint Commission, which was a 16 major impetus for the floodway proposal, 17 recommended increased flood protection for 18 Winnipeg. But the IJC left no doubt that 19 protecting large urban centres should "not affect 20 upstream or downstream flood levels," went on to 21 say clearly the protection of Winnipeg must be 22 given a high priority but it is equally clear that 23 proposals for additional flood protection for the 24 city or alterations to the operating rules for the 25 Winnipeg Floodway must take account of the full 02066 1 economic, social and human costs for other areas 2 that would be affected by such measures. 3 A transparent process of open 4 consultation must be established to ensure that 5 residents in such areas have an opportunity to be 6 integrated -- an integrated part of any 7 decision-making process. 8 The present process is not consistent 9 with what IJC envisioned and, as such, is an 10 affront to citizens living upstream. Consistent 11 with the IJC recommendation, NRAC has always 12 advocated working in concert with the government 13 to ensure the best possible solution for all 14 Manitobans. 15 Political expediency has given 16 precedence over comprehensive and inclusive 17 discussions, spending time and money to assess 18 recreational potential but not putting sufficient 19 effort into a proper EIS is particularly offensive 20 to folks upstream. But the haste to get the 21 shovels in the ground may yet lead to wasted time 22 and effort by choosing a restrictive perspective 23 instead of a comprehensive and inclusive review as 24 identified by senior ministers. The MFA has set 25 itself up for major revisions to meet those 02067 1 standards. I tell my kids, do it right or do it 2 twice. 3 There are so many omissions in the EIS 4 that CEC cannot reasonably recommend environmental 5 approval. Should CEC recommend approval, there 6 remains so much uncertainty around operation and 7 mitigation, so many exclusions to cumulative 8 effects, so little attention to alternative 9 structures and operations and persistent 10 significant public concern, the floodway expansion 11 will still require a comprehensive review through 12 the federal process. 13 NRAC remains committed to seeing 14 improved flood protection for Winnipeg coupled 15 with an increased protection and a reduction of 16 harm outside the city. 17 MR. ABRA: Dr. Stewart, you are going 18 too fast, sir. The court reporter is having 19 trouble keeping up with you. 20 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry. NRAC remains 21 committed to seeing improved flood protection for 22 Winnipeg coupled with increased protection and 23 reduced harm outside of the city and stands firm 24 in its resolve to work with government and all 25 affected parties for the mutual benefit of 02068 1 everyone. NRAC believes that the current CEC 2 review has been prejudiced by the exclusion of 3 some issues, the issues of interest to affected 4 residents, we continue to provide our comments 5 through the federal process. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Dr. Stewart. 7 Does the Floodway Authority have any questions of 8 Dr. Stewart? 9 MR. MCNEIL: Yes, Mr. Chair, just a 10 couple of questions for clarification of what 11 Mr. Stewart mentioned. On page 4 of his 12 submission under the subheading cumulative 13 effects, in the fifth paragraph -- do you have a 14 copy of your submission? 15 MR. STEWART: I don't actually, 16 technological glitch, I didn't bring the piece of 17 paper and Paul is just retrieving one. 18 MR. MCNEIL: In any event, I'll read 19 from your submission. You state and I quote, 20 "The rules were changed in 1999/2000 21 to further restrict flows through 22 Winnipeg, and the effect of that 23 change in light of a wider floodway 24 needs to be assessed." 25 Are you aware that through subsequent hydraulic 02069 1 analysis, and the fact it was confirmed that the 2 city did in fact see the design flow of 3 80,000 cubic feet per second downstream of the 4 confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers in 5 the '97 flood, thereby meeting the requirement of 6 going to rule 2? Were you aware of that 7 confirmation that the design flow was met in 1997? 8 So in fact, the rules weren't revised to further 9 restrict flows. Rule 2 says, hold it at 10 80,000 cubic feet per second until you get to the 11 end of rule 2. So I just wanted to make that 12 clarification. 13 Also in the following sentence, the 14 province, and I quote, 15 "The province considered these rules 16 to be no more than guidelines, 17 document 11-Bowering, meaning there is 18 no statement enforcing how the 19 expanded floodway will be operated." 20 Were you present during Mr. Bowering's testimony 21 in week one of the hearings, or have you had a 22 chance to read the transcript wherein he clarified 23 that the rules are the rules and in fact not 24 guidelines? 25 MR. STEWART: I wasn't in attendance 02070 1 at the meeting. I have read Mr. Bowering's 2 retraction of the guidelines, and I have also seen 3 your comments that they are hard and fast. 4 MR. MCNEIL: Good. Thank you. 5 MR. STEWART: And I guess I wonder 6 what makes them any more hard and fast than they 7 were in the past? 8 MR. MCNEIL: The rules, as you quote 9 in your document, were approved by the province in 10 2000. As well the federal government approved 11 those rules for operation of the floodway in 2000. 12 MR. STEWART: And my read of the 13 Manitoba Environment Act indicates that any 14 alteration to the project should require an 15 environmental licence. I also don't know whether 16 that environmental licence was given for the 17 rules, and we are currently undertaking a process 18 to find out if the appropriate environmental 19 assessment was done at the federal level. 20 The opinion that there should be an 21 environmental assessment of any changes to the 22 rules as required by both Manitoba and federal 23 legislation is endorsed by supplementary filing 24 actually which says in section 8, pages 32 and 33, 25 with respect to control of summer river levels in 02071 1 Winnipeg, it's assumed that this will be a project 2 requiring a licence for a change in the floodway 3 operation rules and that the environmental issues 4 will be dealt with as part of the environmental 5 licensing process. And I haven't seen any 6 evidence that, in fact, that environmental 7 assessment was done, either in Manitoba or in 8 Canada, for the changes of those rules in '99 and 9 2000. 10 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, I don't think 11 it's appropriate to enter into debate at this 12 time, so I have no further questions. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Barrie. 14 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 15 I have a couple of questions for you. 16 First of all, Dr. Stewart, to what extent has your 17 organization been consulted or involved in the 18 process to establish the rules of operation of the 19 floodway? 20 MR. STEWART: Our committee requested 21 to be completely involved in the consultation 22 process and that request was denied. There was 23 attendance by two of our members to a half day out 24 of the ten days of meetings. Our contribution at 25 the time was primarily to encourage the people who 02072 1 were reviewing the rules of operation to come out 2 and talk to the community. 3 MR. WEBSTER: So there has been 4 involvement, not by the organization, not by NRAC, 5 but by individuals who are members of NRAC? 6 MR. STEWART: No. When I say 7 individuals, I mean some committee members 8 attended. And our representation was to encourage 9 the people who were reviewing the rules to come 10 out and talk to the people in the community about 11 them, get their input and their concerns, and also 12 make the process known to them. 13 MR. WEBSTER: And to what extent did 14 that take place? 15 MR. STEWART: It didn't. 16 MR. WEBSTER: Not at all? 17 MR. STEWART: Not at all. I would add 18 to that -- am I allowed to do this? In approving 19 the rules of operation, then Minister of the 20 Environment, David Anderson, strongly recommended 21 to then Minister Lathlin that he hold public 22 consultations on those rules and that has also not 23 been done. There were at least 80 written 24 submissions to Minister Lathlin's office 25 requesting that he hold public meetings, I like to 02073 1 think of them as town hall meetings, town hall 2 meetings on the rules of operation, and that was 3 not done. 4 MR. WEBSTER: So what you're telling 5 us is there was no consultation at all? 6 MR. STEWART: I think that's a fair 7 summary. 8 MR. WEBSTER: You've made a strong 9 point about the difficulties facing residents in 10 the area upstream of the floodway in terms of what 11 we might call mental health, anxiety, and so 12 forth. We have had some extensive discussions 13 which have related to, within this hearing, 14 relating to calculated natural levels of flooding 15 versus artificial flooding. And I wanted to ask 16 you whether you were aware of those calculated 17 levels since -- they have to be calculated since 18 there is an effect of the Shellmouth Dam and the 19 Portage Diversion on the levels that are 20 experienced in the Red River. Are you aware of 21 those natural and artificial levels that have been 22 presented -- calculated and presented? 23 MR. STEWART: I'm aware that they have 24 been done. I would say that I am a biologist, so 25 I may not understand all the technical details. 02074 1 But I understand enough to know and to believe 2 Mr. Bowering when he says that there are many 3 opportunities for sharing those flows. And there 4 is a very basic part of me that says that natural 5 should be the amount of water coming down the 6 Assiniboine, you know, what water really exists. 7 And my main point here is the design philosophy, 8 the operation philosophy has not taken into 9 consideration that they could do some good 10 upstream, that they could lower water. 11 Now we're talking about artificial 12 flooding, and I think Mr. McNeil said that it's 13 almost a catch phrase for artificially high. 14 Well, it could be artificially low too. And we're 15 not suggesting that we'd jeopardize Winnipeg to do 16 that. But as Mr. Bowering says, there's a wide 17 array of options there that were not considered. 18 MR. WEBSTER: We have also heard about 19 the concept of holding back water with what's been 20 called a waffling concept. Are you referring to 21 that in terms of artificially lowering the river, 22 is that what you're thinking of? 23 MR. STEWART: No, I was following your 24 comment about Assiniboine flow and Shellmouth and 25 Portage and so on. It's my perspective, it is our 02075 1 perspective that this is a whole flood protection 2 system, that the Winnipeg Floodway is only one 3 component of Winnipeg's protection. And that by 4 operating that system in a different way, upstream 5 residents could gain some benefit without costing 6 protection of Winnipeg anything. And my point 7 here is that that hasn't been considered because 8 it's been dismissed out of hand that, sorry, they 9 were built for Winnipeg's protection. That was a 10 stance when it was originally done. It sounds a 11 bit like a six year old saying, but mommy gave it 12 to me, I don't have to share. 13 Well, we're now 36 years past that, we 14 are 42. We have a different perspective on 15 things, and not sharing because mommy gave it to 16 me when I was six doesn't cut it. 17 MR. WEBSTER: Let me ask you one more 18 question then. There is anxiety with respect to 19 the runoff that affects the flooding in the Red 20 River for all of us who are in the Red River 21 basin. And I wanted to know whether, in fact, 22 your concern is with the operation of the floodway 23 and the expanded floodway, or whether it's in fact 24 more oriented towards the unpredictability of the 25 natural conditions that generate floods in the 02076 1 valley, in the basin. 2 MR. STEWART: I think everybody in the 3 valley has to be aware of that unpredictable 4 natural flooding, that's a consequence of being 5 here. 6 What our main concerns are, is that 7 the expanded floodway will continue, promises to 8 continue doing harm through artificially high 9 water levels, and at the same time refuses to 10 provide any benefit by possible operation to below 11 natural, below -- artificially low levels. And I 12 think that's our main concern. 13 The uncertainty is starting to 14 disappear. The information that Mr. Clifton and 15 Mr. Bowering tabled recently, the flows in the 16 Shellmouth and so on, indicate that roughly ten 17 times in the lifetime of the floodway, people 18 upstream have had artificially high water in 19 spring operations. So that's about a 33 per cent 20 average. It's not rare, that's for certain. 21 Now, I know Mr. McNeil had said that 22 he had data that 22 times out of the last 36 23 years, summer operation would have caused 24 artificial flooding. And I know he was going to 25 come back. I haven't seen that in the 02077 1 transcripts, but let's say about 20. Well, 20 and 2 10 is 30 out of the last 36. The uncertainty 3 about being flooded artificially upstream is gone. 4 We can count on it 80 per cent of the time; 80 per 5 cent of the years we'll have, based on historical 6 record, some form of artificial flooding. 7 Now with an expanded floodway maybe it 8 will only be 77 per cent, but the point remains 9 that we are pretty certain we're going to be 10 flooded just about every year. 11 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Stewart, do you 13 take any comfort from at least the claims by the 14 Manitoba Floodway Authority that artificial 15 flooding will be lower with an expanded floodway 16 than with the current floodway? 17 MR. STEWART: We take some solace in 18 that, but not enough, inasmuch as being told that 19 we are going to be beaten up a little less 20 severely, a little less often is really not very 21 much comfort. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: What would you propose? 23 MR. STEWART: In terms of? 24 THE CHAIRMAN: As an alternative or as 25 a way to deal with that fact? 02078 1 MR. STEWART: I think what I would 2 propose here, and I will say again I'm a 3 biologist, is that the design philosophy has to be 4 expanded. Because there are people more expert 5 than I in seeing how this could actually be done. 6 The technical aspects I think are beyond me. 7 In terms of what to do with the 8 people, I think they have to have -- they have to 9 be acknowledged that this is going to harm them 10 for the greater good. There has to be some kind 11 of negotiated easements that makes it actually 12 legal to store water in my living-room. 13 I think the compensation aspect of 14 mitigation, what -- so the first part of my answer 15 deals with the technical mitigation, and I can't 16 tell you what the specifics are. I have the 17 feeling, and I've heard Mr. Bowering say that 18 there are ways of doing it, so I'll leave that 19 with him. We need the easements, I guess they 20 would be called legally, the legal right to flood 21 assist. The compensation package has to be 22 negotiated with the people who are being 23 victimized. 24 And this isn't a huge number, I mean, 25 that's part of our problem, right, we are a 02079 1 minority in the province. So it shouldn't be 2 difficult to talk to all of us, lay all the cards 3 on the table, this is what we're going to do, what 4 do you want? And I think we need the town hall 5 meetings to find out what people want. 6 One of my thoughts is that there could 7 be a grandfathered buyout, where you negotiate the 8 current market value and you negotiate -- maybe 9 even put that in a trust fund, but we know in the 10 next couple of years that if we lose our houses, 11 then we are gone and that's the money we get. Why 12 I say that has to be done up-front and 13 grandfathered is because the last guy on the 14 street has pretty low property value. 15 But I think the most important part of 16 it all is to get people to come out and say, this 17 is the bad side of what we're doing, how are we 18 going to make that right for you? And that hasn't 19 happened. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Stewart, is it your 21 view that the federal government should conduct a 22 review, a panel review of this project? 23 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is, and I think 24 we are leaning that way. I mean, I think -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: We being NRAC? 02080 1 MR. STEWART: Sorry, I think the whole 2 process is kind of headed that way. I guess I 3 said it in my presentation, that it's hard to see 4 how the project could be approved right now, 5 because there's work to be involved to go back and 6 fill those gaps in the EIS. You know, it does 7 strike me as being a lot of work. And I don't 8 know the jurisdictional relationships here, but it 9 seems to me that if you accept those kinds of 10 arguments and say, sorry, we need some more work 11 done, then why don't we go to the federal panel on 12 the next iteration right away? And it's my read 13 that the federal requirements are a little more 14 rigorous. So if you can get over the biggest 15 hurdle, you got over the shorter hurdle, and that 16 makes most sense in getting the project under way. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: So your view is that 18 the federal process would fill in these gaps? 19 MR. STEWART: My personal opinion is 20 that there is a lot of work yet to be done on the 21 EIS, and if you agree with that and say come back 22 to me in two months when you've got it done, then 23 we haven't necessarily satisfied the requirements 24 of CEAA. And CEAA may after that say, "yes, but." 25 So if you're going to ask that major changes be 02081 1 done, and I think it would be unsafe to say, we 2 will approve you on the basis that these things 3 will be done, if you require things to be done and 4 to be demonstrated to be done, then perhaps that 5 should be demonstrated to the next level up to 6 avoid the possibility of still having to do a 7 federal panel. 8 I wandered around a bit there. I 9 don't know if you caught that or not. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure how you 11 arrived at some of your numbers in your October 12 2004 report, which at least as I read them are 13 quite different than what the Floodway Authority 14 has presented to us. You talk about a one in 225 15 year flood, there being something in the order of 16 1.5 metres of artificial flooding. You also talk 17 about by the time rule 3 is implemented, upstream 18 residents are inundated by as much as 8 feet of 19 artificial flooding. 20 Now, the evidence that we've heard 21 from the Floodway Authority is that at least until 22 a one in 700 year flood, the artificial flooding 23 will be lowered than the current? 24 MR. STEWART: I'll see if I can get 25 what you are referring to, but I would also say 02082 1 that I'm not in a position to discuss very many 2 technical details. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: You make these 4 statements in your October report. 5 MR. STEWART: Yes. I think this is in 6 reference to the figure 5.3.4. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is that figure. 8 MR. STEWART: If you'll just excuse me 9 for a second, I'll grab that binder. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. It's on 11 page 11, I think the graph is on page 10 of 22 and 12 then some of your figures are on page 11 and 12. 13 MR. STEWART: And your question was? 14 THE CHAIRMAN: I am just wondering how 15 you get your figures that the expanded floodway 16 causes -- this is in the last paragraph on page 17 11, just above the cartoon, which says, 18 "At the same time, the expanded 19 floodway causes something in the order 20 of 1.5 metres of artificial flooding 21 during the one in 225 flood." 22 The next page, the top paragraph, 23 "By the time rule 3 is implemented 24 upstream residents are inundated by as 25 much as 8 feet of artificial 02083 1 flooding." 2 MR. STEWART: The origin is the figure 3 5.3-4, and the horizontal dotted line is upstream 4 flood protection level. The blue curve, I 5 believe, shows flows -- or sorry, shows water 6 elevations with the expanded floodway. And it 7 crosses our flood protection level some place 8 between the one in 120 and the one in 125 -- 9 sorry, the one in 225. 10 Rule 3 kicks in at 778, which is where 11 the green line takes the sharp horizontal angle. 12 And in my neighbourhood the flood protection level 13 of '97 plus two is about 774. So by the time rule 14 3 starts, we are already 4 feet over our flood 15 protection level. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Over your flood 17 protection line, yes, but that's not necessarily 18 artificial flooding, as I understand this. 19 Now, I will ask, when we have the 20 Floodway Authority back on the stand next week for 21 redirect or re-examination by this panel, I will 22 ask that question of them. But as I recall them 23 explaining it to us the week before last, the top 24 line is what's natural, and then those bottom 25 lines are with the existing and the expanded 02084 1 floodway. And that the artificial flooding 2 doesn't really level off until you get to a one in 3 700 year flood. 4 I mean, I think I'll have to ask those 5 questions of the Floodway Authority to get an 6 explanation of that, and I will do that next week. 7 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, would you like 8 me just to clarify now while you are looking at 9 the graph? 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. 11 MR. MCNEIL: So you are looking at 12 page 10 of 22 of the North Ritchot Action 13 Committee's submission, and figure 5.3-4 which 14 came out of the EIS, and the KGS Aces, UMA 15 studies. The lower line which ends at a 16 horizontal dotted line, dashed line, that lower 17 line is the state of nature water level, for all 18 those floods, those various flows. And the line 19 that takes off from that natural line at about, 20 just below the one in 100 year flood. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: The rule 2 line? 22 MR. MCNEIL: The rule 2 line, that's 23 rule 2 as it exists today with the existing 24 floodway. And then at approximately elevation 25 237, it flattens out and goes horizontal, that's 02085 1 the existing floodway. That's how the rules would 2 be applied. 3 And the line in the middle, which is 4 curved, takes off from the natural waterline at 5 the one in 120 year flood, and then takes a curved 6 upward approach and then levels off at 237. That 7 would be the operation for those flows with the 8 expanded floodway. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. So there will be 10 artificial flooding beyond about a one in 120 11 flood? 12 MR. MCNEIL: That's correct. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: But it's lower than, or 14 it's less artificial flooding than with the 15 existing floodway? 16 MR. MCNEIL: Correct, for all flows up 17 to the 700 year event. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. So that would 19 explain your statements in here. It's a 20 comparison to the existing floodway, which I asked 21 you that question earlier. 22 I have no further questions. 23 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, I just have a 24 couple of questions arising out of the 25 Commission's questions and the responses. 02086 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 2 MR. MCNEIL: In the first place, 3 Mr. Stewart, with respect to public 4 representation, are you aware that the Government 5 of Manitoba, specifically the Minister of Natural 6 Resources, in November of 1998, appointed the Red 7 River Floodway Operation Review Committee, and are 8 you aware that an elected official from the RM of 9 Ritchot, Ms. Valerie Rutherford, sat on that 10 committee among elected officials from the RM of 11 Morris, Macdonald, and then government officials? 12 MR. STEWART: I'm aware of that. I am 13 also aware that our request that we'd be able to 14 provide Councillor Rutherford with technical 15 assistance was rejected. 16 MR. MCNEIL: Who was it rejected by? 17 MR. STEWART: I believe it was Water 18 Resources Branch. 19 MR. MCNEIL: Anyway, the fact is that 20 the Minister established that committee that 21 elected representatives that represent all 22 residents of the RM of Ritchot, or rather one 23 elected official, Ms. Rutherford, sat on that 24 committee. And I recall that Mayor Bob Stefaniuk 25 also attended many of those meetings. So your 02087 1 concerns could be heard from the committee up 2 through your elected officials. 3 On a second question, Mr. Chair, 4 Mr. Stewart had indicated that preventing 5 artificial flooding was dismissed out of hand. 6 And I apologize if I didn't quote him exactly. In 7 fact, the flood protection studies for Winnipeg 8 report that is dated November 2001 has three 9 specific references to dealing with artificial 10 flooding, or preventing it, as options to floodway 11 expansion. And I specifically refer to appendix 12 B, section B.9.2, and it's called rule 2, raising 13 water level above the state of nature. And I 14 refer specifically to table B-21, comparison of 15 floodway expansion schemes in alternative rule 2 16 operation modes. And that in fact for the 500, 17 700, 1,000 and 1,200 year floods, KGS did look at 18 limiting water levels upstream of the inlet 19 control structure to the natural level. 20 So for the one in 700 year flood 21 protection for Winnipeg, to limit the water level 22 upstream of the inlet control structure to state 23 of nature would cost an additional $500 million, 24 over and above the $660 million. So it was 25 considered in the report and government took that 02088 1 into account. 2 And, Mr. Stewart, are you aware of 3 these references in this report? 4 MR. STEWART: I had missed those. 5 MR. MCNEIL: Thank you, Mr. Chair. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 7 MR. STEWART: If I could just respond? 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 9 MR. STEWART: The consultation, or 10 lack of consultation that went into the rules of 11 operation makes me think of something that you had 12 asked, that we talked about in compensation. And 13 I noticed that both Mayor Stefaniuk and 14 Mr. Bowering noted the other day that those 15 deliberations were thought to be interim rules and 16 they were adopted unilaterally after that. 17 With respect to compensation, I think 18 why this example is important is that when the 19 community is represented in discussions of 20 compensation, it should be by somebody who is 21 selected, elected for exactly that specific 22 purpose, so that the expertise to represent is 23 there, and discuss technical issues or legal 24 ramifications or compensation. And it's not 25 necessarily somebody who was elected on a 02089 1 different platform as a councillor. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 3 Do any of the registered participant 4 groups have any questions of the North Ritchot 5 Action Committee? Seeing none, I thank you for 6 your presentation here today. I would like to, I 7 don't know whether you will take any comfort in 8 it, Dr. Stewart, but I would like to assure you 9 that in spite of your misgivings about the Clean 10 Environment Commission process, we are very open 11 to consider all relevant matters before us. I 12 don't share your interpretation of the June 1st 13 meeting and what you call restrictions on our 14 mandate. We will give this as thorough a review 15 as we are able to. 16 MR. STEWART: Thank you. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 18 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, could we 19 add Dr. Stewart's submission as Exhibit 74. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 21 22 (EXHIBIT 74: Submission by Dr. 23 Stewart to CEC) 24 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Next up is Ritchot 02090 1 Concerned Citizens. Do you have technological 2 matters to set up? It's 10 after 10:00. How long 3 will your presentation will be? 4 MR. STARR: 45 minutes. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we'll take a 6 ten minute break now, rather than breaking later, 7 we will take a ten minute break now, come back at 8 20 after, and then you can proceed then. 9 10 (Proceedings recessed at 10:10 a.m. 11 and reconvened at 10:30 a.m.) 12 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we come to order 14 now? I apologize for the delay, but a minor 15 glitch. 16 Appearing now is the Ritchot Concerned 17 Citizens Committee. Could you please introduce 18 yourself for the record, and then we will have the 19 Commission secretary swear you in. 20 MR. STARR: My name is Bob Starr. And 21 I'm the chairman of the Ritchot Concerned Citizens 22 Committee Incorporated. 23 24 (BOB STARR: SWORN) 25 02091 1 MR. STARR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I have 3 watched -- first of all, I will just warn you, Mr. 4 Sargeant, there is a little preamble of my 5 observations over the last two weeks. 6 I have watched with interest the 7 conduct of these hearings and have tried to review 8 the transcripts, however, my participation has 9 been limited, because I'm the owner of a small 10 business and it has simply not been possible for 11 me to commit three full weeks to the hearing 12 process. I have made a couple of observations 13 about the hearing, however, and would like to 14 share these with you at my outset today. 15 Firstly, I have watched with interest 16 the focus of attention on possible downstream 17 effects. I can understand the fear and concerns 18 expressed by downstream residents, who fear for 19 their water supply and other important impacts of 20 the project. But as someone who experienced the 21 '97 flooding disaster and its aftermath, I hope 22 you will understand and appreciate my focus on 23 impacts upstream of the inlet control structure. 24 Thousands of homeowners affected by past 25 artificial flooding would like to think that their 02092 1 concerns would be given high priority in the 2 conduct of these hearings. It is important that 3 upstream residents receive fair consideration in 4 your deliberations and are not treated as 5 throw-aways in the floodway expansion project, as 6 we have in the past. For us future artificial 7 flooding is 100 per cent certain, and based on our 8 experience for almost 35 years, we take no comfort 9 from assurances by the Floodway Authority and the 10 province that the unproclaimed Red River Floodway 11 Act will look after us. 12 Secondly, we have heard a great deal 13 about baseline, incremental impacts, and 14 cumulative effects. I am far from being an expert 15 on such matters, but I have come to understand 16 through this hearing process that current 17 legislation and guidelines are in place to 18 conserve and protect the environment, while 19 sustaining our resources for future generations. 20 My understanding is that this 21 legislation dictates that existing works serve as 22 the baseline for determining the cumulative 23 impacts of man's intervention and development of 24 the landscape. While this may be the case, I 25 question whether or not such baseline 02093 1 considerations are in our collective best 2 interests unless the baseline is fully and 3 completely understood. 4 I say this, Mr. Chairman, because of 5 our concern for the baseline for evaluating the 6 impacts of the floodway expansion project. Using 7 the existing floodway as a baseline provides the 8 opportunity for the Floodway Authority to bury the 9 designed and planned water elevation of 778 feet 10 just upstream from the inlet control structure as 11 part of the existing project, even though this 12 elevation has never been experienced, was never 13 the subject of an environmental assessment and 14 could not be achieved in the '97 flood of the 15 century. 16 This elevation is of paramount 17 importance to upstream residents, as this level of 18 flooding and proposed summer operation of the 19 control works are at the very heart of our 20 concerns for natural versus artificial flooding. 21 Some of us who are not experts in 22 environmental assessment have had difficulty 23 trying to understand the concepts of baseline, 24 incremental impacts, cumulative effects, being 25 applied from a starting point that is far higher 02094 1 than anything ever studied or experienced and, 2 therefore, not fully understood. As one person 3 attempted to explain to me, cumulative assessment 4 is like adding straws to a camel's back, you want 5 to understand how many straws, and when the 6 addition of straws are likely to break the camel's 7 back. Continuing with this analogy, my question 8 is this: Shouldn't we, as a society seeking 9 decisions in the common good, determine the health 10 and strength of the camel before we add any more 11 straws? 12 Mr. Chairman, my presentation which 13 was filed with the Commission several weeks ago 14 deals with these concerns and others, and I would 15 refer you to that document now. I will not read 16 it word for word, but I will go through it 17 systematically with a few additions, comments, and 18 examples. And I would invite you and the 19 Commissioners to stop me at any time and ask 20 questions. I will go to that main document now. 21 The particular interest of the Ritchot 22 Concerned Citizens Committee: The Ritchot 23 Concerned Citizens Committee represents concerns 24 of people who live immediately upstream from the 25 floodway inlet. Our interest is to provide the 02095 1 CEC evidence focusing primarily on the potential 2 socio-economic impacts of the proposed project on 3 our residents, drawing on our experiences gained 4 from the impacts of the 1997 flood and the 5 operations of the floodway both before and since 6 that date. 7 Our position taken: Our committee 8 fully understands and supports the intention to 9 improve flood protection measures for the City of 10 Winnipeg. However, the proposed project as 11 described in the EIS is not acceptable, because it 12 will inflict artificial flooding on the people we 13 represent without any specific provisions for 14 prevention, compensation, mitigation, and once 15 again demonstrates inadequate thought, analysis, 16 understanding and actions on the part of the 17 authorities responsible for floodway construction 18 and operation. 19 Our residents' perspective is critical 20 because we bore the brunt of the '97 flood of the 21 century and it is 100 per cent certain we will be 22 flooded again and again after that. 23 At this point I would like to refer 24 the Commission to the brochure, it is in our black 25 binder with supplementary documents, and there is 02096 1 a little brochure in there called "The Facts 2 Behind the Floodway." 3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, we feel 4 this is a very critical document and I refer to it 5 fairly frequently today. It does not have a 6 publication date, however it mentions the floodway 7 was used in 16 springs up to 1995. And I picked 8 up my copy after the '97 flood at Water Resources. 9 Residents tell me it was also available in a box 10 right on the inlet control structure for the 11 public to pick up after the '96 flood. 12 For now I would direct you to the 13 second question and answer. The question asked 14 is: Does operating the floodway aggravate 15 flooding south of Winnipeg? And we have to 16 realize this is the province answering these 17 questions. So does operating the floodway 18 aggravate flooding south of Winnipeg? Their 19 answer, no, the floodway inlet control structure 20 is operated to keep the water level south of the 21 floodway at or below what it would be under 22 natural conditions. 23 This, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, 24 should be the baseline, the highest natural level 25 that was part of the existing environment, not 02097 1 MFA's pie in the sky baseline that was a 2 theoretical, emergency level that only a handful 3 of engineers knew about. Residents have always 4 been told the floodway was never operated above 5 natural and this document by the province proves 6 that. 7 I would also like you to go to -- this 8 is out of the EIS -- further to my baseline 9 argument, on page 19 of section 8, and apparently 10 it is after the fourth bullet. There is the 11 passage in there, 12 "Although the existing floodway can 13 pass a maximum of a 225 year flood, it 14 is not reliable due to submerged 15 bridges and inadequate freeboard on 16 the West Dyke." 17 What I have come to understand, Mr. Sargeant, is 18 this proves that the MFA baseline of 778 was 19 simply impossible in 1997, and not even possible 20 today, because no engineer would operate to that 21 level and risk a veritable tsunami going through 22 Winnipeg. 778 today was just a number that was 23 contemplated in a severe emergency. 24 Because the MFA used the theoretical, 25 never attained, never studied elevation of 778 at 02098 1 the inlet as the baseline for the environmental 2 studies, even for the so-called cumulative effects 3 assessment in the EIS, our experiences which are 4 based largely on elevation 771.5, in the flood of 5 the century, have been trivialized. We believed 6 that the 778-foot level could never be reached 7 without the enhancements made since '97 that were 8 never looked at from an environmental perspective. 9 Elevation 771.5 is the highest level ever 10 attained. To use a level six and a half feet 11 higher than the flood of the century as the 12 baseline for the EIS is completely unjustifiable 13 and unacceptable. 14 In 1997, many of our properties, 15 lives, and relationships were devastated when 16 elevations at the inlet control structure were 17 raised to 771.5. Yet the EIS says nothing about 18 what damages might be at 773, 775, 777. These are 19 levels that to upstream residents are beyond 20 comprehension. Rather the EIS is based on the 21 fantasy that at 778, upstream residents ought to 22 be relieved and thankful for the bigger ditch, 23 since we won't be any worse off than we would be 24 with the existing floodway. 25 And the CEC has been asked to buy into 02099 1 this fantasy and weigh impacts at 778, with no 2 quantification of impacts below a level that I 3 repeat is six and a half feet higher than the 4 flood of the century. 5 It is important for the CEC and 6 residents of Winnipeg to understand that the 7 Ritchot Concerned Citizens Committee is not 8 opposed to flood protection for Winnipeg. We 9 understand better than most the concept of 10 sacrifice for the greater good. All we are asking 11 is to be treated openly, honestly, and fairly, 12 which I'm sorry to say would be a striking 13 departure from our past experiences. 14 We are not the only ones disagreeing 15 with the baseline, as these hearings have shown. 16 Indeed, all funded intervenors met with Federal 17 Government representatives and Mr. Larry Strachan 18 from Manitoba Conservation, July 21, '04 and 19 October 5th, '04. The purpose of those meetings, 20 which were well documented, was to express 21 intervenors' concerns regarding the narrow 22 definition of environmental effects and baseline 23 used by MFA. 24 In fact, at the October 5th meeting, 25 all intervenors were so concerned they unanimously 02100 1 asked that the proposed project be reviewed by an 2 independent Federal panel. The project 3 administration team, PAT, completed its review of 4 the EIS November 1, '04. And it is of great 5 concern to our committee that the PAT, even though 6 it was by that time fully aware of intervenors 7 concerns, would say that the PAT generally concurs 8 with the assessment approach outlined in the EIS. 9 After reviewing the responses by MFA 10 to information requests, it is apparent other 11 intervenors have the same or similar concerns as 12 we do. And we noted even the CEC also asked many 13 of the same questions. On the one hand this is 14 encouraging because it shows that CEC and others 15 are aware of the problems Ritchot residents will 16 face. On the other hand, however, a large number 17 of information requests resulted in responses 18 which were, to paraphrase -- sorry, but that 19 concern or issue does not fall into the tiny 20 basket for concerns or issues that meet MFA's 21 interpretation of environmental effects of the 22 project, or don't worry about that, just believe 23 us when we say that you will be treated fairly, 24 even though we cannot provide any details, or 25 plans, or procedures, or timetables, or any 02101 1 specific information whatsoever about how such 2 fair treatment will be achieved. 3 Our committee believes the most 4 effective arguments regarding the interpretation 5 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act are 6 made in submissions by the North Richot Action 7 Committee and by Health Canada. We would 8 especially ask the CEC to consider these 9 submissions carefully. 10 I would like to give you a brief 11 history of Ritchot and the Red River Floodway. 12 One cannot properly assess the socio-economic 13 impacts of the project without some background on 14 the RM of Ritchot before any manmade flood 15 prevention measures were in place. And as well 16 the original intent and history of the Red River 17 floodway has to be examined. 18 The RM of Ritchot has a rich history 19 that developed just as early as Winnipeg's, and 20 our committee has found no documentation to 21 indicate that it was any more or less prone to 22 flooding than the City of Winnipeg. We asked MFA, 23 this in our interrogatory number 39, and they 24 essentially agreed. This is something that has 25 bothered us since 1997. Residents were told, you 02102 1 shouldn't live in the flood prone area, you built 2 too low. Ritchot was not any lower or more prone 3 to flooding than the City of Winnipeg. First 4 person interviews with long term residents 5 upstream from the inlet control structure confirm 6 this. Many of the people we interviewed still 7 live on land inherited from families that 8 originally settled there before Manitoba was a 9 province. Their recollections are clear and 10 unanimous, the RM of Ritchot was never more prone 11 to flooding than Winnipeg. The area upstream from 12 the inlet control structure never had frequent 13 flooding events until after construction of the 14 Red River floodway. 15 The floodway concept was originally 16 recommended by the Manning Royal Commission in 17 1958. The concept was fairly simple, a giant 18 ditch to allow excess water to flow around 19 Winnipeg. The Commission never considered 20 environmental effects or the socio-economic 21 effects of upstream artificial flooding as there 22 were to be none. 23 The existing floodway was constructed 24 between 1962 and 1968. It was more than just a 25 giant ditch, it included gates to limit the Red 02103 1 River flow through Winnipeg and to force some of 2 the water into the ditch. 3 The existing floodway was first 4 operated in the spring of 1969. Unknown to 5 upstream residents, this operation altered our 6 futures forever. 7 In response to our interrogatory 8 number 46, the MFA revealed that artificial 9 flooding occurred the very first time the floodway 10 was operated to the extent of .9 feet. It is 11 extremely important for the CEC to note this 12 because it is so typical of the experiences of 13 upstream residents. And apparently this set the 14 pattern for the next 35 years. In spite of the 15 countless letters, numerous meetings with 16 technical people and politicians, access to 17 information requests, legal challenges, and all of 18 the rest that we have been forced to endure, this 19 response to our information requests provided in 20 late 2004 is the very first time upstream 21 residents have been told that artificial flooding 22 occurred in 1969. 23 In July 1969, immediately after the 24 first operation of the floodway, Canada asked 25 Manitoba to provide a program of operation as per 02104 1 the original construction agreement. The record 2 shows that Manitoba did not provide the requested 3 program of operation until over a year later in 4 August of 1970. And Canada didn't approve it. 5 Indeed, it was not until April 26, 6 2001, that the Honourable David Anderson, Minister 7 of the Environment, provided the first ever 8 Federal approval for the program of operation, 39 9 years after the 1962 construction and maintenance 10 agreement, and 32 years after Ritchot residents 11 experienced the first artificial flooding. 12 Between 1969 and 2001 there were eight 13 years in which artificial flooding occurred, as 14 per our interrogatory number 46. Over this same 15 period, Ritchot residents were consistently told 16 that the floodway is never operated beyond natural 17 levels, in response to any concerns expressed to 18 the contrary. 19 Over the years operations have been 20 changed to benefit the City of Winnipeg with 21 resulting negative impacts on upstream residents. 22 For example, summer operations were ordered by the 23 province in 2002 and 2004. These actions were 24 outside of any rules of operation and resulted in 25 considerable stress and financial loss to upstream 02105 1 residents. 2 Mr. Chairman, I have only scratched 3 the surface of a very ugly history, a harmless 4 diversion ditch with no impacts whatsoever that 5 has grown into a project that forced artificial 6 flooding on thousands of unsuspecting upstream 7 residents, until in 1997 the induced artificial 8 flooding became so severe as to cause the total 9 destruction of hundreds of upstream homes and 10 businesses, and inflicted long term health and 11 other socio-economic effects permanently on 12 upstream area residents. 13 Now that I have given you a brief 14 history of Ritchot before it flooded any worse 15 than Winnipeg, I would refer the Commission to the 16 charts that I handed out this morning, and I will 17 show you how a harmless diversion ditch has grown 18 into a destructive dam. 19 Mr. Sargeant, members of the 20 Commission, these charts are from the EIS 21 supplementary filing and they are from annex E, 22 water surface elevations. These are just black 23 and white copies. They are clear and in colour in 24 the EIS. These charts show the water surface 25 elevations for various flood events under calm 02106 1 conditions, that is no allowance for wind setup or 2 wave action. What I have done is pull five of 3 them out to examine, as they give us a really good 4 picture of what will happen in Ritchot for a 700 5 year flood event. What I have done is highlight 6 the 700 year level and the ring dyke elevation for 7 five ring dyke communities starting at the 8 Turnbull Drive dyke and moving upstream to 9 Ste. Agathe. I have taken the 700 year level and 10 added three feet for freeboard, for wind setup and 11 wave action. I chose three feet instead of the 12 standard two feet because these are ring dyke 13 communities and I feel that's a minimum safe 14 freeboard. 15 I then subtracted that new level from 16 the current ring dyke elevation to see how much 17 these dykes would have to be increased to have at 18 least a reasonable protection in a 700 year flood. 19 The figure I came up with is in red at the top of 20 each page. 21 And if you follow me so far, I would 22 like to just review them quickly with you. The 23 first one, the Turnbull Drive dyke, if they wanted 24 to stay safe in a 700 year flood would have to 25 raise their current protection 10 feet. That's 02107 1 not possible with that dyke, it is too close to 2 the river and it is too close to the homes. 3 Grande Pointe has a new dyke, a newly 4 constructed ring dyke. That dyke for a 700 year 5 event is 6.7 feet too low. And I'm not familiar 6 with it, it might be able to be raised that much. 7 There may be homes too close. 8 St. Adolphe for a 700 year flood has 9 to be raised almost 7 feet. I know that cannot be 10 done. There are homes too close to go that high, 11 and in some cases it is too close to the river. 12 Niverville has to come up 6.1 feet, 13 and Ste. Agathe, who we all watched go under in 14 1997, could well happen again, they have to go up 15 almost 4 feet. 16 Mr. Chairman, my point in reviewing 17 these charts is to show you the devastation that 18 will occur in Ritchot when elevations 778 is held 19 at the inlet. Over 2,000 homes could be lost 20 affecting 5,000 residents, hundreds of farms and 21 businesses go under. Ile des Chenes, which has 22 never flooded, goes under. You simply cannot 23 possibly flood proof to the insane levels that I 24 have shown you on these charts. 25 There is a promise by the province to 02108 1 increase these dykes in an emergency. However, 2 even if there was no rain or snow to prevent heavy 3 equipment from working, it is physically 4 impossible in most cases as the dykes are too 5 close to buildings or the river or other 6 obstructions to go that high. MFA says these 7 levels will be rare events. We question that. If 8 it is so rare, why are we bothering to expand the 9 floodway? 10 Mr. Gilroy, in his opening remarks 11 said there was a 37 per cent chance in the next 50 12 years of a big flood. Our risks are a lot greater 13 than that. It has been 179 years since the 1826 14 flood. We are due for a big one. 15 As you can see from these charts, even 16 a 225 year flood would sacrifice most of Ritchot. 17 If you look about the middle of the page for the 18 225 year flood, expanded floodway, and quickly 19 flip through, now those are the ring dyke towns 20 which are generally a bit higher than the 21 individual flood protection. The individuals 22 living outside of those towns are even more 23 susceptible. 24 But, Mr. Chairman, there is even more 25 uncertainty to add to this. I would like to read 02109 1 you something from our interrogatory number 22. 2 Interrogatory number 22, our question is, please 3 provide a detailed description of data collection, 4 use of computer models, operation related 5 communications, and operational decision making 6 during a flood event. In the description, please 7 explain how the natural rating curve is used. 8 Please advise whether the natural rating curve is 9 adjusted in any way during a flood event, or 10 whether judgments are ever made to depart from it 11 to account for no known differences between actual 12 events that are unfolding and the assumptions and 13 uncertainties studied and quantified in its 14 derivation. Complicated question. All I want to 15 refer to is the end of it. 16 At the end of it they say the natural 17 rating curve is not adjusted during the flood, it 18 is applied directly. The only time when the 19 natural rating curve cannot be used is when the 20 river levels are affected by ice. However, ice is 21 normally gone at the inlet structure by the time 22 floodway operation commences. So this is not an 23 issue. 24 It is a huge issue, Mr. Chairman. All 25 big floods have very thick ice and very thick ice 02110 1 tends to jam. It was a huge issue in 1997 and ice 2 did jam the floodway. 1826, the ice was 3 especially thick. What I'm trying to say here is 4 in any flood year an ice jam can block the 5 floodway entrance. It happened in 1997, and as a 6 result the inlet level rose over 10 feet in about 7 12 hours, in the dark of the night while we all 8 slept. We woke up to roads under water. We 9 couldn't get stuff in or out. 10 Now with the ability to hold 778 at 11 the inlet, an ice jam hugely increases Ritchot's 12 chances of experiencing devastating flood levels. 13 And there is still more uncertainty to throw into 14 this whole mix, there are the effects of the West 15 Dyke. 16 Can I read something from 768's 17 submission, even though they haven't presented 18 yet? 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Briefly. 20 MR. STARR: It is very brief. This is 21 from Green Mountain Hydrotech, 768 Association's 22 submission on the effects of the West Dyke. 23 "The full effect of the West Dyke 24 extension starting from the pre-April 25 '97 condition to the future proposed 02111 1 design may have significant effects on 2 flood levels locally and over a wider 3 area during extreme flood events such 4 as the 700 year flood, but this does 5 not appear to have been tested by any 6 modeling to date." 7 So we have got the ice jams, we have got the West 8 Dyke. And then Green Mountain Hydrotech also 9 talks about the modeling uncertainties. 10 "There is a concern that the Mike-2 11 model would not be able to simulate 12 water levels nearly as accurately as 13 the Telemac model. The main reason 14 for this is Mike-2 is a one 15 dimensional model and is not as well 16 suited to simulate flows across the 17 regular flood plain surface as a two 18 dimensional model such as Telemac 2D." 19 So there is the ice jams, the West Dyke, modeling 20 uncertainties. 21 Mr. Chairman, the effects from 22 artificial flooding in Ritchot are going to be 23 horrible. However, as we discussed in the EIS, 24 the effects of artificial flooding are felt -- 25 sorry, as we discovered in the EIS, the effects of 02112 1 artificial flooding are felt as far south as 2 possibly the U.S. border. We raised this question 3 with MFA in a phone call, December 10, '04. 4 Mr. Doug McNeil responded December 22, '04, and 5 also copied CEC. I will read you first the 6 paragraph that triggered our question and then Mr. 7 McNeil's reply. 8 This is from page 7-1 in the 9 supplementary filing of the EIS. The paragraph 10 that triggered our question is, 11 "The one in 700 year flood level will 12 be 6.5 feet higher than the 1997 peak 13 level immediately upstream of the 14 floodway inlet control structure and 15 tapering to approximately 1.7 feet for 16 the reach of the Red River between 17 Aubigny and Emerson. Many of the 18 community's homes and businesses 19 between Aubigny and Emerson have 20 permanent flood protection that may be 21 sufficient in a one in 700 year level, 22 and if not, additional flood 23 protection measures, whether temporary 24 or permanent, may be required." 25 So this paragraph is the first time we 02113 1 have seen any indication of artificial flooding 2 going further south than just beyond Ste. Agathe. 3 So we had to ask MFA the question, does it 4 actually go all of the way to the U.S. border? 5 I will read from Mr. McNeil's response 6 December 22nd. 7 "When the water level at the inlet 8 control structure is at 778 during a 9 one in 700 year flood event, for 10 either the existing or the expanded, 11 there is the same small amount of 12 artificial flooding at Aubigny 13 tapering to no artificial flooding at 14 Emerson. More specifically, the 15 artificial flooding amounts to .3 feet 16 at Aubigny, .6 feet at Morris, and 17 .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste, and no 18 artificial flooding at Letellier and 19 Emerson." 20 Mr. Chairman, members of the 21 Commission, Mr. McNeil's response raises some 22 very, very large questions. Number one, as the 23 EIS has not studied the effects of the West Dyke, 24 as I showed you, or ice jams, or almost anything 25 upstream, and there is a margin of error in all of 02114 1 the artificial calculations, and as 768 2 Association expert states that a two dimensional 3 model would be more accurate, how can we be 100 4 per cent certain that in a 700 year flood with 778 5 at the inlet that we are not artificially flooding 6 into the U.S.? 7 From Mr. McNeil's response, we have to 8 assume that .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste doesn't 9 just stop there, it would have to taper out to 10 nothing at Letellier -- this is only about ten 11 miles from the U.S. border. Leaving the U.S. 12 question behind, I'm more concerned that the flood 13 study region is not large enough. I stand to be 14 corrected, but I believe there was no public open 15 houses held south of Ste. Agathe, and I see nobody 16 registered at these hearings from south of 17 Ste. Agathe. 18 We are very concerned that a large 19 upstream population is not aware of the artificial 20 flooding they will face. Because the Indian 21 Reserve Number 2, Roseau River, is right in the 22 middle of the .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste, and no 23 artificial flooding at Letellier, are they 24 affected? It is crucial for all upstream 25 residents to know if they are affected by 02115 1 artificial flooding. 2 Obviously, more upstream studies are 3 required so that the cumulative effects of the 4 West Dyke and all other contributing factors are 5 considered. Detailed inundation charts for 6 upstream areas need to be done as they were for 7 downstream. I would suggest a detailed colour map 8 for the areas affected by artificial flooding 9 similar to the one done by the '98 Water 10 Commission. This map shows very clearly right 11 down to .1-foot, and that is what is needed, I can 12 assure you, because my home was lost in '97 by 13 about that amount of water. I will show you that 14 later in a photo. The map should also show 15 clearly the margin of error for the artificial 16 levels. 17 We note the margin of error at the 18 inlet for approximately a 700 year flood is minus 19 1.0 to plus 0.8. This is a range of almost two 20 feet of uncertainty. Now I remind you about 21 .1-foot put my house under. We do not know what 22 the margin of error is further upstream. For 23 example, if we take .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste 24 how much margin of error do we add to that? If 25 the Red River Floodway Act is to look after all of 02116 1 these people, they need to know this, and they 2 need to know exactly how far upstream this 3 artificial flooding goes. 4 It is very disturbing to see that 5 there are no damage calculations done for 6 artificial flooding upstream. As the province has 7 promised to pay 100 per cent of these costs, you 8 wonder if they have any idea what they are getting 9 into. So I went out on a limb, Mr. Chair, and I 10 did some very rough calculations, but don't hold 11 me to it, they are very rough, but somebody has to 12 give you an idea of what we are looking at here. 13 So for a 700 year flood, 778 at the 14 inlet, there are 2,000 homes in Ritchot that could 15 go under. I know that there has got to be 2,000 16 homes between Ste. Agathe and St. Jean Baptiste, 17 so we have got 4,000 homes. And I know something 18 about the damages from '97, so I took 4,000 homes 19 at 250,000 for building and contents, it comes to 20 $1 billion. 21 Now, let's add in the municipal 22 buildings, the churches, the community centres, 23 the commercial buildings, the agricultural 24 buildings, and of course all of the contents of 25 these various buildings, and then there is the 02117 1 business losses which are promised to be covered 2 in the Floodway Act. My guess, but it is kind of 3 an educated guess, is that we are at a potential 4 $2 billion cost easy. 5 Now, remember, we have got a 37 per 6 cent chance in the next 50 years of this 7 happening, and an ice jam could greatly increase 8 those chances. How is the province going to pay 9 this? Are we really doing the right thing with 10 this floodway expansion, or should we look at the 11 billion dollar so-called third option? 12 Of course we can not begin to put a 13 dollar value on the social costs that would 14 result, Mr. Chairman, these are only monetary 15 costs. However, I will give you a good idea of 16 how devastating those social costs can be later. 17 I will now take you back to our main 18 presentation, and I'm starting at a section called 19 section 3, mistrust of all governments. 20 The lack of evident consideration for 21 upstream interests, as I have just shown you, is 22 breathtaking. The lack of openness by the 23 province forced upstream residents to raise their 24 own money and retain our own independent experts 25 to get honest answers in 1997. Following the 02118 1 flood in '97, Water Resources advised upstream 2 residents that there had been a few inches of 3 artificial flooding. The Premier at the time, 4 Gary Filmon, is on record as saying that as a 5 trained professional engineer specializing in 6 hydrology, he was convinced that operation of the 7 floodway did not cause upstream damages. 8 On September 9, '97, the North Ritchot 9 Restoration Committee, I was chair at the time, 10 hired the firm Charles Howard & Associates to 11 conduct an independent review of the '97 flood. 12 We were the first ones to do this as we wanted 13 honest answers. Residents had long suspected the 14 province was not telling the truth. It was not an 15 easy thing, Mr. Chairman, in 1997 to raise money 16 from flood damaged people in order to hire Chuck 17 Howard. 18 The Howard report concluded that 19 levels upstream of the floodway inlet may have 20 been as much as three and a half feet above 21 natural. 22 Finally, in June of '98 the Manitoba 23 Water Commission admitted up to 2.1 feet of 24 artificial flooding, and then introduced another 25 very important aspect that had not been previously 02119 1 admitted, uncertainty. A study by Klohn-Krippen 2 upon which the Manitoba Water Commission based its 3 figures stated that the calculations were subject 4 to an error of plus or minus .5 feet. 5 In view of experiences such as these 6 over the past 43 years, I hope that the Commission 7 can begin to understand why residents of Ritchot 8 have developed a strong mistrust of both the 9 Provincial and Federal Governments. This is not 10 healthy, it affects our members mental health, 11 even municipal politics, and is preventing 12 residents of the RM of Ritchot from participating 13 fully, as a healthy population should, in everyday 14 life as a Canadian citizen. 15 The total lack of consideration for 16 upstream residents who sacrificed their homes and 17 health in '97 to save Winnipeg, and who ultimately 18 will have to do so again, is appalling. The level 19 of mistrust for Government must be alleviated by 20 allowing all concerns, past, present, and future, 21 to be addressed in the environmental assessment 22 process for floodway expansion. 23 Aspects of flood proofing programs 24 provide a very good example of the lack of 25 consideration for upstream residents. In May of 02120 1 1997, Canada and Manitoba committed to an 2 agreement titled the 1997 "Red River Valley Flood 3 Proofing and Dyke Enhancement," which was 4 originally signed in March of '98. The program 5 was universally applied in the Red River Valley, 6 but did not recognize the upstream area that is 7 subject to artificial flooding. The upstream 8 residents in the RM of Ritchot, outside of town 9 dykes, are the ones that will surely be sacrificed 10 again to save Winnipeg, yet these residents are 11 the only ones in Ritchot being saddled with long 12 term debt of flood proofing deductible and costs 13 that far exceeded the maximum covered by the 14 program. In essence, these residents are being 15 forced to flood proof high enough so they can 16 withstand the artificial flooding that will keep 17 Winnipeg dry, largely at their own expense. 18 Our committee is and has always been 19 committed to working with Canada and Manitoba to 20 address Ritchot's concerns in a clear, transparent 21 process. We would really like to believe that 22 Canada and Manitoba are equally committed, but we 23 have not yet seen one single shred of evidence 24 that this is the case. 25 Now I'm at section 4, our 02121 1 socio-economic effects of artificial flooding in 2 1997. As victims of the 1997 flood, members of 3 our committee are all too familiar with the 4 socio-economic impacts of natural flooding versus 5 artificial flooding. Hundreds of families in 6 Ritchot lost entire homes or experienced severe 7 damage as a result of artificial flooding in '97. 8 I would remind the CEC again that this 9 occurred at elevation 771.5 and that the EIS 10 baseline is 778. While the EIS touches on some of 11 the socio-economic impacts generally associated 12 with flooding, it does not adequately address the 13 issues arising from artificial flooding, nor does 14 it contain the results of any studies on long term 15 effects. 16 These, and some of our other key 17 concerns, are extremely well documented in the 18 Health Canada response to the EIS dated 19 October 15, 2004. I won't repeat them, but I 20 would really strongly urge the CEC to read it. It 21 is only about six pages. 22 Rather, I thought it would be helpful 23 to provide some more personal insights into some 24 of the initial and ongoing socio-economic impacts 25 from the '97 flood. 02122 1 Many homes in Ritchot were lost by 2 mere inches. Many men have related to me the 3 sense of failure and guilt they will carry with 4 them forever as they blame themselves for the loss 5 of irreplaceable family items, and the resulting 6 trauma and upheaval that their families went 7 through in rebuilding. I have personally heard 8 words from many men in the community to this 9 effect. My last words to my wife and kids as they 10 were evacuated were, don't worry, I will keep the 11 house dry. These men feel that they failed their 12 families. However, they fought with one hand tied 13 behind their backs because they did not know about 14 the artificial flooding. However, they still feel 15 they failed their families. And I can attest to 16 the mental health, mood disorders, substance 17 abuse, and failed marriages resulting from this. 18 Women, as the health guardians of the 19 family, seemed to suffer the most. Some of the 20 men, feeling defeated by the artificial flooding, 21 buried themselves in their jobs, leaving their 22 wives to cope with family issues and contractors 23 in the rebuilding process. I personally sat down 24 with couples and tried to explain to the husband 25 that he was leaving too much for his wife to 02123 1 handle. I was not trained at all to do this, but 2 residents seemed to feel more comfortable with me 3 than the province's trauma team, again, perhaps 4 because of their feelings of deep mistrust. 5 In addition to uncertainties in the 6 calculations of artificial flooding, as mentioned 7 earlier, there are other levels of uncertainty 8 that flowed into the lives of upstream residents 9 along with the 1997 flood of the century. 10 For more than a year after the moment 11 that I finally realized that my house would be 12 lost, I was completely uncertain as to the cause 13 of the flooding, and for much longer than a year, 14 whether and to what extent I would be compensated. 15 That is real stress -- if I would be compensated 16 at all, and I say that's real stress. 17 The EIS barely touches on this, and in 18 fact notes that many of the socio-economic impacts 19 of artificial flooding are worse than natural 20 flooding, but then it dismisses it because the 21 delays, bureaucracy, stonewalling and cover-up are 22 not a direct effect of the project. 23 Professors Karen Grant and Nancy 24 Higget (ph) of the University of Manitoba were 25 interviewing women in the Red River Valley in 02124 1 1998. Their early results indicated post 2 traumatic stress disorder, depression, and marital 3 stress. And there is no reference to this at all 4 in the EIS. 5 The level of stress and anxiety for 6 upstream residents arising out of their dealings 7 with the Manitoba Emergency Measures Organization 8 is well documented. The irony of severe stress 9 and anxiety caused by the very organization that 10 was supposed to help flooded residents and thereby 11 relieve their stress and anxiety seems to have 12 escaped Provincial officials. Eventually, the 13 problems were so serious that the organization now 14 known as EMO became the subject of an Ernst & 15 Young report. However, volume 2 of the report has 16 not been made public, although we understand that 17 a few of its recommendations may have been 18 implemented. 19 Our committee has not seen evidence of 20 any changes at EMO, but even so we are now told to 21 accept the assurances in the EIS that everything 22 is just fine, and we should have no worries about 23 EMO administering the standard DFA program as well 24 as the proposed Red River Floodway Act. 25 Again, the fact that volume 2 of the 02125 1 Ernst & Young report and any follow-up reports 2 have not been shared does nothing to overcome the 3 feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Our 4 experience leaves us with no alternative. 5 It is the long term effects of the 6 artificial flooding that are most troublesome. 7 Residents are suffering long term health effects, 8 some for life, from asthma, mental health problems 9 and severe exhaustion. Long term debt incurred 10 directly as a result of uncompensated losses 11 suffered from the '97 flood is causing many stress 12 related health effects. Many residents have lost 13 any hope of retirement or vacations as they 14 struggle with second mortgages, flood proofing 15 loans, and increased taxes on the new homes that 16 replaced the ones that were destroyed. 17 Mr. Chairman, many don't realize most 18 of us have two mortgages, one on the home that's 19 buried done below, and another mortgage on the new 20 home. Just because the home was flooded and 21 destroyed, the bank didn't say we didn't have to 22 pay the mortgage. So a lot of us have two. 23 The cumulative effects of all of the 24 above combined to affect many of the residents and 25 their ability to cope with their jobs. Owners of 02126 1 small to medium businesses were especially hard 2 hit as their homes and source of income were 3 destroyed at the same time. Some businesses have 4 gone bankrupt, others will never recover, as the 5 owners have lost their creative energy. For some, 6 the most productive earning years of their life 7 have been stolen from them by the artificial 8 flooding, and there is simply not enough years 9 left, if you are in your 50s, to replenish lost 10 retirement funds. 11 There is stress and concern over the 12 property value of their new homes. The studies 13 quoted in the EIS are not comparable to our 14 situation. They are done in the States and they 15 are not artificial flooding. 16 Unsuspecting residents that put 17 retirement funds into rebuilding in 1997, based on 18 assurances from the province that their new houses 19 were in compliance with all flood related 20 criteria, are sure to have their property values 21 eroded by the fact, only publicly admitted in 22 2004, that they now live in an area subject to 23 artificial flooding. Our very flood proofing 24 hills and dykes serve as a giant buyer beware 25 sign. 02127 1 Artificial flooding has changed the 2 esthetics of our community forever. I note in the 3 EIS, when they talk about trying to raise some of 4 the dyking within the City of Winnipeg, that a 5 real concern is the esthetics will be ruined and 6 there will be objections to the two feet or so 7 that will have to be raised. I will show you in a 8 minute some of the pictures of our area, Mr. 9 Chairman, and really our area has been destroyed. 10 The local flood proofing has really 11 scarred the landscape with hills and dykes that 12 are dangerous and impossible to maintain. The 13 hundreds of deep ponds that are a result of our 14 building hills and dykes are mosquito breeding 15 grounds, and worse they are a very real source of 16 drowning danger to pets, children and wildlife. 17 At this point I would like to refer 18 you to our black binder of documents and I will 19 just refer you to some photos. Just going through 20 these quickly, Mr. Chairman, pictures one and two 21 of these pictures are all of my house. You can 22 see how just an inch can be the difference. This 23 is where the water came over my dyke in '97. What 24 you are seeing actually is about a week after the 25 water came over, so there is some erosion. That 02128 1 water came over only by about an inch and then 2 eroded. So that little spot you see there did my 3 whole house in. So when we talk about .3 feet in 4 St. Jean Baptiste and how far does it go, it is 5 very critical. Pictures three and four is the 6 home during the '97 flood. What I want to show 7 you is a pond. There is a very large picture of a 8 pond. This is the pond that we had to dig to 9 get -- 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Which number is that? 11 MR. STARR: It is number nine. So 12 photo number nine is about a two acre pond, this 13 pond is not full yet, but it is 40 feet deep. 14 Directly behind this pond are a couple on the 15 right side with a day care, and I don't have the 16 money to fence in this big pond, but we have 17 already lost wildlife. My neighbour has lost a 18 pet. And it is a very real concern. 19 These ponds are everywhere. If you 20 look to the right, you will see a little bit of 21 water in one corner. Literally every home has one 22 of these ponds, so it is a real source of concern. 23 If you look at some of the before and 24 after pictures, 10 and 11 compared to 12 and 13, 25 you can see some of the devastation. Particularly 02129 1 what I want to show you is the mold in number 12. 2 Mold was a huge problem in '97, so huge that the 3 province developed a mold team, and you could even 4 have a second EMO claim if you had mold. Many 5 houses were actually redone twice, some even a 6 year or more later. But the mold is very evident, 7 you can see more of the evidence as we go through 8 here. 9 If you take -- when I talk about the 10 esthetics of our community, if we look at 14 and 11 15 compared to 18, 19, you can see where the 12 bulldozer is having to take down dozens of 30, 13 40-foot blue spruce that I had because the flood 14 proofing hill went right to the edges of our 15 property. 16 Finally, what we end up with, photo 17 number 21, I think you saw the yard that we had 18 before. Now we have got this clay mound, it is 19 highly compacted, we can't grow anything on it. 20 It runs from one side of our property to the 21 other. We can't drive our vehicles to the back, 22 to the pond you saw in the back, I can't get 23 vehicles back there. 24 So everyone, including MFA, seems to 25 make a big deal of this wonderful flood proofing 02130 1 program, but it is no picnic living on these 2 hills. Getting up them in the winter is no fun, 3 and they are even dangerous for the emergency 4 vehicles. I believe that the RM is putting 5 winches on some of the fire trucks because of 6 these hills. 7 These clay hills, like I said, are 8 horrible to try and grow anything on. What this 9 means is that the mature trees we all lost as they 10 were cleared for flood proofing can pretty well 11 never be replaced. This damage to the natural 12 environment is very depressing for residents who 13 moved here for the natural beauty of the area. 14 Not only are they suffering financially, they 15 don't even recognize the community that they live 16 in anymore. 17 The economics of future development in 18 Ritchot is severely hampered by artificial 19 flooding. The restrictions imposed by the 20 province since '97 and the huge cost of flood 21 proofing will stop any meaningful development. 22 Our committee can only wonder at the 23 lost economic prospects for Ritchot, which 24 prospered before artificial flooding. We watch 25 booming new developments in Lorette, Headingley, 02131 1 La Salle, Stonewall, Stony Mountain, and we 2 understand why the same sort of development is not 3 happening in Ritchot. Many families, some of them 4 my neighbors with large tracts of farm land in 5 Ritchot, closer to the city than these other new 6 developments, have watched their dreams of 7 financial security vanish as prospective 8 developers shun the area. The EIS denies all such 9 impacts. 10 Where we live, quite close, about two 11 kilometres from the floodgates, neighbors on both 12 sides of us have large tracts of land that run 13 from the Red River west to LaBarriere Park, if you 14 are familiar with that, very beautiful property, 15 and now they can't do anything with it. I would 16 say closer, more beautiful and bigger than the 17 Waverley West development -- so you can imagine 18 the kind of losses they have taken. All they can 19 do is farm it now. 20 Following the '97 artificial flooding, 21 mold caused long term health effects in many 22 residents. Again, not mentioned in the EIS. Many 23 residents now suffer from asthma and other 24 respiratory problems. There is no doubt that some 25 will develop emphysema, chronic obstructive 02132 1 pulmonary disease, their lives will be impaired 2 and they will be shortened. 3 Unsettled claims and lawsuits have 4 caused horrible socio-economic impacts to some of 5 the people upstream of the inlet control structure 6 that were affected by artificial flooding in '97. 7 A claim filed by 22 parties, including 47 8 individuals and businesses, is one I will comment 9 on because I was part of the original claim. 10 Most, if not all of these claimants 11 lived immediately upstream of the inlet and took 12 the full brunt of the artificial flooding and 13 resulting velocity of the flood waters. The 14 claimants fought hard and many were sacrificed by 15 mere inches. Some homes originally thought 16 salvageable were uninhabitable due to mold that 17 eventually developed. The claimants did not sue 18 frivolously, they were forced to do so as a result 19 of huge losses, and a province that would not deal 20 with them. 21 The province promised to address 22 outstanding issues from 1997, and has not. The 23 province promised to investigate a shameful 24 mediation process, and has not. This is the same 25 province that we are to trust for future 02133 1 compensation. 2 I would like to refer you to the 3 supporting documents again, and I'm going to read 4 you an exchange between Minister Ashton and Maxine 5 Clifton in the minutes from the legislature from 6 the reading of bill 23, the Floodway Act. 7 It is a little difficult to find, 8 there are a lot of pages there, but it is only a 9 few sentences. I'm on page 1946 of those minutes. 10 Do you want me to go ahead and read it? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 12 MR. STARR: This is Minister Ashton 13 speaking. 14 "One thing I do want to assure you is 15 we did take the initiative recently of 16 putting in place a mediation process 17 which did result, I know, in some 18 settlements. There are still some 19 ongoing concerns about the process 20 that was put in place. I know you had 21 not contacted me on this...", 22 he is speaking to Maxine Clifton by the way, 23 "...but some other people had who were 24 part of the process. I do not know if 25 this is your view or not, but I was 02134 1 asked to review the mediation process. 2 We will be doing that as well in 3 addition to the process that did take 4 place with Justice Nurgitz. I do want 5 to indicate that I have given the 6 undertaking to look at the mediation 7 process. I know at least one claim, 8 and even though they did sign, I 9 believe, a settlement, they felt there 10 were problems. So we are going to 11 take a look at the process itself, 12 because it was intended to try and see 13 if there was some way outside of the 14 court process." 15 Now that was June 26, '05. Nothing 16 has been done with that at all. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: '04. 18 MR. STARR: Sorry, '04. Mrs. Clifton 19 in response says this. 20 "The mediation was an underhanded 21 attack. There was no mediation. 22 Judge Nurgitz freely admitted that he 23 did not have a chance to mediate or 24 act as a judge. Half of the claimants 25 out of our group were bullied into 02135 1 accepting a single digit settlement. 2 The rest of us could not do that. 3 That is all I will say." 4 And then Paul Clifton after that says, 5 "We are talking about a legislated 6 right to take my rights away, to take 7 judicial review through the courts." 8 He is talking about the Floodway Act, and then he 9 says he is going to go into more detail where 10 Maxine is not. 11 "Under this judicially assisted 12 mediation, there were ten families 13 that were brutalized by the Province 14 of Manitoba. They were offered the 15 thought, if you settle now we will not 16 charge you costs. They took these 17 folks with an aggregate loss of 18 2.4 million, and out of the ten 19 families they pieced up 365,000. On 20 average that is about 10 per cent of 21 their loss, and they were forced to 22 sign a confidentiality agreement that 23 they could not even tell their mother 24 that they were brutalized by the 25 province." 02136 1 The reason for me reading you that is 2 to show you the broken promises, to show you we 3 tried but we can't seem to trust the province. We 4 have had promises for separate consultation on 5 compensation. It didn't happen. Promises for 6 separate consultations on summer operations, never 7 happened. Promises to settle things from '97. 8 As I know most of the 44 claimants 9 personally, I can attest to the following impacts 10 that I believe were directly related to the '97 11 artificial flooding. This may not be a complete 12 accounting because they are only the ones of which 13 I have intimate knowledge. So of the 44 claimants 14 that sued, I want to show you the health effects 15 that they are suffering or have suffered. Because 16 there is no studies done upstream, this is the 17 only little study that there is. Out of the 44 18 claimants, there have been two deaths, one stroke 19 resulting in partial blindness, one attempted 20 suicide, one business bankruptcy, one divorce, two 21 with heart problems, three with high blood 22 pressure, one with auto immune disease, four with 23 severe depression, three with loss of retirement, 24 and six have had their jobs threatened or impacted 25 by the province or affiliate. 02137 1 Three out of this affected group are 2 presenting to you today, Mr. Chairman, and I'm one 3 of them. The impacts on this small group of 4 people were and are severe. Their sacrifice in 5 1997 helped save Winnipeg $7 billion in monetary 6 damages in the avoidance of immeasurable emotional 7 and stress related problems. It is completely 8 beyond me why they are still being hung out to dry 9 by the province and that steps have not been taken 10 to settle these outstanding issues immediately. 11 Surely, this is not what Manning or Roblin 12 envisioned, or what Winnipeggers expect. 13 It is critical to note that this is 14 the only small example of health effects caused by 15 artificial flooding that I can provide, as there 16 are no long term health studies in the EIS. 17 The proposed project will do this 18 again and again and again to people. Section 5 is 19 our comments on summer operation -- am I running 20 too long? 21 THE CHAIRMAN: We are not on a 22 timetable or deadline. 23 MR. STARR: The years 2002 and 2004 24 proved especially stressful for upstream 25 residents. Raising the gates during the summer 02138 1 was contrary to everything that we had ever been 2 told or promised about the floodway and how it 3 would be operated. The socio-economic effects of 4 summer operations were much larger than portrayed 5 in the EIS. Once more this operation served to 6 deepen the mistrust, especially the province. 7 Over night the lives of upstream residents were 8 changed again. All of the uncertainties that we 9 feel before the spring runoff are continued now 10 through summer and fall. And we are now forced to 11 go through claim procedures on almost a year round 12 basis. We all know how stressful these hearings 13 alone can be. We have been going through this for 14 eight years now. 15 Now the NRAC committee before me 16 brought up that we are going to see flooding about 17 80 per cent of the time. We are going to be 18 filling out compensation forms every second year 19 for the rest of our lives. It is ridiculous. 20 To make matters worse, promises made 21 by the province in 2004 to cover all damages from 22 artificial flooding are not being kept. My 23 personal claim with respect to a section of river 24 bank approximately 200 feet by 60 feet was denied 25 without even an inspection. This alone raises 02139 1 concerns about any promised baseline studies for 2 future summer operations. How can a baseline be 3 established for the river bank along my property 4 after this collapse that nobody even bothered to 5 investigate? The mistrust fostered by the summer 6 operations has convinced upstream residents that 7 this was an experiment by the province to observe 8 just how much damage occurs, and to make summer 9 operations part of the existing environment. 10 The Red River Floodway Act is the only 11 measure proposed in the EIS for mitigation or 12 compensation for artificial flooding. Our 13 committee can provide only general comments 14 because the Act contains nothing specific to 15 provide comments about. There are no regulations, 16 procedures, details or guidelines. We believe 17 that granting a licence to develop a project in 18 the absence of any specific plans to mitigate or 19 compensate for intentional upstream flooding would 20 be unprecedented in Canada. 21 Probably about two or three more 22 minutes, Mr. Chairman. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Fine. 24 MR. STARR: The Red River Floodway Act 25 is so full of uncertainties, all slanted in the 02140 1 province's favour, that it must not be proclaimed 2 in its present form. If proclaimed, we believe 3 that the Act will be a source of continuing stress 4 and anxiety for upstream residents, worse than the 5 nightmare of '97 because it requires a distinction 6 between the effects of artificial and natural 7 flooding. 8 In a meeting that I had with Mr. Paul 9 Anderson from EMO, 2004, he agreed when I gave 10 examples that it would be a very difficult program 11 to work with. It is going to be extremely 12 difficult, if you have got three feet of water on 13 your main floor, Mr. Chairman, to try and figure 14 out, with the uncertainties in determining 15 artificial flooding in the first place, where was 16 the artificial flooding, where was the natural 17 flooding? One is covered 100 per cent in the 18 Floodway Act, one you have to pay 20 per cent 19 deductible on. So you can imagine the mess that 20 is going to result in trying to make this Act 21 work. 22 It took the province over seven years 23 to finally admit that the one inch of water that 24 began flowing over a low spot in my dyke, and 25 eventually resulted in the complete destruction of 02141 1 my house, was due to artificial flooding. Now 2 thousands of upstream residents all the way to the 3 U.S. border in some cases will have to sort out 4 questions such as this with the EMO. Will the 5 province always get the benefit of the doubt with 6 regard to the possible range of plus or minus 7 .5 feet or 1.8 feet when it comes to artificial 8 flooding? The cynic in me, rooted firmly in my 9 experience in dealing with this issue, expects 10 myriad technical reports, correspondence and 11 meetings involving engineers, hydrologists, 12 bureaucrats, lawyers, spanning months, if not 13 years, and then finally possibly something saying 14 that, no, there was no artificial flooding. 15 The Health Canada submission supports 16 our view in this regard and asks if legislation 17 such as this is feasible and practical. 18 Our summary: On behalf of our 19 committee, I hope I have just demonstrated to the 20 Commission the socio-economic effects on Ritchot 21 over the past 43 years. The EIS baseline of 778 22 is a farce which glibly permits the exclusion of 23 all of our socio-economic impacts by defining them 24 out of scope for this process. As a result, our 25 committee view is that the EIS is extremely biased 02142 1 towards highlighting benefits at 778 by totally 2 ignoring the serious adverse upstream impacts at 3 this level, and also totally ignoring upstream 4 adverse impacts of more frequent flood events. 5 The facts are, Mr. Chairman, Winnipeg 6 could not be completely saved in 1997, and it 7 cannot be saved in future large floods without 8 depending on Ritchot residents to sacrifice their 9 homes and health in the future. In 1997 we saw 10 hundreds of homes were sacrificed to artificial 11 flooding. In future larger floods, Ritchot is 12 guaranteed to lose thousands of homes, as we can 13 not possibly protect, even the ring dyke 14 communities, to the impossible levels required 15 when the level is held to 778. Lives will most 16 certainly be lost. 17 The effects that we have suffered are 18 real. They are continuing as I speak. These are 19 serious long term adverse effects on the lives of 20 real people, our friends and neighbors. 21 To date these adverse effects appear 22 to have been purposely hidden by Manitoba, and at 23 best, ignored by Canada. They have not been 24 addressed in the EIS or elsewhere. This is 25 shameful and should be embarrassing to both 02143 1 governments, to all Manitobans, and to all 2 Canadians. 3 I asked Mr. Keith Grady of 4 Infrastructure Canada if they had ever licenced a 5 project that is guaranteed to destroy thousands of 6 homes and ruin thousands of lives? His answer was 7 no. 8 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I'm very 9 close to the end. Just before I end, I would ask 10 for your continued understanding when you listen 11 to some of our residents later today and this 12 week. You will hear some very passionate, 13 possibly even angry, presentations from them. You 14 have been very lenient so far. They are still 15 hurting from '97, and some are not physically 16 well. 17 I would like to thank you, Mr. 18 Chairman and Commissioners for your attention, and 19 I would like to say that we will provide you with 20 some very specific recommendations in our closing 21 statements. At this time, we can not possibly 22 support this project as proposed. I hope I have 23 shown you why. Thank you. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Starr. 25 We will put off asking you any questions until 02144 1 after lunch. 2 Just before we break for lunch, I 3 would just like to ask any and all of those 4 individuals who are making presentations this 5 afternoon that copies of the presentation should 6 be delivered to the Commission secretary over the 7 lunch break. There should be at least ten copies 8 for the Environment Commission, a half a dozen for 9 the Floodway Authority, and if at all possible, 10 some additional ones for members of the audience. 11 They should be turned in over lunch to the 12 Commission secretary. We will take a break and 13 come back at 1:00 o'clock or very shortly after. 14 (Proceedings recessed at 12:05 p.m. 15 and reconvened at 1:00 p.m.) 16 17 MR. CHAIRMAN: Could we come to order, 18 please. 19 We will continue with the presentation 20 of Mr. Bob Starr on behalf of the Ritchot 21 Concerned Citizens Coalition. 22 There is an opportunity now for 23 questions of Mr. Starr. 24 Mr. McNeil, do you have any questions 25 of the presenter? 02145 1 MR. McNEIL: Yes, Mr. Chair. I have 2 one question for clarification. 3 Mr. Starr, in your presentation this 4 morning, you talked about 778 water level being a 5 fantasy and I am not quoting you exactly, but 6 that's what I recall you saying. 7 Were you present during these 8 proceedings on February 17th when I read from a 9 design document from 1962? 10 THE WITNESS: I can't remember, Doug, 11 if I was or not. 12 MR. McNEIL: Are you aware what that 13 1962 document says about elevation 778? 14 MR. STARR: I have seen it some time 15 ago. 16 MR. McNEIL: Let me read just from the 17 transcript on February 17th, page 809, line 10 and 18 following: 19 "The title at the top of the document 20 is, 'Manitoba Department of 21 Agriculture and Conservation, Water 22 Control and Conservation Branch, Red 23 River Floodway Inlet Control Works, 24 memorandum on preliminary design.'" 25 It was produced by H.G. Acres and Company of 02146 1 Niagra Falls, Canada, and it is dated July 28th, 2 1962. 3 I read further on line 16 and 4 following -- I am now turning to page 2 of that 5 document, section 2 is titled "hydraulics" and 6 section a, "design requirements" and let me read 7 paragraph 3 -- and I quote: "The works should be 8 capable of restricting the design" -- sorry. 9 "The works should be capable of 10 restricting a discharge passing 11 downstream through the City of 12 Winnipeg so that water levels at 13 Redwood Bridge would not exceed 14 elevation 775.5 feet under conditions 15 of a maximum Assiniboine contribution, 16 up to the stage at which upstream 17 water levels have been increased to 18 elevation 778.3 feet above sea level." 19 So, are you aware then why in our EIS 20 document and in all the other designs for the 21 expansion of the Floodway that we are basing it on 22 the fact that the original structure was, in fact, 23 designed to go to a water level of 778.3 feet 24 above sea level, above the inlet control 25 structure? 02147 1 MR. STARR: It may have been designed 2 to operate that high, Doug, but surely you're 3 aware that if it held 778, the whole city could go 4 under with wind and wave set up. I think I have 5 read somewhere that no responsible engineer would 6 ever operate to that height without enhancing the 7 west dyke and raising the bridges. 8 MR. McNEIL: Are you aware that under 9 the project, which is the reason for these 10 hearings, that we will be raising all the bridges 11 to be up and out of the water in the expanded 12 Floodway for the design event that results in a 13 water level of 778 feet above sea level? 14 And are you also aware that as part of 15 this project, we will be dealing with those very 16 significant concerns of wind and wave uprush for 17 the west dyke by increasing the freeboard from 18 approximately two feet to approximately six feet 19 on the west dyke as part of this project? 20 MR. STARR: You are doing that, you 21 say, with the expanded project? 22 MR. McNEIL: Yes. 23 MR. STARR: So then the existing 24 project obviously couldn't hold those levels, just 25 like I said. That's why we say it is a 02148 1 pie-in-the-sky baseline. 2 MR. McNEIL: No, it is not. The 3 existing structure was designed for that water 4 level, but -- 5 MR. STARR: The whole thing works 6 together, though, Doug. The gates, the Floodway, 7 the whole system works together. Just because the 8 gates can physically go this high, doesn't mean 9 you can operate it that high because the water 10 will go over the west dyke, the bridges will act 11 as a barrier, cause more artificial flooding. 12 MR. McNEIL: In actual fact, if there 13 was no concern for significant wind and wave when 14 the water level at the inlet was 778, then there 15 is no risk of overtopping the west dyke because 16 the west dyke is higher than 778. And, in fact, 17 it is designed to have a two-foot freeboard. 18 What we are seeing from our experience 19 in 1997 and based on sophisticated computer 20 analysis, both the MIKE-11 and the Telemac-2D, 21 that we need more freeboard on the west dyke to 22 secure that protection level. 23 MR. STARR: Mr. McNeil, are you 24 saying -- you are a respected engineer. Are you 25 saying that in 1997, you would have cranked those 02149 1 gates up to 778 with the bridges in the west dyke 2 as they were in 1997? 3 MR. McNEIL: That's not my decision. 4 It is actually Water Stewardship who is the 5 operator -- 6 MR. STARR: I am asking you, as an 7 engineer, would you have done that? 8 MR. CHAIRMAN: That's a conjectural 9 question. I think both of you are getting into a 10 little bit of a debate here. I think the point 11 was to establish that the 778 was in the design 12 criteria from the '60s. 13 MR. STARR: It is important for CEC to 14 know that, yes, it was in the design of the gate, 15 the inlet structure. But, that structure doesn't 16 operate all by itself. It operates as a function 17 of the whole system. 18 MR. CHAIRMAN: Yes, we are aware of 19 that. Thank you. Anything further, Mr. McNeil? 20 MR. McNEIL: No, that's it. Thank 21 you, Mr. Chair. 22 MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Barrie? 23 MR. WEBSTER: What evidence do you 24 have for the presence of ice in the 1826 flood 25 report that you were referring to? 02150 1 MR. STARR: I am sorry? 2 MR. WEBSTER: You mentioned in your 3 presentation that there was ice in the flood 4 waters in 1826. 5 MR. STARR: Yes. 6 MR. WEBSTER: I wondered where that 7 information had come from, we haven't heard that 8 anywhere else yet. 9 MR. STARR: I went to the Manitoba 10 Archives, I believe, in about 1998, my wife and I, 11 and looked up the records out of curiosity. 12 Apparently -- I am going from memory -- but the 13 river didn't break up until almost June because 14 the ice was so thick. When it eventually did go, 15 it went with such suddenness, it took cattle, 16 houses, horses, people; it went with a real bang. 17 But this thick, thick ice was a real problem. The 18 river would not break up. 19 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you. That's of 20 course well beyond what -- or those conditions are 21 well beyond what we have been talking about and 22 without a floodway in position, the effects would 23 have been quite different. But, I still was 24 curious to know how you had realized that there 25 was ice at that time. 02151 1 MR. STARR: Yeah. 2 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you. Now, I 3 wanted to go back to this level of 778 and the way 4 in which you had determined -- or the way in which 5 the height of protective dykes had been 6 determined, was that figure of 778 feet at the 7 flood gate used in the determination of the flood 8 proofing, of properties within the Ritchot? 9 MR. STARR: Was that 778 used in 10 determining flood height? 11 MR. WEBSTER: Yes. 12 MR. STARR: No. In determining flood 13 height, I remember watching Larry Whitney on TV as 14 I was evacuated. He said, well -- when they were 15 asked what height we are going to build these new 16 places to, he said, we did in 1977, we went that 17 flood, plus two feet and we will likely do the 18 same thing. For '97, indeed that's what they did, 19 which was careless now when we look back on it. 20 The 778 -- I only knew about the 778 21 when I started studying the EIS. The only thing 22 residents know is natural. That's all they ever 23 been told. They have been suspicious of the 24 level, but they have only known the natural level. 25 MR. WEBSTER: What you're telling us 02152 1 is then that those levels -- the levels to which 2 people have flood proofed their homes and their 3 communities doesn't take into account the 778 4 operating level? 5 MR. STARR: No. Like I showed you on 6 that chart, at that level, everybody goes under 7 all that expensive flood proofing that Ritchot 8 goes under. 9 MR. WEBSTER: Is the concept of 10 artificial flooding at all taken care of in the 11 flood proofing of those properties? 12 MR. STARR: Could you repeat that? 13 MR. WEBSTER: Is artificial flooding 14 considered in determining the level of flood 15 proofing for people's houses and communities, 16 upstream of the flood gates? 17 MR. STARR: At the time they 18 determined those levels, I don't think we knew 19 about artificial flooding. 20 MR. WEBSTER: So, it was a question of 21 whatever it was and whatever flood, plus so many 22 feet? 23 MR. STARR: Yeah, the province knew 24 about the artificial flooding. 25 MR. WEBSTER: That's how it was 02153 1 determined as far as you were aware? 2 MR. STARR: Yes. 3 MR. WEBSTER: Okay, thank you. 4 MR. MOTHERAL: If I may, Mr. Starr. 5 One thing that stands out very prominent in your 6 presentation is your mistrust of government. 7 I am just asking -- I know this is a 8 general feeling that can probably be -- I don't 9 whether know if it is an attribute, asset or 10 liability of all Manitobans or Canadians. What 11 would it take -- it is a very -- maybe I was more 12 saying -- yeah. What would it take for you to 13 have any inkling of trusting things? That's a 14 difficult one for you to answer right now, but 15 until something like that is done, I feel you will 16 have that in your presentation all the time until 17 something is done. 18 MR. STARR: Yeah, that's a good 19 question, Mr. Motheral. 20 The mistrust is so serious, I have 21 seen people chase off government employees 22 spraying for mosquitoes, government employees out 23 with Dutch Elm disease. They literally hate 24 anything government. That's not healthy. 25 To get that trust back, the government 02154 1 has to simply deliver on their promises. When 2 they say they will settle outstanding issues from 3 1997, simply deal with it fairly and do it. 4 MR. CHAIRMAN: I have a few questions 5 arising out of your presentation. Just to take 6 off on your answer to Mr. Motheral. I don't know 7 whether you can do it briefly, but can you briefly 8 just describe for us what is left to be undone 9 from 1997? You said the government has to deliver 10 on its promises from -- 11 MR. STARR: Yeah, I went over that a 12 little bit. There was a promise to settle the 13 outstanding issues from '97. 14 MR. CHAIRMAN: What are some of those 15 outstanding issues? 16 MR. STARR: It is not just the 17 lawsuits. There is also some, I call them 18 "anomalies", in the area. You have some people 19 flood proofing, shifting, you have some people 20 living with mould in their houses. It is very 21 hard to control the mould. It is like cancer when 22 it comes back. You have to have the house at a 23 certain degree of humidity or it comes back. You 24 have to settle these outstanding lawsuits, the 25 ones that were attempted in the mediation 02155 1 agreement. 2 Then you have to identify these 3 anomalies and put those to bed so you're not 4 leaving people in debt for the rest of their 5 lives, people who saved Winnipeg seven billion. 6 That would be a good start. 7 MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you. I 8 have three or four specific questions, basically a 9 clarification out of your main report. On page 6, 10 the top of page 6 -- 11 MR. STARR: Mine is printed -- 12 MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay, it is 13 section 2 -- 1, 2, 3 -- the third paragraph, in 14 the last sentence, you say: 15 "The area upstream from the inlet 16 control structure never had frequent 17 flooding events until after the 18 construction of the Red River 19 Floodway." 20 MR. STARR: That's right. 21 MR. CHAIRMAN: No flooding events at 22 all? 23 MR. STARR: No. Like, in 1950, for 24 example -- maybe we should look at the 25 interrogatory? We could look at MFA's answer. 02156 1 Say in 1950, Ritchot had some flooding, as 2 Winnipeg had some flooding. Ritchot had some 3 higher areas as did Winnipeg. I think that's 4 basically what MFA's answer says. So, Ritchot 5 wasn't always a low area always prone to flooding. 6 MR. CHAIRMAN: But, you still had -- 7 you still had the same flooding that the city or 8 other parts of the valley had? 9 MR. STARR: Oh, yes. 10 MR. CHAIRMAN: I take it that your 11 main point is that this has been exacerbated by 12 the artificial flooding caused by the Floodway? 13 MR. STARR: Oh, yes, big time. 14 MR. CHAIRMAN: A few paragraphs down, 15 you note that -- you are talking about the 16 operating rules and the fact that they were sent 17 to the federal government in August of 1970 and 18 that Canada did not approve it. 19 Now, it is also correct -- I mean, 20 correct me if I am wrong, but they never formally 21 approved it, but they never dismissed them or said 22 they were not sufficient; is that correct? 23 MR. STARR: Yeah, I'm not a lawyer, 24 Mr. Sargeant, and I imagine if you operate 25 something this long, that it is going to be 02157 1 accepted. But, I understand that the Floodway 2 structure itself is not even legally -- does not 3 even legally have a license. 4 MR. CHAIRMAN: Well, I can't debate 5 that point -- you will have your opportunity at 6 another time, Mrs. Clifton. 7 MS. CLIFTON: I am part of this group 8 and I would like to help with answering that 9 question, if I might? 10 MR. CHAIRMAN: Well, you weren't part 11 of the presentation this morning. You will get 12 other opportunities. 13 Mr. Starr, is it correct that the 14 operating rules that were followed from 1970 until 15 2001, when the federal government finally gave its 16 consensus, were the operating rules consistent? 17 Was the operation of the Floodway consistently 18 done over those years? 19 MR. STARR: I can only tell you from 20 when I have lived there, Mr. Sargeant. 21 MR. CHAIRMAN: They followed the rules 22 that the provincial government sent to the feds in 23 1970? 24 MR. STARR: If you have got eight 25 years of artificial flooding, obviously, they 02158 1 haven't followed the rules because there shouldn't 2 have been artificial flooding. 3 MR. CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, repeat that 4 again? 5 MR. STARR: Well, it is confirmed in 6 the EIS that there is eight years of artificial 7 flooding. 8 MR. CHAIRMAN: Since '69? 9 MR. STARR: Yeah. Now, none of those 10 years, I don't believe, were severe enough to have 11 that kind of artificial flooding. So, I would 12 think they haven't followed the rules. 13 MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay. 14 MR. STARR: I think there was a lot of 15 tinkering in the beginning. There was artificial 16 flooding the first time they used it. 17 MR. CHAIRMAN: We will try to clarify 18 that when we have Floodway Authority people on the 19 stand again. 20 In the last paragraph, before section 21 3, you say that in 1997 the induced artificial 22 flooding became so severe as to cause the total 23 destruction of hundreds of upstream homes and 24 businesses. 25 Has anybody quantified just how many 02159 1 homes and businesses were flooded because of 2 artificial flooding? 3 MR. STARR: I don't know of any. EMO 4 could give you how many homes in the area were 5 damaged by flooding. I don't think they could 6 give you artificial flooding. I don't think it 7 has been quantified. 8 MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you. 9 Towards the end of your section 3, the 10 third last paragraph, you talk about: 11 "The 1997 Red River Valley Flood 12 Proofing and Dyke Enhancement program. 13 The program was universally applied in 14 the Red River Valley, but did not 15 recognize any of the upstream area 16 that is subject to artificial 17 flooding." 18 Could you just expand a little bit on 19 that for me? 20 MR. STARR: Yes. For example, in our 21 area where there is artificial flooding, you might 22 have raised 8 feet, 10 feet or 12 feet and at 23 Emerson or Letellier, you might have raised one 24 foot, but you got the same amount of money. It 25 was the same program for all areas and didn't 02160 1 recognize that we had to raise much higher in our 2 area. 3 MR. CHAIRMAN: So, you were paid -- I 4 am just thinking out loud here. I may be off 5 base. Please correct me if I am. 6 You were paid to raise or flood proof 7 to 97 plus 2, but artificial flooding would take 8 it higher than that? Is that -- 9 MR. STARR: Artificial flooding in 10 certain years would take it higher than that, yes. 11 We were only protected to about the artificial 12 flooding level in '97. It was about two feet of 13 artificial flooding in our area. 14 MR. CHAIRMAN: So, if you wanted to 15 flood proof to the artificial flooding level plus 16 two, you would have had to pay for that yourself? 17 If that was higher -- 18 MR. STARR: Some managed to go higher 19 because we all suspected that we were not being 20 told the truth. You know, it is a complex 21 situation. Bob Starr on his property was able to 22 dig out of his own yard. So, it was fairly 23 inexpensive to build his two hills. Someone else 24 might have had to haul the soil in from five miles 25 away, which would make it doubly expensive. Some 02161 1 people were able to go higher if they could, if 2 their lots permitted. Others couldn't even build 3 a hill. They had to build on top of a floodable 4 lower level. There is quite a variety of what we 5 have in the area. 6 MR. CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you. I 7 think that's all the questions I have. 8 Mrs. Clifton? 9 MS. CLIFTON: Yes? 10 MR. CHAIRMAN: There would be an 11 opportunity for you now, if you wish to straighten 12 out the record on this issue. I am playing fast 13 and loose on what we call re-examination. 14 MS. CLIFTON: Just like the operating 15 rules, eh. 16 MR. CHAIRMAN: I can't comment on 17 that. 18 MS. CLIFTON: I just wanted to help 19 Bob out when you were asking him about the rules 20 being approved or not by the federal government in 21 1970. There is a huge hole in the federal records 22 at that time. There is nothing available in 23 writing either way on what the federal government 24 said, what they recommended and the province can't 25 find anything either. 02162 1 MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 2 Mr. Starr, I think that concludes our 3 questions. So, thank you very much for your 4 presentation. 5 MR. STARR: Thank you. 6 MR. CHAIRMAN: We will now turn to 7 individual presentations. 8 For the benefit of those not in 9 attendance last week when we had similar 10 presentations, I will set out the basic ground 11 rules. 12 Presenters are limited to 15-minute 13 presentations. You will be sworn in by the 14 Commission Secretary. You will not be 15 cross-examined, other than questions of 16 clarification by members of this panel. 17 We have ten, perhaps 11 people, 18 depending on time, already registered for this 19 afternoon. 20 First is the Mayor of the RM of 21 Ritchot, Robert Stefaniuk, followed by Maxine 22 Clifton, Rita Bartmanovich, Jay Doering, Dr. James 23 Shapiro, Cheryl Kennedy Courcelles, Vaughan Baird, 24 John Corp, Allan Cieskiewicz and Jim Stinson. 25 We have had one request for an 02163 1 additional presentation from Valerie Rutherford, 2 if time permits. 3 Mayor Stefaniuk, please state your 4 name for the record and I will have the Commission 5 Secretary swear you in. 6 MR. STEFANIUK: My name is Bob 7 Stefaniuk and I am joined today by Yves Sabourin, 8 our Chief Administrative Officer. 9 (BOB STEFANIUK: SWORN) 10 MR. STEFANIUK: Yes. 11 MS. JOHNSON: Thank you. 12 MR. STEFANIUK: Good afternoon. My 13 name is Bob Stefaniuk and I am Mayor of the Rural 14 Municipality of Ritchot. 15 Today I appear before you with the 16 full support of my Municipal Council to present 17 our genuine and serious concerns regarding the 18 proposed expansion of the Red River Floodway. 19 More importantly, I am here officially 20 representing 5,000 Manitoba citizens in my 21 jurisdiction that bore the brunt of the Flood of 22 the Century. 23 MR. CHAIRMAN: Mayor Stefaniuk, could 24 I just ask you to go a little more slowly so that 25 the reporter can -- 02164 1 MR. STEFANIUK: Okay, I am sorry. I 2 am just trying to get my presentation in within 3 the 15 minutes. 4 MR. CHAIRMAN: I won't be Stalinist in 5 cutting you off. 6 MR. STEFANIUK: Okay, thank you. 7 These are the hundreds of families 8 living south of the Floodway Control Structure and 9 straddling the Red River. The names of our 10 communities, read like a media roll call from the 11 Great Flood: St. Adolphe, Ile des Chenes, Howden, 12 Glenlea, St. Agathe and Grand Pointe. The very 13 mention of these communities conjures up images of 14 bravery, but also of the great devastation 15 suffered by so many families. 16 In total, 91 percent of our 17 municipality was under floodwater. 4,000 were 18 forced to abandon their homes. 800 family homes 19 were flooded. 120 families had their homes 20 destroyed. 21 Indeed, you would be hard-pressed to 22 find another single group of Manitobans with a 23 greater interest in and a greater right to voice 24 their views about flood protection in our 25 province. That's because we have paid the price. 02165 1 We have experienced natural and 2 artificial flooding, not as bystanders or as 3 volunteers, but as Manitobans who were forced to 4 risk, and in many cases, lose all, a life's work, 5 homes and a way of life. For what? To help the 6 save the City of Winnipeg. 7 As the official record also clearly 8 indicates, our families absorbed as much as 9 three feet of artificial flooding, pushed back at 10 us by the operation of the Floodway. Three feet. 11 In a battle that for many that came 12 down to inches, three feet of artificial 13 floodwater was the difference between victory and 14 defeat. Between having a home to return to and a 15 home to tear down. 16 Let me stress that we have no argument 17 against the critical need to enhance Winnipeg's 18 flood protection to a one in 700 year level. 19 Winnipeg is the economic hub of 20 Manitoba and large scale flooding would be an 21 economic catastrophe for every one us. 22 Yes, Winnipeg must be protected, but 23 others do not have to be sacrificed to save the 24 city. There are engineering solutions, any number 25 of them, that will protect Winnipeg and its 02166 1 neighbours outside of the Floodway, upstream and 2 down. 3 That's what I will be asking of you 4 today, to hear our legitimate concerns of 5 artificial flooding, operating rules, summer 6 operations, and matters of financial compensation, 7 To require the province and the Floodway Authority 8 to look closing at engineering solutions, and to 9 help us fight for fairness. 10 Ritchot families deserve the fairness 11 of flood protection that is equal to Winnipeg 12 against the 700 year flood event. 13 Unless the CEC mandates changes to the 14 current proposal, should a flood marginally larger 15 than this occur, we would once again will be 16 inundated rendering our government regulated 100 17 year flood protection absolutely useless. 18 Ritchot families also deserve 19 protection from artificial flooding, which during 20 a flood approaching the one in 700 year flood 21 level, will once again be absolutely catastrophic 22 for our municipality. 23 Finally, engineering solutions to 24 artificial flooding are our first priority. 25 However, if flood compensation is ultimately 02167 1 required, Ritchot families deserve the comfort of 2 knowing that both levels of government are 3 prepared to stand behind them with fair, financial 4 flood agreements. 5 Presently, the stand-alone Red River 6 Floodway Act is not worth of the paper written on. 7 Nor has the federal government agreed to it as 8 part of a larger disaster financial assisted 9 agreement. 10 In 1997, our citizens were forced to 11 lay everything on the line to help protect 12 Winnipeg. Today, you have it within your mandate 13 and your power to ensure that we are never 14 sacrificed again. 15 It is our strong belief that the 16 intention of this expansion, should be to ensure 17 fairness and equal protection for all Manitobans, 18 regardless which side of the perimeter their home 19 lay. 20 In this matter, we believe that the 21 current proposal falls far short. 22 In articulating the shortcomings, 23 allow me to revisit the project history, for there 24 is much to learn from the past if we are to avoid 25 repeating previous mistakes. 02168 1 Following the flood of 1950, a 2 solution to massive flood damages was sought by 3 examining two major alternatives: A detention 4 structure centre near Ste. Agathe and a Floodway 5 around the east side of Winnipeg. 6 In comparing the alternatives, it was 7 determined that the floodway was preferable 8 because it could be built and operated without 9 artificially flooding anyone. 10 This made it unnecessary for 11 governments of the day to concern themselves with 12 flood easements or property purchases. The Red 13 River Floodway was then designed and built on this 14 premise, no artificial flooding. 15 After the Floodway was in place, 16 decisions were made by the Floodway operators, not 17 the designers, that in certain circumstances the 18 Floodway could be operated to create artificial 19 flooding. This was a totally different premise 20 upon which it was designed or initially justified. 21 It was also a decision that was made 22 without a single word of discussion with affected 23 landowners, residents or the public at large. 24 Strangely, when the Ste. Agathe option 25 was under consideration, floodways were a critical 02169 1 design consideration. Yet when it came to the 2 Floodway, the same issue was of absolutely no 3 importance upstream of the inlet. 4 On a related note, the original 5 Floodway was not designed with the possible 6 four-day elevation of 778 feet in mind. Contrary 7 to the claim in the EIS supplementary filing. 8 I know of no design engineer who would 9 agree that a dyke with a top elevation of 780 feet 10 would be adequate to hold water to an elevation of 11 778 feet. 12 It was the operators and developers of 13 the 1970 operating rules that made this choice, 14 not the designers of the original Floodway. 15 This poses a critical question for the 16 Clean Environment Commission and regulating 17 agencies of the proposed project: Is the 18 environmental baseline pre-Floodway; existing 19 Floodway designed and built; or the existing 20 Floodway as subsequently operated? 21 Given that the operating rules and 22 intention to artificially flood were never forced 23 to withstand public or legal scrutiny, I am 24 certain you can appreciate why we believe the 25 baseline should be either pre-Floodway or, at 02170 1 worst, the floodway as designed and built, not as 2 subsequently operated. 3 The decision to operate the Floodway 4 differently than the manner for which it was 5 designed, has led to quite different impacts than 6 when original construction was approved. As a 7 result, you must appreciate our consternation when 8 we are being asked to endorse a Floodway expansion 9 based on EIS in which commitments are made only by 10 those charged with the construction and not 11 maintenance of the Floodway and not by the 12 operators themselves. 13 Note that the initial EIS submission 14 did not deal with operations at all. 15 Where the EIS now does deal with 16 operations, all the MFA is able to do is to 17 recommend to the operators, Manitoba Water 18 Stewardship, certain potential mitigation 19 measures. 20 While we are supportive of Winnipeg 21 receiving greater flood protection to the extent 22 it must be done on the backs of Ritchot, 23 appropriate arrangements with citizens and 24 landowners must be made prior to that support 25 being provided. Such arrangements are as much a 02171 1 responsibility of the operator as of the builder. 2 Taking the distinction between 3 construction and operation further, your terms of 4 reference do not require the CEC to consider both 5 construction and operation. The Commission is 6 faced with an EIS which contains commitments on 7 behalf the builder, but few, if any, that come 8 from the authority or the operator. 9 I suggest that you cannot conclude 10 your process in the absence of this participation 11 by the operator. 12 Neither should the citizens engaged in 13 this process be expected to conclude their review 14 in the absence of commitments from the operator. 15 In respect of the scope of the 16 hearings, verbal clarification was provided to 17 applicants for intervener funding, that the scope 18 would be restricted to the impacts of expanding 19 the Floodway and will not include the full impacts 20 of an expanded Floodway. 21 There are many impacts of the existing 22 Floodway operations Which were never considered 23 when it was approved and built. Those impacts do 24 not form an appropriate baseline for this 25 environmental assessment. 02172 1 By adhering to this restrictive 2 interpretation of the scope of this hearing, you 3 will perpetuate a wrong and legitimize a practise 4 which cannot withstand even a basic test of 5 fairness. 6 It addition, it limits your ability to 7 take into account the full economic, social and 8 human costs of the project. 9 This is especially true regarding the 10 need to study flood-related protection 11 enhancements in Winnipeg and summer time 12 operations of the floodway. 13 Non-completion of upgrades to 14 Winnipeg's primary dykes and pumping stations as 15 will, without a doubt, prompt regular summertime 16 use of the Floodway. The result, additional 17 impacts to Ritchot residents that must be 18 considered. 19 We have concerns regarding the scope 20 and mandate of the CEC. It is clear to us that 21 the scope of the expansion project is also too 22 small. In fact, one of the greatest shortcomings 23 of the project is linked to the communities and 24 areas left with inadequate protection during the 25 design flood. Not surprisingly, these two areas 02173 1 are Winnipeg and Ritchot. 2 Of course, Winnipeg's problems will be 3 corrected with the 700 year flood level 4 protection, while those of us in Ritchot will be 5 left behind with just 100 year protection. 6 Allow me to demonstrate my point using 7 the Floodway Authority's graph, entitled "Water 8 Surface Profiles South of Winnipeg." This is 9 something that the Floodway Authority has 10 published, and used at one of their open houses. 11 I have added to it. I have drawn a 12 line here showing where the -- anything between 13 this line and the Floodway entrance, which is all 14 in Ritchot, is a place where it will be overtopped 15 by as much as six feet of flooding during that 16 time. 17 The red line here delineates the Flood 18 of the Century, the 700 year flood. And the 19 little bars here indicate all the flood protection 20 levels. 21 So, after we go south of Ritchot, all 22 the way up to Emerson, all the flood protection 23 systems are okay and that's based on the lay of 24 the land more than anything. We are all protected 25 to 97 plus 2. 02174 1 When you get upstream of Ste. Agathe, 2 then the land contours and changes and it is 3 flatter. So, the water goes further east and west 4 rather than up a hill as we have in Ritchot. I 5 will make this available for the Commission, if 6 they so choose. 7 Clearly, this graph points out 8 absolutely catastrophic results that will be 9 caused by Floodway operations and immense 10 artificial flooding during a 700 year flood event. 11 For instance, by as much as six feet -- now, six 12 feet is this height here. By that much, by six 13 feet, the flood defences of Grand Pointe, 14 St. Adolphe, Niverville and Ste. Agathe will once 15 again be easily overtopped. 16 This will render current 100 year 17 flood proofing useless without further 18 modifications. 19 Ile des Chenes unaffected by the flood 20 of '97 will also be inundated. At present, given 21 their status of 778 feet above sea level, no flood 22 protection infrastructure has even been 23 contemplated. 24 500 rural homes in our municipality 25 with individual flood proofing will be overtopped. 02175 1 Again, their government mandated 100 year flood 2 protection will be rendered useless. 3 At the same time, residents of the Red 4 River Valley living further upstream and away from 5 the artificial flooding zone will be adequately 6 protected. That leaves Ritchot as the lone, 7 unprotected voice in the wildness. 8 Imagine our anxiety. We pick up the 9 pieces after the '97 flood, flood proofed 10 according to the government mandated levels, and 11 now we are learning that, in the face of a flood 12 greater than '97, immense artificial flooding will 13 once again bring disaster to Ritchot. That's 14 simply not good enough. 15 As Manitobans and Canadians, we 16 deserve protection that is equal to Winnipeg and 17 the rest of the Red River Valley. We deserve 18 protection from artificial flooding. We deserve 19 to have inequalities corrected this time around. 20 Always remember, unless the CEC 21 recommends changes, Ritchot when next faced with a 22 flood marginally greater than '97 will be far 23 worse off with the Floodway than without it. 24 That's a disaster in waiting that you should not 25 tolerate on behalf of those who are so susceptible 02176 1 to the tremendous social, economic and human 2 implications of flooding. 3 This situation is especially 4 unwarranted when you consider that engineering 5 options can rectify the situation and ensure all 6 Manitobans who need it are equally flood 7 protected. 8 We make this appeal directly to you 9 because today the concerns of the affected 10 municipalities have not been listened to or taken 11 into consideration by the Floodway Authority 12 although, they claim otherwise. 13 Repeatedly, during public meetings and 14 consultations, our concerns have been dismissed as 15 being 'outside the scope and mandate of the 16 project'. That's according to the MFA. 17 If our concerns are not within the 18 scope now, when will they ever be addressed? 19 After all, it is not Mother Nature 20 pushing the water back at us, it is the Winnipeg 21 Floodway and the purposed expansion. 22 Sadly, many of our concerns are not 23 new. We have been putting them on the public 24 record since the original Floodway was first 25 envisaged. 02177 1 And for decades, governments have 2 chosen to ignore us, dismiss us and marginalize 3 us. 4 Even today, the Floodway Authority 5 seems bent on carrying forward the shortsighted 6 legacy that ultimately resulted in the 7 international disaster known as the Flood of the 8 Century. 9 Fortunately, there are engineering 10 solutions that could resolve our concerns. 11 Yes, there are costs associated with 12 them, but that should not preclude the options 13 from being discussed and seriously considered. 14 This is especially important when you 15 look at the numbers. Simply put, repairing 16 repeated flood damage costs far more, in the long 17 run, than preventing it in the first place. 18 Why governments would want to increase 19 their liabilities in the future rather than 20 minimizing them now, makes no economic, social or 21 human sense at all. 22 To address inequality being forced 23 upon my constituents, I respectfully ask you to 24 consider the following three alternatives as 25 recommended by various experts in the field. 02178 1 Firstly, the first and simplest 2 engineering solution would be a deeper and/or 3 wider Floodway expansion that would permit greater 4 flows with lower elevations upstream of the inlet. 5 Secondly, an option -- the second 6 option is a larger phased-in project to provide 7 comprehensive flood protection for the whole Red 8 River Valley. This three-phase approach would 9 include: 10 Phase I: The current Floodway 11 expansion. 12 Phase II: A channel paralleling the 13 Red River starting somewhere south of Ste. Agathe 14 and joining the Floodway east of Grand Pointe 15 where the channel begins to swing northerly. 16 Phase III: Another supplementary 17 channel, cutting into the Floodway between Birds 18 Hill Park and Lockport. This channel would go 19 directly to Devils Creek, which would convey 20 floodwater directly into Lake Winnipeg. 21 These channels could be staged or 22 controlled so they would only operate when flood 23 levels exceed those of 1997. 24 The third solution a "mega" low-lift 25 pumping station at the inlet of the Floodway 02179 1 channel to be operated instead of using the 2 control gates to raise upstream levels of water. 3 Similar lift stations are used around 4 the world. Examples close to home are: 5 Abbotsford, BC for storm water run off, and the 6 inlet structure for the City of Winnipeg's water 7 aqueduct at Shoal Lake. 8 Each of these solutions comes at a 9 cost, but in our view, the time is now to correct 10 past mistakes once and for all. 11 As I indicated earlier, we fully 12 recognize the importance of full flood protection 13 for Winnipeg. After all, not only do we share the 14 same flood plain, Winnipeg is quite a bit lower in 15 the watershed than those of us in Ritchot. 16 That said, there is an urgent need to 17 eliminate the discriminatory practices that are 18 about to be perpetuated -- again -- on our 19 municipality. 20 Allow me now to move on to our 21 concerns about the Red River Floodway Act. As 22 you're aware, the province has drafted this 23 legislation to provide compensation for damages 24 caused by artificial flooding. 25 We have many concerns about how it 02180 1 affects Ritchot, including: 2 The province's lack of collaboration 3 with the federal government which must be involved 4 not resolve substantial payout's. 5 The province's ability to change, 6 amend or withdraw the Act with the same minimal 7 lever of public engagement as was employed when it 8 was created. 9 Compensation gaps for property losses 10 and lost business wages. 11 Lack of integration with appropriately 12 derived operating rules. 13 Expected complexities in interfacing 14 between Disaster Financial Assistance and the Red 15 River Floodway Act. 16 Inherent conflict of interest with the 17 same agency that operates the floodway determining 18 when compensation will be paid. 19 For instance, it took one and a half 20 years and an independent study before that agency 21 would acknowledge artificial flooding in 1997. 22 The following are essential changes 23 the province must make: 24 In collaboration with affected 25 citizens, close compensation gaps and operating 02181 1 rules. 2 Choose an administrative, not 3 legislative mechanism, for delivery with 4 appropriate built-in independence. 5 Finalize a federal-provincial flood 6 compensation agreement to ensure the major funder 7 is fully committed. 8 Another concern revolves around 9 operation of the Floodway during the summer. 10 On an experimental basis, this was 11 carried out for the first time in June of 2002. 12 Prior to the initial experiment, 13 consultation took place with the Floodway 14 Operations Committee. However, consultations were 15 quickly replaced by unilateral action when summer 16 operations next took place this past June, 2004 17 Simply put, the compensation provided 18 for summer flooding does not cover the true cost 19 of water storage on private lands to personal or 20 community well being. 21 As well, artificial summer flooding: 22 Increases riverbank erosion and property loss. 23 This includes significant future costs for the RM 24 to replace roads along the west bank of the river 25 south of the inlet control structure. 02182 1 Inhibits drainage of farmland. 2 Negative effects of wildlife due to 3 dislocation of their habitat when they may be most 4 vulnerable. 5 Causes additional anxiety and mental 6 stress for residents along the Red River who are 7 already sensitized to artificial flooding. 8 Compromises personal security and the 9 right to enjoy one's private property. 10 Creates additional business risks for 11 market gardeners. 12 Finally, I would like to speak briefly 13 about operating rules and emergency designation. 14 Ritchot residents will not be 15 surprised if operating rules are suspended when 16 push comes to shove in order to save Winnipeg. 17 Nonetheless, some elements should be well-defined. 18 It should be clearly defined what 19 elevation or flow the province will use to declare 20 a state of emergency. 21 Will it be 1:120 or higher when Rule 2 22 kicks in? Will this be the basis upon which the 23 province says it can flood Ritchot residents 24 without liability? If so, what is the rationale 25 for calling an 'emergency' that is far below the 02183 1 design flow? 2 If 1:120 is an 'emergency', what do 3 you call something in the magnitude of 1 in 700? 4 In summary, I would like to conclude 5 by stressing the major concerns raised on behalf 6 of Ritchot residents. 7 At no time has approval ever been 8 obtained for artificial flooding. Not from 9 landowners, local governments, tax payers, the 10 Legislature or especially Manitoba voters. 11 Thus, the environmental baseline must 12 be either prefloodway or the existing Floodway as 13 designed and built, not as operated. 14 The designation of an official 15 emergency must be one of necessity, not 16 convenience, in order to prevent the province from 17 avoiding acknowledgment of property rights. 18 Residents inside and outside the 19 Floodway must be afforded equal non-discriminatory 20 flood protection to 1 in 700 year levels. 21 A federal-provincial financial 22 compensation agreement must be replaced by the 23 flawed Red River Floodway Act. 24 This project must not be considered in 25 relative isolation, without inclusion of 02184 1 additional protection works in Winnipeg and the 2 proposed use of Floodway for summer water level 3 control. 4 All landowners must have their 5 property rights protected. 6 The CEC cannot fulfil its mandate 7 unless the Floodway operator is formally involved 8 in the hearing process, including publicly making 9 the commitments necessary for the Floodway 10 operations. 11 The CEC must take into account the 12 full economic, social and human costs before 13 recommending approval. 14 In closing, it is not often that 15 projects of this magnitude are undertaken. So, 16 let's do the job right and do it right this time, 17 with an expansion that passes the test of fairness 18 and equity. 19 Regardless on which side of the 20 Floodway your home is located, we believe 21 Manitobans expect nothing less than 'fairness for 22 all'. 23 With your help, it is not too late for 24 governments to do the right thing. 25 Now, Mr. Chairman, that concludes my 02185 1 presentation and thank you for your indulgence. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mayor 3 Stefaniuk. I just have one question of 4 clarification, and you mentioned it a couple of 5 times, including in your summarizing comments, the 6 fact that the Floodway Authority should be 7 involved in the hearing process. 8 I know you were here a fair bit of the 9 last couple of weeks, but were you here when we 10 were asking questions of Mr. Rick Bowering, who is 11 here on behalf of the operator? 12 MR. STEFANIUK: Yes, I was. I did 13 hear what Mr. Bowering said. Mr. Bowering 14 indicated, he answered the questions appropriately 15 as presented. But I think -- again, I see the 16 smoke and mirrors, for want of a better word. You 17 have a division of responsibilities here. You 18 have the agency that is going to build the 19 floodway and put that through and maintain it 20 being separate from those people that are going to 21 operate it. I think that the Water Stewardship 22 Branch should be here front and centre, all the 23 time, and sort of on a level equivalent to what 24 the Floodway Authority is. Because there will be 25 commitments made, and once all is said and done, 02186 1 the shovels in the ground, when we question this, 2 it will be said, well, why didn't you raise the 3 questions before? That's what we are doing now, 4 sir. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: I don't know if this 6 will offer you any comfort, but I think from our 7 perspective, we view the Water Stewardship, or 8 Department of Water Stewardship as a co-proponent 9 in this, and we will be discussing it in our 10 report on that basis. If they try to challenge us 11 legally, I suppose that is open to them, but we 12 feel -- I think we share your concern that the two 13 should be treated equally, or regarded as equals 14 in proposing this project. 15 MR. STEFANIUK: I thank you for that 16 and I appreciate that, because other than 17 Mr. Bowering, I have not seen any significant 18 presence from the department. And it seems to me 19 that it has been somewhat subdued, or whether that 20 is intentional or not, I am not saying that. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: I had requested, some 22 time before the hearing started, that the 23 Department of Water Stewardship be present to 24 answer questions in this regard, because of the 25 very issues you raised, that in fact they will be 02187 1 operating it afterwards, and our terms of 2 reference say we are to look at the operations of 3 the project. So, that is why Mr. Bowering is 4 here. He is representing the department, he is 5 the lead person in that division. 6 MR. STEFANIUK: The only concern I 7 have in that regard too, and I agree with what 8 you're saying, is that down the road I can 9 certainly envision, summer operations, for 10 example, when you go to rule 2 or start 11 artificially flooding, the concerns of our 12 citizens have not been heard because there is a 13 division of responsibility. But if your 14 Commission is going to deal with that on the basis 15 you have indicated, I am satisfied with that at 16 this point. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: I realise that's only 18 one area of your report, and we will certainly 19 consider all your comments, but I just wanted to 20 bring that one matter to your attention today. 21 MR. STEFANIUK: I would appreciate 22 that. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Webster or Mr. 24 Motheral, do you have questions? 25 MR. WEBSTER: One brief question. You 02188 1 presented us with this table which I took from 2 your desk while you were going on to your next 3 point. I presume this occurs somewhere in our 4 material and I wonder if you could direct us to 5 it? If not, could you give us a copy? 6 MR. STEFANIUK: It appeared in the EIS 7 as a sort of a very small postage stamp thing. I 8 saw the Floodway Authority use it during some of 9 their public meetings they held during the past 10 year, and I obtained that copy from Mr. McNeil of 11 the Floodway Authority. I didn't see it in the 12 EIS as such, that's why I requested a full page 13 copy to present that to you today. 14 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you. 15 MR. MOTHERAL: Thank you. Mr. 16 Stefaniuk -- Bob. 17 MR. STEFANIUK: Thank you. 18 MR. MOTHERAL: It has been a very 19 clear presentation, thank you very much for that, 20 it is nice to be able to follow it as you are 21 going through it so we can highlight things. I 22 take it from the response to your presentation 23 that you truly do represent your constituents, so 24 thank you very much. 25 MR. STEFANIUK: Thank you, 02189 1 Mr. Motheral. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mayor 3 Stefaniuk. 4 MR. STEFANIUK: Thank you. 5 MR. STEWART: I don't want to be out 6 of order, but I think there is an important 7 clarification on the top of the page. The bullet 8 as read and presented said that a 9 federal/provincial financial compensation 10 agreement must be replaced by the flawed Red River 11 Floodway Act. 12 I am wondering, Bob, if you actually 13 mean must replace the flawed Act? 14 MR. STEFANIUK: You are correct. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: I took it to read that 16 way. I realised it was a mistype. 17 MR. STEWART: I wasn't sure what the 18 record was going to show. Thanks. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Maxine Clifton. 20 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, just 21 before we get on to the next one, I would like to 22 add the Ritchot Concerned Citizen's Committee 23 presentation as Exhibit number 75 and Mr. 24 Stefaniuk's presentation as number 76. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 02190 1 2 (EXHIBIT 75: Presentation of Ritchot 3 Concerned Citizen's Committee) 4 5 (EXHIBIT 76: Presentation of Mr. 6 Stefaniuk) 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Order, 8 please. Ms. Clifton, could you please state your 9 name for the record and I will have the Commission 10 secretary swear you in. 11 MS. CLIFTON: My name is Maxine 12 Clifton. 13 (MAXINE CLIFTON: SWORN) 14 15 MS. CLIFTON: Before I start my 16 presentation, I wanted to comment that I had never 17 in my life spoken publicly until I spoke in front 18 of Mr. David Farlinger at the Water Commission in 19 1997 or 1998. Wouldn't it nice if this was the 20 nice time, Mr. Farlinger? 21 I also wanted to tell people my relief 22 at seeing in the Winnipeg Sun on Tuesday, and I am 23 sure Mr. Sargeant is relieved as well, that Greg 24 Selinger was quoted as promising the people in 25 Manitoba that shovels will be in the ground in 02191 1 July, with or without the participation of the 2 Federal Government. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: You are using precious 4 time. I won't be quite as lenient with you as I 5 was with Mayor Stefaniuk. We have many others 6 behind you. 7 MS. CLIFTON: Mr. Chairman, 8 Commissioners, Ladies and gentlemen, I am a 9 lifelong resident of rural Manitoba and a resident 10 of the upstream area of the Winnipeg floodway. 11 Some years ago we moved from the area, not far 12 from the Winnipeg city boundary. We have come to 13 understand some of the history of the floodway, we 14 have suffered artificial flooding as well, and 15 have learned about the trials and tribulations of 16 trying to work with governments during, and with 17 most difficulty after flood events. We have 18 learned about water management issues and the 19 operation of the floodway. We lived in the eye of 20 the storm during the '97 flood and the years of 21 aftermath. 22 These experiences have caused us to 23 have a very high level of frustration, among other 24 symptoms of distress. I have made many 25 presentations at all of the hearings, and most of 02192 1 the workshops and conferences over the years. I 2 have written hundreds of letters, arranged 3 meetings with politicians, and communicated with 4 the media. 5 Clearly, the Floodway Authority still 6 doesn't know who we are, what our issues are, or 7 what recommendations we would like to discuss. 8 There has never been the slightest 9 change in the attitude of the Provincial 10 Government about raising upstream flood levels 11 above natural without the negotiated right to do 12 so. 13 I felt that the floodway 14 socio-economic impact story lacked a human face 15 and voice to enable the Commission to better 16 understand the terms described in the EIS, like 17 anxiety, stress, frustration, and complete lack of 18 trust. 19 You will forgive me, there will be 20 some overlap and repetition, although I got to 21 hear the point of view of the Floodway Authority 22 several times, so perhaps you will tolerate it 23 from us as well. 24 Mr. Chairman, I believe, in fact I 25 know, that former Premier Duff Roblin's intention 02193 1 in approving the Red River Floodway was to 2 introduce a system of flood control measures that 3 would provide increased flood protection for the 4 City of Winnipeg, while maintaining natural flood 5 levels for other Manitobans. The floodway was 6 intended to function over the full range of Red 7 River discharges, without ever raising upstream 8 water levels above the natural. 9 The '58 Royal Commission on Flood Cost 10 Benefit, in deciding on the most economical 11 floodway capacity, assumed that whenever the 12 design flood is exceeded, the excess flows are 13 passed through the city. This would result in 14 some flooding, but in a much lesser degree than 15 without the floodway. They contemplated 16 surcharging the floodway, as Mr. McNeil describes, 17 but this was not allowed in the end. 18 The operation of the floodway, with no 19 communication about this to the upstream people, 20 has been altered over the years for an ever 21 greater benefit to the city, until today we have a 22 situation where the province claims that upstream 23 citizens are not adversely affected by 24 above-natural levels of some seven, eight, nine or 25 ten feet. The province has at some unknown date, 02194 1 after constructing the floodway, set the maximum 2 operating levels at 778 above sea level or higher. 3 This seems to assume that emergency rules composed 4 after the floodway was built have the status of 5 design criteria, which cannot be the case. 6 One of the original floodway designers 7 was up here in '97, and was very distraught after 8 seeing the destruction after the 1997 flood, 9 saying this was never supposed to happen, and he 10 explained why. He was one engineer who believed 11 in his social responsibilities for projects he 12 designed. Before the floodway was constructed, 13 unsuspecting, upstream communities took comfort in 14 assurances that this project would be good for 15 you. They began to be suspicious later with the 16 altering of rating curves and experimental 17 manipulation of the gates. They began to realise 18 they were not informed or consulted on any of 19 these changes and the ever increasing impact they 20 were having on fellow Manitobans. 21 The difficult search for information 22 continues to be made more onerous when concerned 23 citizens have faced restrictions concerning 24 release and distribution of records we consider 25 critical. Published assurances by the province 02195 1 were freely distributed and received by rural 2 Manitobans as late as the summer of 1996, stating 3 that the floodway would never cause artificial or 4 above natural flooding upstream. 5 It is our position then that this 6 recent 1996 promise must be the baseline used for 7 the environmental impacts assessment of this new 8 project. 9 It is baffling to us how the province 10 has twisted this promise made, we assume in good 11 faith, into a new assurance, that the expanded 12 floodway will be good for us. At some uncertain 13 future date, all of our homes, properties, and no 14 doubt some lives will be destroyed, but don't 15 worry, the expanded floodway won't make these 16 project induced damages any worse. 17 Mr. Chairman, the rules of operation 18 of this system are of paramount importance to us. 19 Much uncertainty comes from the province's 20 statement to the federal government, while a 21 review of the rules was ongoing, that the rules 22 are not rules in the legal sense, but really 23 guidelines like all our reservoirs. 24 The new operating rules drafted in 25 1999, in anticipation of this expanded floodway 02196 1 project, over our vigorous protests, excluded any 2 representation from our most heavily impacted 3 community, even from the technical committee 4 elected by the residents to represent them on 5 flood-related issues. 6 Mr. McNeil commented that we had our 7 councillor appointed to that committee, but there 8 was no mention made that on the last meeting all 9 the people that were there had agreed that they 10 really didn't represent the area they came from, 11 only their own personal interests. 12 When our new municipality, for good 13 cause and on sober second thought, decided to 14 withdraw their endorsement, the city, province and 15 federal government were the very next day into the 16 municipality to secure their signatures after all, 17 under conditions that demanded an inquiry. There 18 most certainly should have been an environmental 19 impact assessment done on the impacts of these 20 never before attained levels of flood waters in 21 the inhabited upstream community, as well as for 22 the new trigger for gate operation, and for the 23 new lower levels to be held in the city, and for 24 artificial levels far higher than anyone ever 25 suspected. 02197 1 The new rule 4, added secretively just 2 prior to these hearings with no consultation or 3 notification is jaw-dropping. 4 We must, therefore, do with the 5 assessment of this new project the rules that were 6 put in place for it. 7 The Province of Manitoba plans to 8 operate the floodway in a way that raises the 9 design water in the Red River at the control 10 structure up to eight feet above natural flood 11 level. As a result, our flood risk will be 12 dramatically increased. The province intends to 13 do this without compensating in any way by flood 14 easements for this increased risk, and further, 15 they have been clear they intend to continue this 16 practice. 17 One should note that the increased 18 risk is just as real for the upstream citizens as 19 the decreased flood risk is for the City of 20 Winnipeg. The province refuses to recognise 21 citizens' rights in operating this floodway, so we 22 believe we must then rethink the design. 23 The flood protection of Winnipeg 24 clearly and with no doubt or uncertainty requires 25 the sacrifice or inundation of the citizens 02198 1 immediately upstream. We cannot live under these 2 conditions. I could not accept this no matter 3 where in Canada I might live. 4 Mr. Chairman, it was disconcerting to 5 learn, after studying flood events, the extent to 6 which experimental procedures and crisis planning 7 would influence the operation of the floodway. 8 Over time and more recently, I have come to 9 understand that, number one, assurances provided 10 by the government concerning the operation of the 11 floodway cannot be relied upon. The province has 12 stated, even recently, that the floodway has only 13 caused artificial flooding once, in 1997. Our own 14 review of provincial numbers indicates we were 15 artificially flooded actually ten times since the 16 floodway was built, and possibly greater than 20 17 times if the Assiniboine River reduction is 18 considered. 19 All these times, Mr. Chairman, with no 20 negotiated compensation agreement ever attempted, 21 no apparent consideration of the legal riparian 22 rights of this minority of Manitobans, no 23 discussions with impacted homeowners regarding 24 purchasing the legal right to do this, no option 25 of buyouts permitted to those who requested them, 02199 1 no admission publicly that there even was 2 artificial flooding, and no public recognition of 3 the sacrifice that these citizens of Canada are 4 being forced to endure. 5 Secondly, no environmental impact 6 assessment was ever undertaken for the existing 7 and likely illegal flood control works. This is a 8 perfect example of why people have struggled so 9 hard and for so many years to put these assessment 10 rules in place. 11 Thirdly, larger flood events in the 12 future are likely to have more disastrous 13 consequences than the '97 flood. The KGS report 14 on flood protection studies for Winnipeg on page 15 28 estimates the average annual damage from 16 raising the water level to 778 feet above sea 17 level to be 30 million 2001 dollars. That's 18 reduced from the $51 million I had there 19 originally after discussion with Mr. Carson. 20 I might add that this figure does not 21 estimate that the costs for this sort of flooding 22 extend far beyond the material damage that can or 23 should be compensated after it has occurred. 24 While planning may be a dynamic 25 process, it can also be a confusing one with great 02200 1 uncertainty. For example. 2 A) Not knowing what the Director of 3 Water Resources was talking about when early in 4 the 1997 event he told us we are following the 5 rules, we are holding 24.5, only to learn later 6 that there even was any rules, and that this level 7 was not part of them, and further that the thought 8 of maintaining natural levels in 1997 was not even 9 considered. 10 B) When asking about the apparent 11 change in the rules was told by another provincial 12 water engineer, "we haven't followed those rules 13 for ten years." 14 When I requested a copy of the new, 15 new rules, was told that they had not been written 16 down. 17 Immediately after the '97 flood event, 18 the province reassured everyone that there was no 19 artificial flooding. It took five and a half 20 years after the event for the province -- that the 21 province's natural level study, which we were 22 completely shut out of, stated we had seen 23 2.25 feet. None of this is of any consequence 24 anymore, as the province is telling those of us 25 still holding on for our claims, that artificial 02201 1 flooding is not the problem, it is not 2 contributory negligence. 3 The province and their insurance 4 lawyers continue to assert they have no 5 responsibility for the artificial flooding that 6 occurred in '97. 7 Mr. Chairman, 14 days ago in The Free 8 Press our premier was quoted as saying that the 9 best predictor of future government actions is 10 past actions. This is all we know. Everything 11 else is uncertain. There is confusion and 12 uncertainty during large flood events. Many 13 citizens suffered huge losses when the province, 14 fearing liability for deaths, forced evacuations. 15 The province, in their Floodway Act, 16 expects citizens who have spent hundreds of 17 thousands already on flood protection to take 18 measures to protect their homes and properties 19 from ever higher flooding, with no details 20 provided. There seems to be a lack of 21 understanding by the authorities that when we 22 erect these massive sand bag dykes, as required, 23 they and the pumps to support them must be 24 maintained and managed 24 hours a day. It is 25 cruel to expect individuals to struggle to take 02202 1 action, then force them out. The province refuses 2 to address this issue, as its local. The local 3 authorities have no answers and refer us back to 4 the province. 5 We have been asking for years now, 6 under what authority would the province remove 7 private citizens from private property, either 8 forcibly or voluntarily? This question remains 9 unanswered, sir. 10 There is a lot of fear, confusion, and 11 uncertainty regarding this West Dyke. In front of 12 our disbelieving eyes, in anticipation of the 13 floodway expansion project, and with requests on 14 the responsible minister's desk for an 15 environmental assessment before the project began, 16 this dyke across the Red River Valley was not only 17 moved further south, but significantly lengthened, 18 with no studies of the impacts that will surely 19 result. 20 We take no comfort with assurances 21 that now that the contentious part of this dyke 22 was done, the planned raising will cause no 23 further impacts. 24 The Water Commission in '98 25 acknowledged some local effects with the old dyke, 02203 1 but there is no public information on the impacts 2 created with this new dyke in any operational 3 ranges. Funding arrangements for this project are 4 either denied to us or are very confusing. 5 Our position is that this new dyke 6 must be assessed with the floodway expansion 7 project it is part and parcel of. 8 Anger and confusion is rampant in our 9 area regarding the planned future summer 10 operations. The original design did not 11 contemplate summer operations, nor did any rules 12 of operation, fairly obtained or not. Yet, 13 provocatively, it was used this way in 2002 and 14 2004 as an experiment and to establish existing 15 conditions. The predicted rainfall did not occur, 16 yet the gate was up for weeks. The result was 17 deeply disturbing environmental damage to riparian 18 riverbank areas, vast erosion for which 19 compensation is denied, and far more severe damage 20 to wildlife and their habitat than any spring 21 operation. 22 Information on this damage or any 23 baseline does not exist. The province reassures 24 Manitobans that the market gardeners, some here 25 for more than a hundred years, will be bought out, 02204 1 apparently giving themselves carte blanche to 2 destroy this precious river bottom riparian land. 3 The province says this is for sewer 4 relief, rather than the wildly held belief it is 5 really to insensitively keep the Forks and 6 Waterfront drive developments dry for tourists, 7 and this is separate from the walkways that 8 Mr. McNeil spoke about. Recently published 9 information in 1996 states the floodway cannot be 10 used this way. 11 Our position is that this new and 12 planned future operation must be examined now. 13 Development is occurring rapidly in the city, as 14 we speak, in historically low river front 15 properties, well outside the primary dykes. The 16 upstream citizens need clarification on how 17 frequently we will see water storage and increased 18 erosion on our properties to protect these new 19 developments. 20 Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 21 turn my attention to flooding. The '97 flood or 22 Flood of the Century, as it became known, provided 23 me with firsthand knowledge and experience of what 24 it is like to become a victim of such a disaster. 25 I feel qualified, therefore, to speak as an expert 02205 1 on the matter of socio-economic events 2 anticipated, planned even, associated with future 3 flood events. 4 While the project EIS attempts to 5 convey the serious nature of the socio-economic 6 impacts, it fails to describe the many intangible 7 personal consequences to people. I would like to 8 share some of these with you, and I am pleased 9 that Mr. McNeil saw fit to listen as well. 10 Immediately after the '97 flood, we 11 faced very aggressive media spin, blaming us for 12 our misfortune. The sense of shock and 13 abandonment still exists over this betrayal. 14 Suggestions were made by the province that we 15 built too low, on the same plain as Winnipeg 16 residents occupy. We had taken all precautions to 17 ensure we met the terms and conditions of 18 provincial permits and government direction and 19 approvals processes. We were well high enough for 20 the '97 flood, especially with the massive sand 21 bag dykes that were erected. And remember, we 22 were told that above natural flooding was not 23 permitted. None of us would have been flooded, 24 Mr. Chair. The province continues to blame us, 25 even with the incredible hard mitigation work in 02206 1 '97, which we know we can never do again. We are 2 described as architects of our own fate. 3 Parades were held, bells were rung in 4 the city celebrating the end of the flood, as the 5 water continued to rise in our area. To date, no 6 one in our upstream area just outside the city 7 boundary is aware of, or has ever been thanked for 8 the terrible hit we took on behalf of our 9 neighbours, which we accepted as necessary at the 10 time. 11 I recall the personal supervision and 12 provision of 18 tandem loads of sand on our 13 driveway. I had to go out of town to secure 14 sandbags not available locally, rolls of poly to 15 seal the dyke by the truckload, and with the help 16 of volunteers and my elderly mother cooking for 17 them, erected a sand bag dyke of 20,000 bags, six 18 and a half, seven feet high. The last two feet at 19 the top were done on the fly, as the rules 20 changed, and were pulled out from the cold filthy 21 flood water from homes that had already gone 22 under. They were placed wet and without benefit 23 of poly to help with the outrageous leaking that 24 our nine pumps running full time day and night 25 could barely handle. I will never forget the open 02207 1 weeping sores on my husband's hands from this, 2 right down to the ligaments, Mr. Chair. 3 Our gas was turned off, so for six 4 weeks that spring we had no heat or hot water in 5 our home. Actually, as we had a cistern, we had 6 no water at all. 7 Of course, we could never evacuate. 8 Of course, our home got wet, developed the mold 9 that next winter, ultimately costing us the home 10 we fought so hard to save. The province's 11 response, contributory negligence, sir. 12 The time lost at work, both during and 13 the years after the event, dealing with claims 14 procedures and paperwork, cleaning up, which is 15 continuing, rebuilding, which is halted, meetings, 16 letter writing, hearings, preparations by myself 17 and others has been incalculable. Sadly, loss of 18 careers, benefits, pensions, security and mental 19 health is. 20 Retirement savings by many of these 21 residents has vanished. It is so hard to wish our 22 best to friends and colleagues on their 23 retirements, while we quietly mourn that after a 24 lifetime of full employment we cannot look forward 25 to our own. 02208 1 You cannot begin to fathom the impact 2 of severe long-term stress, fatigue, and 3 protracted legal intervention on our health, 4 family, and social life, or the sense of loss 5 knowing that the eight most productive years of 6 your working life, and it looks like more, have 7 been stolen from you. The long-term anger and 8 frustration of an entire community eats at you. 9 The regulators are assured that when the flood 10 waters recede, that this rare, brief, 11 non-significant event is over for us. 12 Let me challenge that statement by 13 saying that when the city's damages are reduced 14 and the celebrations are over, the event for the 15 sacrificed citizens is just beginning. The study 16 I am living through continues, and eight years 17 after this life-altering sacrifice, there is 18 little sign of recovery. Sharing grief with our 19 neighbours last week and last night, forced to 20 drop out of our litigation from sheer exhaustion 21 of money and energy, realizing it is not whether 22 your claim is legitimate, it is how long and 23 firmly you can hold on and how much money you 24 have. We, who have studied this Floodway Act, 25 know it will be worse next time. 02209 1 Just prior to these hearings the 2 province decided they wanted myself and my husband 3 in for cross-examination, eight years after the 4 flood, on the first three days of these hearings. 5 They now have finally put their water resources 6 engineer up for examination tomorrow. 7 I am not suspicious, Mr. Chair, but 8 does it seem like coincidence to you? 9 You have already observed in some of 10 our presenters the destruction of personalities 11 associated with this long-term stress. You will 12 observe more. The whole community is still 13 suffering from post-traumatic stress. Did you 14 note Mr. Osler's comment, that residents become 15 anxious and stressed at the mere mention of the 16 word "floodway." Do the regulators feel this is 17 unusual? Were you concerned in the EIS that the 18 only source of stress for us was from traffic 19 disruption? The Floodway Authority clearly, and 20 for cause, has no idea of the situation in the 21 upstream community, nor are they likely to explore 22 this deplorable and historic abuse of citizens' 23 rights. We understand why, they have a project 24 they to do. What we don't understand is why the 25 province chose to make us adversaries and not the 02210 1 allies we would have preferred to be. 2 Before we leave this life, and I am 3 afraid it might be sooner rather than later, our 4 only goal in life is, and I swear this before God, 5 to see that this never happens to another citizen 6 of Southern Manitoba. 7 I vividly recall a year after the '97 8 event, my mold-infested home, a very ill husband, 9 ongoing confrontations with Provincial Disaster 10 Assistance officials, and the inability to get 11 myself together enough to care for others. Being 12 denied insurance for our brand new mortgage 13 because we were both seeing trauma professionals, 14 suffering the depression associated with every 15 socio-economic impact, caused me to question the 16 very value of life itself. In the middle of 17 continuing to deal with ongoing claims procedures 18 and an ever ongoing adversarial process, one year 19 after the event, I required a stay at a crisis 20 stabilization facility. Other serious health 21 issues are now moving forward. The collective 22 suffering around us was and remains immense. 23 Stress between marriage partners is 24 unbelievably high. The blame the victim approach 25 taken by the province was deeply hurtful and 02211 1 continues to be internalized by many. The sense 2 of failure, especially men, and especially by 3 those forced to evacuate, continues. The sense of 4 betrayal is beyond comprehension. 5 I, myself, still mourn having to give 6 up a 27-year career as a health care professional 7 as post-traumatic stress and community 8 representation took over my life. 9 Mr. Chairman, I could go on, but let 10 me conclude my comments with the following 11 question: How could anyone in a fair and 12 reasonable manner conclude that upstream residents 13 will experience no significant adverse impacts 14 associated with major flood events compared with 15 what we know as the existing environment? 16 How can there be no significant 17 effects with summer artificial flood levels when 18 riverbanks in close proximity to homes are eroded 19 because of reverse and altered moisture levels of 20 bordering riverbanks? 21 Lastly, Mr. Chairman, let me share my 22 apprehension and mistrust for government disaster 23 assistance and emergency measures programs that 24 have evolved since the last flood. Key to 25 legislative and regulatory measures respecting 02212 1 mitigation and compensation is the definition of 2 artificial versus natural flooding. Then, as now, 3 such questions as: Who will determine the 4 difference? How long will this process take? How 5 is such a determination made and with what degree 6 of accuracy? How will different opinions be 7 addressed, or, for God sakes, funded? 8 The legal confrontations that have 9 developed as a consequence of unsatisfactory 10 dispute mechanisms and compensation measures are 11 ongoing. Arguments concerning artificial flooding 12 have taken on a life of their own. The floodway 13 EIS describes the disaster financial assistance 14 program as ineffective. Court records, on the 15 other hand, show that the province denies any 16 responsibility associated with flooding a 17 residential area, and suggests that individuals 18 are to be blamed for inadequate flood protection 19 measures. The much bally-hued Floodway Act is 20 horrible, once studied by someone who has been 21 through that process, and clearly there is no 22 intention by the province to ever have to pay 23 damages. There is no public information available 24 as to what these damages will be. 25 When I asked Mr. Ernie Gilroy at a 02213 1 public meeting what he thought the damages would 2 be, he stared off into the horizon and told me, 3 well, the province can handle it and we won't have 4 to pay it for 700 years. 5 Mr. Chairman, no pun intended, but the 6 protection, mitigation and compensation provided 7 by existing legislation governing flood events has 8 been and is an unmitigated disaster. It has, 9 however, provided the basis for a total lack of 10 trust by rural Manitobans in government at all 11 levels in matters related to Red River flooding, 12 and eroded any respect for integrity of government 13 mitigation and compensation measures. 14 We are expected, not asked, to assume 15 the flood risk and endure the disaster that might 16 have been for our neighbours, which we did quite 17 bravely in '97. Permission, legal or otherwise, 18 to do this to one part of society for the 19 exclusive benefit of another has never been asked 20 for, nor granted. We were never informed in any 21 way that this was ever a possibility. Under the 22 current conditions and uncertainty, it is 23 impossible to put this on the backs of Canadian 24 citizens. 25 Members of the Commission, we do have 02214 1 a great need to make it clear to our fellow 2 Manitobans that we do not, nor have we ever 3 begrudged the City of Winnipeg its flood 4 protection. We ask only that the folks who take 5 the hit do not bear the burden of cost for such 6 protection. While we recognise this hearing is 7 not about the '97 flood, the hearing must, 8 however, consider the socio-economic consequences 9 of the proposed project as a whole on the people 10 living upstream of the control works. We plead 11 for your support in the resolution of long 12 standing issues associated with the '97 flood. 13 Whatever measures this Commission may take to 14 ensure that appropriate and mutually acceptable 15 compensation agreements are in place would be 16 invaluable. Flooding for our community is not a 17 matter of "if," but "when." We ask for only 18 assurance that we be treated in a fair, reasonable 19 and timely manner when such an event occurs. If 20 anything, the '97 flood should have taught us what 21 not to do. 22 Mr. Chairman, thank you for giving me 23 the time to share with you and others. 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 25 Mrs. Clifton. We have no questions for you. It 02215 1 was very clear. 2 MS. CLIFTON: Thank you. 3 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, we will 4 add Mrs. Clifton's presentation as Exhibit 77 5 6 (EXHIBIT 77: Presentation of Maxine 7 Clifton to CEC) 8 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Rita 10 Bartmanovich. 11 Before Ms. Bartmanovich proceeds, I 12 would just like to note that I allowed Ms. Clifton 13 considerably more than 15 minutes because she had 14 in fact asked for some additional time some time 15 before the presentation, so I don't want that 16 taken as a precedent. If everybody goes so much 17 over, then a number of people will not be able to 18 get on today. I would please ask people to try 19 and restrict their remarks to 15 minutes. 20 Ms. Bartmanovich, would you please 21 state your name for the record and I will have the 22 Commission secretary swear you in. 23 MRS. BARTMANOVICH: My name is Rita 24 Bartmanovich and I live at 1040 Red River Drive in 25 the Rural Municipality of Ritchot. It is known as 02216 1 Howden, Manitoba, with my husband, Peter. 2 (RITA BARTMANOVICH: SWORN) 3 MRS. BARTMANOVICH: My presentation 4 might be different than a lot of other 5 presentations that are being made. Although it is 6 going to be a little different than what I have 7 given you because there is a couple of questions 8 that were asked earlier that I think I have the 9 answers to. 10 I am not an engineer, or a public 11 speaker, I am a wife, mother, grandmother, who has 12 lived and worked all my life in this area. As a 13 child I lived at lot 205 St. Mary's Road, which 14 was directly across the river from where I live 15 now. During the spring, summer, and fall we 16 crossed the river by boat every day to go to 17 school and walked across in winter. We even made 18 a road across the river so that we were able to 19 drive, because our property was two miles from St. 20 Mary's Road so it was easier to get to Red River 21 Drive. My parents settled in the area in 1930 and 22 started up a market gardening operation. 23 My husband's grandparents, Peter and 24 Sophia Bartmanovich, arrived and settled in the 25 area in 1893. The fifth generation of the 02217 1 Bartmanovich family now lives on Red River Drive. 2 The first experience with flooding 3 occurred in 1950. After my mother, my younger 4 brother and myself were evacuated, we moved to 5 Washington Avenue in East Kildonan. My older 6 brother and my father stayed behind to move 7 cattle, all kinds of livestock with Richardson's 8 in their barge to try to save the animals. I 9 worked as a teenager on the Leighton Avenue dyke 10 in Winnipeg to protect Winnipeg in the 1950 flood. 11 Peter and his father began building 12 the homestead in 1949. During the 1950 flood the 13 flood water was below the floor joists in the 14 basement and never reached the main floor. To put 15 things in perspective, during the 1997 flood the 16 flood waters in our home were above the light 17 switches on the main floor. In other words, there 18 was approximately four and a half feet of water on 19 the main floor of our house. 20 When construction of the floodway 21 began, assurances were made to us that the water 22 level within the city limits would be kept at 23 25.5 feet James Avenue. I know this for a fact, 24 because the people from the government were 25 sitting in our kitchen, buying property to build 02218 1 the West Dyke. They told us they were going to 2 make it 18 feet high and this floodway was going 3 to protect us. 4 My father-in-law said, how is this 5 dyke going to protect us when this dyke is two 6 miles away from the river, and I live right by the 7 river, how is this going to protect us? You are 8 making a fish bowl out of this whole area, which, 9 thank God, he wasn't alive to see. 10 To my knowledge, the waters in 11 Winnipeg never reached the 25.5 foot limit, never, 12 not in one of these floods. This brings to mind 13 questions. 14 First, why did the city allow 15 development of subdivisions with storm sewers at 16 24.5 feet, and secondly, why has the city not 17 built up their dykes to the appropriate levels? 18 This was all over the place that this was supposed 19 to be 25.5, so why years later, are they allowed 20 to do this? 21 The 1966 flood occurred because the 22 floodway was under construction and the flow of 23 water was being held back. An ice jam formed that 24 held back water. The ice went across Red River 25 Drive, took asphalt off the road, also took out a 02219 1 hydro post and live wires were in the water. Cars 2 were attempting to come from the north down Red 3 River Drive through the water, because in the 4 morning there was no water there, so they figured 5 it was very low. I was standing there waving and 6 yelling for them to back out, not to try to go 7 through this water, because it was electrified. 8 The main wires were laying in the water. 9 In 1969 flooding occurred even though 10 the water levels were not above previous natural 11 water levels. We also knew that testing of the 12 floodway gates were being conducted at that time. 13 In 1972, '74 and '76, similar 14 situations were experienced. Review of the 15 records will show that water levels at James were 16 kept at between 14 and 17 feet. The water levels 17 south of the floodway were much higher. 18 In 1979 there was another flood. The 19 water in our yard was within inches of the 1950 20 flood water, yet further south the water levels 21 were much lower than 1950. It would be 22 interesting to check the levels at James Avenue in 23 1979. 24 We were fortunate in these last 25 instances to keep our house dry by sandbagging. 02220 1 After 1979 we decided to build a ring dyke around 2 all our property, which is a distance of about one 3 mile. We were getting older and sandbagging was 4 becoming more difficult for us. Another factor 5 that was taken into consideration was that, with 6 sandbagging, our house would be dry but all our 7 outbuildings were in water and we would have to 8 move out the livestock. 9 The dyke at that time cost us 10 approximately $35,000, which was funded -- our 11 portion was $35,000 on our own. 12 We thought the cost was worth the 13 peace of mind. 14 In 1996 there was yet another flood, 15 but our dyke kept us dry, but Red River Drive was 16 under water in many places. Again, it would be 17 interesting to review the record at James during 18 this time. 19 As if all this isn't enough, 1997 20 brought us the flood of the century, a flood we 21 are still trying to recover from, and yet we still 22 see daily reminders of it. 23 Prior to the flood we watched the TV 24 and read newspaper reports and realised this was 25 going to be extremely serious, although we never 02221 1 imagined it would be as bad as it turned out to 2 be. 3 We began to worry that our dyke would 4 not be high enough and we tried many times to 5 reach the engineers from the Department of Natural 6 Resources to give us our current levels. We were 7 finally able to get an engineer to come out to the 8 property on Saturday, April 19th. We were told 9 that our dyke was high enough but we could put two 10 feet of dirt on top to protect against wave 11 action. 12 On Monday, April 22, we hired some 13 heavy machines to begin this job of raising the 14 dyke. At 5:00 p.m. that same day, the engineers 15 came back to the property and informed us that we 16 would need to add an additional four feet to the 17 top of the dyke, not two feet. We had already 18 decided to add the extra protection on our own, 19 even before the engineers returned. The earth for 20 the project was taken from the field just outside 21 the dyke on the west side of the homestead. 22 Early in the morning of April 23rd, I 23 went to get the newspaper and stopped dead in my 24 tracks. Enormous chunks of ice were coming across 25 Red River Drive, and we were totally surrounded by 02222 1 flood water. The water level had risen nine and a 2 half feet overnight. The fact there was no 3 scarring of the asphalt by the ice flows attest to 4 how much the water rose overnight. I had never 5 witnessed such a marked increase in water levels 6 overnight in all my years in the area. The night 7 before there was no water anywhere on Red River 8 Drive. In fact, you couldn't even see it. 9 Apparently the floodway gates were put into 10 operation overnight which resulted in a huge ice 11 jam. The water was backed up and the floodway 12 itself was jammed with ice. 13 It was our understanding that the 14 gates were not to be put into operation if there 15 was still ice in the river. This leads us to 16 question why they were used at that time. In 17 talking to our son later that day, who lives about 18 500 feet from the floodway gates on the Winnipeg 19 side, told us that they were blasting. He got up 20 about 12:30, 1:00 o'clock in the morning, they 21 were blasting the ice because it was almost taking 22 out St.Mary's Road bridge. And this is what 23 caused the water to back up. But that water never 24 left us. People think the water comes up, and 25 then once it can flow that we don't have any 02223 1 problems. We never get rid of that water. That 2 water stays and it just adds to what is coming 3 from the south. 4 Even though Red River Drive was still 5 open to the south of us, it was now impossible to 6 get dirt from outside our ring dyke to raise the 7 level of the dyke. Earth now had to be taken from 8 inside the dyke. We not only had a house to 9 protect, but outbuildings and a relatively new 10 greenhouse operation with three buildings full of 11 plants to think of as well. 12 There were three drotts and a 13 caterpillar 16 ring working against time to raise 14 the level of our existing right dyke four and a 15 half feet for the entire mile around the property. 16 When the heavy equipment left on 17 Friday, April 25th, Red River Drive was completely 18 under water. Luckily, we had marked the road the 19 previous day which allowed the equipment to get 20 out safely. 21 On Friday, April 25th, my husband left 22 the house, took the boat to 75 highway to get out. 23 Given that he had received a heart transplant in 24 1994 and was on anti-rejection drugs which 25 compromised his immune system, it was felt that he 02224 1 would be too great a risk to be around the 2 contaminated water. 3 I had received permission to remain on 4 the property with my son-in-law to tend the 5 greenhouses. We proceeded to move items upstairs 6 to the second floor of our house, just in case. 7 While we were trying to move some of our 8 belongings the mounties came and told us we had to 9 leave. I didn't want to go, but I was told I 10 could come in daily to come tend to my plants. We 11 were told we had to be out before -- if we did 12 come in for the day, we had to be out before dark. 13 I thought it was a fair compromise, so we left -- 14 and never again, they would have to take me in 15 handcuffs, if I would leave. 16 We found out later that this was not 17 true. My son-in-law did make it in on Monday and 18 Tuesday, by a very good gentleman at Natural 19 Resources that took him in. 20 The Wednesday morning was quite calm, 21 Monday and Tuesday were very rough, high winds. 22 Wednesday morning was quite calm and we tried to 23 get access. We waited for over an hour on highway 24 75 but nobody came. We went to the floodway to 25 see if Natural Resources staff were there. They 02225 1 were, but they would not allow me to go. My 2 son-in-law was allowed to go as long as he stayed 3 at my son's house, who had property that was built 4 on a raised platform next door to us. Our 5 property was too risky, as it was contained within 6 a ring dyke. There were enough provisions at the 7 house, so we agreed to that. 8 On Thursday, during one of his routine 9 trips around the dyke, my son-in-law noticed there 10 was a significant amount of erosion on the 11 northwest corner due to high winds we had in the 12 beginning of the week. He called the appropriate 13 emergency authorities to check out the situation. 14 He was told that things looked fine, with about 15 two feet of clearance, there was no leaking and 16 the water was beginning to drop to the south. 17 Friday morning, May 2, my son-in-law 18 came over to the house by boat, he tied up the 19 boat on top of our dyke. Upon arriving, he heard 20 a strange noise. He proceeded to walk to the west 21 side of the dyke and saw the water coming over the 22 top. 23 A helicopter was flying overhead and 24 was telling people to evacuate, as there was 6 to 25 18 inches of water coming. It was coming across 02226 1 the field in the southwest like a tidal wave, and 2 he managed to take a few pictures. He ran to the 3 house to take as much as he could to the second 4 floor, and managed to save our dining room table 5 and chairs. In less than two hours, the yard was 6 filled with water. 7 The Coast Guard landed with the 8 helicopter on top of our dyke and got him out. He 9 phoned us at 11:30 to tell us we were finished. I 10 had never cried so hard in all my life. 11 The order had been given to cut the 12 Glenlea Road to take the pressure off the newly 13 erected Z-dyke. So instead of water flooding 14 west, it flowed east towards the river. It was 15 also my understanding that there were portions of 16 the Z-dyke that didn't have any water on it. So I 17 question the need to take pressure off the dyke 18 that had no water touching it. 19 They did the same thing in Ste. 20 Agathe, they cut the road in Ste. Agathe. Ste. 21 Agathe was dry in the 1950 flood, Ste. Agathe 22 would have been dry in this flood, but they had to 23 cut the road. So the water goes back towards the 24 river, it is not going to go another way. 25 The entire experience was a nightmare 02227 1 from start to finish. At first we could not get 2 the heavy equipment to come in to raise the dyke, 3 because they were all busy in other flood related 4 jobs including the Z-dyke. You finally get the 5 dyke raised and you still get flooded. 6 Approximately 80 percent of the homes in the RM of 7 Ritchot were flooded on May 2, 1997. 8 I don't know if any of you could 9 possibly imagine what it is like to wade into your 10 home with knee high rubber boots, only to see all 11 your belongings floating in water. Our beautiful 12 oak cabinets had fallen apart, a lamp was hanging 13 from a brass bed post, a teapot next to the bed, 14 and the furniture turned upside down, and your 15 clothes everywhere. We couldn't see all the mud 16 in the water, but it was surely evident next time 17 we went when the water had receded. 18 As the river went down, we had to pump 19 the water out from inside the ring dyke. The 20 entire process took us two weeks. 21 The first time I walked into the 22 greenhouse, I felt sick. The benches were all 23 twisted and all the plants were ruined. Not only 24 did we lose all our possessions, we lost our 25 entire year's income from the greenhouse business. 02228 1 Unfortunately, we had already put out 2 the entire year's expenses with no hope of getting 3 any return on our investment. 4 The emotional trauma was worse. I had 5 many nightmares that summer and would wake up in a 6 panic thinking the apartment was filling with 7 water. The realization that everything we had 8 worked for our entire life was gone, including 9 some irreplaceable objects, and many photos of 10 both my children and grandchildren. You know, we 11 didn't realise we had lost these pictures until a 12 day in 1999, when my nephew was killed and my 13 sister-in-law asked if I had pictures of my 14 nephew, which I took when he was 32 years old, I 15 said no problem. I went to get the pictures and 16 there was no pictures there. 17 To add to our misery, the battle for 18 compensation was and still is another nightmare. 19 The $100,000 cap they initially put was woefully 20 inadequate, as we had over three times that in 21 damage. We had recently rebuilt an addition to 22 our farmhouse that was over 1,000 square feet, 23 remodelled the kitchen and bathrooms and purchased 24 new furniture. That alone was valued at about 25 $150,000. 02229 1 That summer, in July, just before our 2 42nd wedding anniversary, what Bob Starr said 3 earlier about the emotional things that 4 happened -- there was a piece on the news and it 5 just got to me and I went running for the river. 6 I figured the river took everything else, it might 7 as well take me. I knew I couldn't swim and could 8 go. My daughter-in-law saw me and she went 9 running after me and she stopped me. The only way 10 she stopped me was by telling me how my husband 11 had fought for two years for his heart transplant 12 to stay alive, and how can you leave him now? 13 That's the only reason I am here today. 14 We were not prepared to make any 15 repairs until a flood proofing plan was in place. 16 Before any rebuilding took place, we flood proofed 17 the property to the 1997 flood levels, and then 18 went an extra two feet for peace of mind. The 19 cost of this was about $20,000 out of our own 20 pocket. In total, we have now spent in excess of 21 $55,000 of our own money flood proofing our 22 property. This is only flood proofing. 23 With the proposed plan for the 24 floodway expansion, we are reasonably certain that 25 our current levels will not be high enough. 02230 1 An important fact seems to be missed 2 here. The river water moves faster than water 3 being redirected into a diversion channel. My 4 understanding, there is no plan to move the berm 5 at the entrance to flood inlet. Water will not 6 enter the floodway any faster than it has before, 7 only the total volume of the floodway is being 8 increased. This plan will not help the property 9 owners who live south of the floodway, and I fear 10 it will only make matters worse. 11 Has no plan been developed that will 12 benefit everyone, or at least give consideration 13 to everyone? 14 Has diversion directly to Lake 15 Winnipeg been considered? The Assiniboine River 16 has a diversion and flooding seems to have been 17 minimized as a result. Would something similar be 18 an option? 19 The floodway expansion is going to 20 cost approximately $650 million to which each of 21 the taxpayers in the RM of Ritchot are 22 contributing without being any consideration. 23 When diversion to the lake was mentioned at an 24 earlier meeting, I was told that this would only 25 save about 500 homes as it would not be cost 02231 1 effective. I say, these 500 home have families 2 living in them who deserve better than they have 3 received so far. 4 The 1997 flood left us in financial 5 dire straits. There had been no mortgage on our 6 farm in over 40 years, but since the flood we have 7 a mortgage or a loan of about $75,000, and have 8 taken at least $55,000 out of our RRSPs. 9 On this loan we had to put up my 10 husband's life insurance policy, in order for them 11 not to put a mortgage on the farm, we have my 12 husband's life insurance policy as collateral. My 13 husband's health is failing and we are still 14 working in order to meet our newly acquired 15 financial obligations. My husband is 73 years 16 old, and I am 70. How much longer should we be 17 expected to work and pay because of the Red River 18 Floodway? We should be enjoying our golden years 19 but instead the years are mired in red ink. 20 Please make no mistake, I don't want 21 to see Winnipeg flooded any more than anyone else 22 in this room, but Winnipeg is not the only 23 consideration that has to be made. The floods of 24 the past have taken their toll on everyone in this 25 rural municipality, and there is not one person 02232 1 who lived through the 1997 flood that wants to 2 have to live through another, and they shouldn't 3 have to. The loss of personal property aside, the 4 emotional scars are even worse. Unfortunately, 5 those are not an easy one to show. 6 The use of the gates during the summer 7 is also putting additional stress on the 8 riverbanks. Last year, for example, they were 9 raising the gates and the water touched the edge 10 of Red River Drive. 11 My greenhouse was open. I sell all my 12 plants from my yard, and I was emotionally wrecked 13 that my customers couldn't come in because the 14 water was going to be over the road. Thank God, 15 it never got over the road. 16 Red River Drive, by the way, used to 17 be the highway to United States of America. It 18 was the old number 14 highway. So it wasn't built 19 at a low location that people might think. It is 20 a high road. It doesn't mean anything since the 21 floodway was built. 22 Every year there is significant loss 23 to the river bank in front of my home. Red River 24 Drive once was the main highway to the States but 25 is now sliding into the river. We used to have 02233 1 over six acres of land and grazed ten cows down 2 there all summer long. And now we have no land 3 left because it is all in the river. At the 4 current rate, I may not have a dyke in front of my 5 house to protect me in the next few years. 6 I think it is time the Federal 7 Government takes an active roll in this project 8 and not to be pressured by the province to start 9 construction before all the appropriate 10 assessments have been completed and all options 11 have been fully explored. Agreeing to do this 12 simply based on increased cost associated with 13 delays is unacceptable. 14 Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your 15 time. I also hope and pray that the Commission 16 does find, and help all of us out, not just one. 17 Don't spend $650 million when it will only help 18 some people and not all. What is another hundred 19 million if it can benefit everybody? Thank you. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Thank you 21 very much, Mrs. Bartmanovich. 22 MRS. BARTMANOVICH: Thank you. 23 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, Mrs. 24 Bartmanovich's presentation will be Exhibit number 25 78. 02234 1 2 (EXHIBIT 78: Presentation of Mrs. 3 Bartmanovich to CEC) 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We will 5 take a short break right now. Please come back 6 about 3:15 p.m. 7 (Proceedings recessed at 3:05 and 8 reconvened at 3:15 p.m.) 9 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. We'll come back 11 to order, please. It's quite clear that we won't 12 get through all of the presenters today. We will 13 have to reschedule those that don't get on today 14 for another date. 15 Next up is Dr. Jay Doering. Could you 16 please state your name for the record and I'll 17 have the secretary swear you in. 18 MR. DOERING: My name is Jay Doering. 19 20 (JAY DOERING: SWORN) 21 22 MR. DOERING: Mr. Chair, I apologize 23 for not having made enough copies and causing a 24 delay. I will do my best to stay within 15. I 25 don't think we'll have a problem there. I'll come 02235 1 back to the title in a little bit. I'm going to 2 mostly run through a little bit of a chronology 3 here. The beginning of course, the reason we're 4 really all sitting in this room to some extent is 5 because the flood water has crested on the 13th of 6 May. If you're superstitious, it wasn't a Friday, 7 it was a Saturday in 1950. It was a late spring 8 with lots of rain and we got 104,000 CFS in a 9 system that had no floodway, no Shellmouth 10 Reservoir and no Portage Diversion. The water 11 level was about five feet higher than it was 12 during the 1997 flood. 13 Most of us have seen these pictures. 14 St. Vital took the hardest brunt of the flood. 15 The Forks, about five and a half feet of water. 16 You could comfortably boat. And yes, all sorts of 17 untold misery of houses completely submerged and 18 all belongings gone. 19 Ms. Bartmanovich painted a fairly 20 clear picture of things floating around her house. 21 It was no different in 1950. 22 I'll just remind you what the 1950 23 flood cost. 150,000 people were moved, 10,500 24 homes flooded including hospitals being evacuated, 25 Portage and Main submerged and really compared to 02236 1 something that might happen now, a mere pittance 2 of $700 million in damage. 3 Numerous investigations followed the 4 1950 flood, the little known Red River basin 5 investigation and perhaps the better known Royal 6 Commission on Floods in 1956 to 1958 which handed 7 down three recommendations to build three types of 8 infrastructure and that was done. By the time the 9 floodway was started in 1966, we had also started 10 to build ring dykes in eight communities. 11 And then came the Flood of the 12 Century. Anything else was just a warm-up, '79, 13 '96. The City of Winnipeg of course escaped the 14 Flood of the Century, so did some of the 15 communities that had ring dykes built from 1966 to 16 1972. Others were not as fortunate, the Town of 17 Ste. Agathe, Aubigny and lots of private residents 18 in the Red River Valley. 19 When I originally sat and thought oh 20 my goodness, I'm following Maxine and Rita, I 21 thought you know what, it's a blessing because in 22 some way, I can't paint as vivid a picture as they 23 can paint of the emotional scarring that lasts 24 forever when you endure one of these. I have 25 often said, and many of you know this, my wife is 02237 1 a physician who practices in the south end of 2 Winnipeg. And many of her patients measure 3 milestones by whether something happened before or 4 after they lost their home in the 1997 flood. You 5 never get rid of it. 6 After the '97 flood, we built eight 7 more ring dyke communities, and we went through 8 more studies. Mr. Farlinger is sitting over to my 9 right who chaired the Manitoba Water Commission 10 that handed down 58 recommendations. The IJC 11 handed down three reports and KGS handed down two 12 and we note the title, "Flood protection for 13 Winnipeg." 14 There were many options considered for 15 flood protection for Winnipeg, 15 were considered 16 viable -- or 15 were considered, only two were 17 considered viable, the Ste. Agathe detention 18 facility and floodway expansion. I heard Bob sit 19 and talk about other options a little earlier on, 20 Ste. Agathe detention facility might have been one 21 of those. If there is political will for it now, 22 I'd say it's too little, too late. You might 23 close the doors but the horses are already out of 24 the barn. Ste. Agathe is not on the table. 25 The terms of reference for this 02238 1 Commission are quite clear. It is not a trial of 2 the floodway or the operation of the floodway, it 3 is indeed an investigation of the impacts of 4 expansion, in bold and underlined, expansion and 5 only expansion. 6 We have heard a number of concerns 7 during the stakeholder meetings, one of them was 8 the effects on groundwater as a result of 9 deepening. The other was the loss of tax base and 10 productive land associated with additional land 11 acquisition. Both of those are off the table. To 12 my mind, they have been adequately addressed. 13 There is no deepening and there is no additional 14 land acquisition. 15 Concerns associated with the floodway 16 are another matter which, albeit, I understand you 17 would want them on the table but they are not on 18 the table. No benefits north and south. This is 19 one of the ones I frequently hear. Well, that's a 20 lie. North, of course benefits from the 21 Shellmouth Reservoir and the Portage Diversion and 22 that is often overlooked that the Assiniboine 23 River has been throttled for the benefits of those 24 to the north. To the south, albeit, it's not 25 going to be a big deal given the new definition of 02239 1 natural, but floodway expansion will decrease the 2 frequency of the need to go above natural. 3 I have put an "X" beside that because 4 to my mind, they are not relevant. They have been 5 dealt with. 6 Compensation. This is one of the ones 7 that the Premier and I have spoken about directly. 8 The Red River Floodway Act was brought in and it 9 was assented on the 6th of June 2004. It says, in 10 a nutshell, that you will be fully compensated for 11 artificial water levels. 12 Increased ice jamming is often raised 13 on the north that somehow the floodway and the 14 operation of the floodway exasperates ice jamming. 15 I have seen no credible scientific evidence other 16 than a lot of anecdotal. So to my mind, it's not 17 there either. None of these are here of course 18 because they are matters related to the floodway, 19 not to the expansion of the floodway. 20 I see no significant environmental, 21 socioeconomic or cultural effects associated with 22 the construction and operation of, and the keyword 23 again, an expanded floodway. Yes, there may be 24 some associated with the floodway if you happen to 25 live to the south. But the question here is, and 02240 1 the question of the day is, is there an effect 2 associated with expanding the floodway? 3 What I have seen is an extremely 4 disappointing display of politicking. The 5 floodway has become a political lever to get what 6 various people feel should be on the table. 7 We'll start with the RMs. There is an 8 apparent lack of altruistic leadership within the 9 RMs that have opposed floodway expansion, and I'll 10 single out Springfield, St. Clements and East St. 11 Paul. That, if for only one ever so brief moment, 12 the City of Winnipeg was one of the opponents to 13 the floodway expansion is completely to me and 14 utterly incomprehensible. I can't imagine how a 15 city and its leadership could oppose something 16 which is so fundamentally beneficial to itself. 17 The risk of the present infrastructure 18 being exceeded within the various time frames that 19 are put forward for the completion of the floodway 20 are as follows: If we do nothing and we don't 21 have a floodway ready to go for four years, we run 22 a 4.37 risk of having that infrastructure 23 exceeded. If there is a one year delay, and it 24 takes five years before we implement it, then we 25 are at 5.43 per cent. In other words, roughly for 02241 1 every year of delay, and this holds true for most 2 of the years up to about 10, you pick up an 3 additional 1.1 per cent risk. 4 1 per cent may not seem awfully large 5 but I would suggest if I stuck a BMW in the middle 6 of the court in St. Vital and said I had a hundred 7 tickets to sell, I'd have an awful lot of takers 8 on that 1 per cent chance. 9 The talks by Maxine and Rita I think 10 were beautifully timed because now we're talking 11 about having flooding going from thousands to 12 hundreds of thousands, 450,000 Manitobans 13 displaced from their home and 140,000 homes 14 flooded, 8,000 businesses and the running number 15 now is $12 billion in damage. I don't know who in 16 this room is willing to shoulder the increased 17 risk that a delay in this project would cause. I 18 don't think anyone in their right mind would put 19 their hand up. 20 I'm going to use my wife's analogy. 21 The patient, the City of Winnipeg, needs bypass 22 surgery. I'm back to the title. A historic 23 flood, and Maxine said this too, is not a question 24 of if, but when. The patient is a ticking time 25 bomb lying on the table. And we seem to be 02242 1 worried about the scars of the surgery and not the 2 bigger picture. Unless we get a grip on the 3 reality and the gravity of the situation that we 4 are toying with here, the patient may end up dead. 5 To my mind, the Manitoba Floodway 6 Authority has gone beyond the call of due 7 diligence in addressing the issues that were 8 originally raised. It has addressed the 9 significant concerns raised during the hundreds of 10 hours of stakeholder meetings. And again, I'm 11 talking about the expansion of the floodway, not 12 the floodway proper. I see no reason not to grant 13 an environmental licence and no reason not to 14 delay the granting of such a licence or to delay 15 the granting. It's time for the delay tactics, 16 the moving of the target, the political rhetoric 17 to halt and for the important project to proceed 18 on time and on budget. 19 This is simply not an option. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 21 Dr. Doering. 22 Please. We have all shown respect for 23 opposing views. We respect the comments that 24 Dr. Doering has made here today. Thank you very 25 much. Not in order, Mr. Jonasson. 02243 1 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, if we 2 could add Dr. Doering's presentation as Exhibit 3 79. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 5 6 (EXHIBIT 79: Presentation by Dr. jay 7 Doering to the CEC) 8 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. James Shapiro. 10 Dr. Shapiro, do we have copies of your 11 presentation? 12 MR. SHAPIRO: Not yet, Mr. Chairman. 13 I do have copies for you. I would like to request 14 that I give them to you after my presentation. I 15 would like you to pay attention to what I'm saying 16 and not reading something and not paying attention 17 to me. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: With all due respect, 19 we do have some procedural rules that the members 20 of the panel at least will have copies of the 21 presentation before it's made. 22 MR. SHAPIRO: I can do that if you 23 want but I'm going to be summarizing my 24 presentation and you won't be able to follow 25 along. 02244 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I would rather 2 that we have the documents before. 3 MS. JOHNSON: I'll also need a copy so 4 I can enter it into the record, please. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Shapiro, will you 6 please state your name for the record. 7 MR. SHAPIRO: My name is Jim Shapiro. 8 9 (JIM SHAPIRO: SWORN) 10 11 MR. SHAPIRO: Mr. Chairman, as I said, 12 I'm going to summarize my presentation. What you 13 have in front of you is a more complete 14 documentation of what I'm going to say. I would 15 like to begin by saying that enlarging the 16 floodway is putting a ring of death around the 17 City of Winnipeg. What you are doing is enlarging 18 a protected depression that will allow mosquitoes 19 to breed in water that will always be there. Now 20 the mosquitoes are not the big problem, not right 21 now because you can spray for them. But when you 22 expand the floodway and you broaden its base and 23 you have shallow water in it that is protected in 24 warm, you are going to attract tens of thousands 25 if not hundreds of thousands of waterfowl, Canada 02245 1 geese and mallard ducks in particular. 2 Both of these organisms carry West 3 Nile Virus and Avian Flu. Both of these diseases 4 are health hazards unprecedented in scope and 5 magnitude. Now what you have now is the disease 6 host, waterfowl, attracted to a protected area. 7 You have the vector of disease transmission, the 8 mosquito, protected, breeding and a test tube 9 consisting of 660,000 warm-blooded organisms just 10 a short distance away. You are creating a ring of 11 death around the City of Winnipeg. 12 Avian Flu is spread by fecal material. 13 It is grown in the intestinal tract of waterfowl. 14 Geese in particular defecate copious amounts and 15 frequently. They will make the floodway slick and 16 slippery; and for that reason alone, the 17 recreational uses of the floodway that have been 18 previously mentioned would be impossible. 19 Now the thousands of geese defecating 20 on the banks of the floodway, the very slope 21 created to contain water in the floodway is going 22 to concentrate all of this fecal material at the 23 bottom of the floodway when it rains. And the 24 pathogens contained in the waterfowl fecal 25 material will be carried downstream all the way to 02246 1 Lake Winnipeg every time the floodway gates are 2 opened at Lockport. The pathogens in that fecal 3 material can leak into the aquifer. 4 Mr. Chairman, the Walkerton Ontario 5 catastrophe will seem like a walk in the park 6 compared to the potential damage, death and 7 destruction that this situation will cause. 8 Avian Flu has been called the world's 9 biggest threat and society's greatest risk. It is 10 estimated that a quarter to a third of the world's 11 population will become ill and a hundred million 12 people will die. Authorities around the world are 13 concerned that the Avian Flu will be transmitted 14 to humans who have the flu, reassert itself, 15 mutate into a new form, do a little bit of both. 16 And what happens is you have a pandemic, a disease 17 capable of killing millions of people. 18 What you're doing by expanding the 19 floodway, in my opinion, is creating a seething 20 cauldron of reproductive possibilities that will 21 increase the probability of just such an event 22 happening. 23 Now, geese that live in urban areas 24 are called nuisance geese, and I am not talking 25 about something theoretical. Winnipeg already has 02247 1 a problem with nuisance geese. It is estimated 2 that we already have 142,000 of them and they are 3 causing a terrific problem in our parks, golf 4 courses, retention ponds, back yards, walkways. 5 The addition of 46 additional kilometres of 6 favourable resting, nesting and foraging areas 7 along the floodway will exacerbate this situation. 8 Now, Mr. Chairman, disease is only one 9 problem associated with the massing of huge -- a 10 huge number of waterfowl. Occupying the same 11 space as commercial airliners is another problem. 12 A major approach to the Winnipeg International 13 Airport is from the southeast, directly above the 14 floodway. What you have are large, cumbersome, 15 slow commercial airlines descending, slowing down 16 in their final approach, incapable of making 17 evasive maneuvers. If one goose, let alone a 18 flock of geese, hits that airplane, enters an 19 engine, there is no aircraft engine in the world 20 that can ingest a bird as large as a Canada Goose 21 and continue to fly. 22 You know what's going to happen. You 23 have passengers on a plane, you have the plane, 24 itself, you have houses in St. Norbert, Fort 25 Garry, Lindenwoods, St. James Assiniboia clustered 02248 1 in densities, each containing more than one 2 individual. The damage is going to be incredible. 3 Collateral damage will also be high. 4 Mr. Chairman, I've called the expanded 5 floodway a ring of death but I'm also calling it a 6 circle of risk. Because the very bridges that the 7 province is suggesting be replaced and improved 8 are themselves a threat to the integrity of the 9 floodway. There are 12 bridges. Without 10 providing a backup to their destruction, each of 11 those bridges becomes a possible point of attack, 12 for what or who, terrorists, a deranged human 13 being, accidental, mechanical or physical failure 14 or natural catastrophe. 15 A collapsed bridge during a flood 16 creates a dam. When you have a dam, the water 17 goes over the floodway and we lose Winnipeg. 18 Adding tens of millions of dollars if not hundreds 19 of millions of dollars to the original cost of 20 expanding the floodway makes no sense if the 21 destruction of any one of those structures can 22 mean the loss of Winnipeg. And the same can be 23 said for the floodway gates. This is simply poor 24 disaster management. If you don't have a backup, 25 what you're doing is putting all of your eggs in 02249 1 one basket and you are circling a city as unique 2 as Winnipeg with vulnerable bridges that just 3 don't make any sense. We have to think of the 4 unimaginable and put preparations for such an 5 event into place. 6 Now recreation is a topic that has 7 been discussed extensively at these hearings. And 8 of course, the presence of thousands of geese and 9 millions of mosquitoes does create a public health 10 hazard and that situation would rule out any 11 recreational use of the floodway. The presence of 12 the humans means that you cannot spray to get rid 13 of the mosquitoes because you'll harm the humans. 14 Encouraging people to use the floodway 15 on a regular basis makes their presence a regular 16 occurrence and nothing to be suspicious about. 17 But just the opposite should be the case. If no 18 one is allowed, the presence of anyone is 19 noticeable. If everyone is allowed, then the 20 wrong person will be undetected. The 21 vulnerability of the bridges and the floodgates to 22 human interference means that people should not be 23 encouraged to use the floodway. 24 But let's assume it is used for 25 recreational purposes. If that occurs, then 02250 1 permanent structures have to be built for the 2 convenience of the recreational users: Picnic 3 areas, campgrounds, playgrounds, shelters, 4 washrooms, parking areas, trees, permanently 5 installed maps. You are here, you have to go 6 there, maybe commercial ventures. But the 7 floodway is a protective device for the safety of 8 the residents of Winnipeg. It is not a 9 playground. 10 Impediments to the free flow of 11 flooding water should be avoided because such 12 objects can form the anchors to dams that can form 13 when debris lodges against these structures and 14 additional debris lodges against that and now you 15 have another breach of the floodway and we lose 16 Winnipeg. 17 There are other considerations. When 18 there is a major flood, Winnipeg calls the army in 19 to help save it. The army occupies the top of the 20 floodway. It is at the top of the floodway that 21 the army pitches its tents, establishes its 22 headquarters, creates landing pads for its 23 helicopters, parks its tanks and amphibious 24 vehicles. That's where they have their mess tents 25 and hospitals. That's the staging area for their 02251 1 landing craft. Anything that would interfere with 2 the operation of the force has to come in to help 3 save Winnipeg is not in the best interests of 4 Winnipeg or the Province of Manitoba. The banks 5 of the floodway should remain bare, clean and 6 unobstructed in the interest of protecting 7 Winnipeg. 8 There are other considerations. What 9 about emergency vehicles, quick access in case 10 there is an accident, access roads, zoning, blah, 11 blah, blah, on and on. I have it here, 12 Mr. Chairman. I won't bore you with the details 13 right now. 14 What I want to do right now is discuss 15 something that the residents of the Red River 16 Valley say is their most urgent concern, and that 17 is drinking water. And I want to make you aware 18 of a precedent established when the original 19 floodway was built. It's called the Connery case. 20 Mr. Connery was a resident who lived about 5,000 21 metres north of the floodway. And as it was being 22 built and afterwards, his well went dry, and then 23 it became contaminated with salt water. He sued 24 the province. In court, the province said that 25 Mr. Connery did not own the water, that 02252 1 Mr. Connery had no common-law rights to water 2 which does not flow in a known channel. The 3 province said that Mr. Connery did not establish 4 any right to prevent the interference by the 5 province with the flow of underground water. And 6 the province said that the floodway was a drainage 7 work for the benefit of the public's good and, 8 therefore, it was exempt from legal challenges. 9 Finally, the province said that no liability could 10 be attached to the Government of Manitoba because 11 the construction of the floodway was authorized by 12 statute. 13 The judge dismissed all of the 14 province's arguments. The province appealed. The 15 province lost. The judge said that the province 16 knew or ought to have known, and that's the key 17 phrase, Mr. Chairman, ought to have known that its 18 actions in constructing the floodway would result 19 in damage to Mr. Connery's well. The judge said 20 that public works must be so executed as not to 21 interfere with private rights of individuals. And 22 the judge said that pollution, which is what 23 happens when you contaminate a well, is a 24 nuisance, that pollution is always unlawful, and 25 that a person who commits a nuisance is under a 02253 1 constant legal obligation to abate it. 2 Now, the point I want to make here, 3 Mr. Chairman, is that the Province of Manitoba is 4 not going to view favourably suits against it as a 5 result of the floodway expansion. There may be an 6 $11 million contingency fund and that may build 7 new wells but it's not going to cover the legal 8 costs of the people who are going to sue the 9 province when their wells go dry or are 10 contaminated. 11 The Connery case establishes a 12 principle that the province cannot engage in 13 public works that it knows or ought to know will 14 interfere with the private rights of individuals. 15 Mr. Chairman, I have called the 16 expanded floodway a ring of death because of the 17 public health hazard but there is another reason 18 why I call it a ring of death. 19 The floodway limits growth in 20 Winnipeg. Growing cities are spreading out. 21 Vibrant cities with vibrant job markets are 22 dispensing away from their cores. Previous 23 building booms in Winnipeg's core never resulted 24 in the anticipated renewal and revitalization. 25 Winnipeg's population is stagnant but 02254 1 municipalities outside of Winnipeg are growing. 2 Winnipeg is restricted in its growth by the 3 floodway. With Winnipeg's population stagnating 4 and its core resisting renewal, it can only look 5 to its periphery, but the floodway limits that 6 growth. 7 Now we know Winnipeg is running out of 8 residential lots and Waverley West is supposed to 9 be our salvation. It will provide 10,000 new 10 homes over the next 20 or 30 years and that's 11 great. But I ask what happens over the next 670 12 years which is the anticipated flood protection 13 safety net that the floodway is supposed to 14 provide. How does Winnipeg grow with an 15 artificial barrier limiting that growth? 16 Now, Mr. Chairman, I have two more 17 sections I want to summarize for you. This one I 18 call -- I want to discuss in this one Lake 19 Winnipeg, Devil's Lake and the Ste. Agathe dyke. 20 These are not apparent digressions and I will 21 bring them back to the main topic, protecting 22 Winnipeg, in a minute. Let me say a few things 23 about Lake Winnipeg. 24 Lake Winnipeg is dying. I don't know 25 if we passed the point of no return. Some people 02255 1 say that within 15 years, it will be destroyed. 2 Nitrogen and phosphorus are the main ingredients 3 that are killing Lake Winnipeg. The majority of 4 the Nitrogen and the phosphorus polluting Lake 5 Winnipeg comes from the Red River. And the 6 majority of the Red River's nutrients come from 7 the United States. It is estimated that one-third 8 of the nutrients in Lake Winnipeg originate in the 9 Red River basin south of the U.S/Canada border. 10 Let me take another apparent 11 digression and mention Devil's Lake. Devil's Lake 12 is in North Dakota. It is a closed basin. It has 13 no natural outlet. It has risen more than six 14 metres. It has tripled in size. North Dakota, 15 its legislature, has passed legislation to divert 16 the water from Devil's Lake into the Red River. 17 Canada has objected and has requested that that 18 issue be referred to the International Joint 19 Commission. But the International Joint 20 Commission cannot do its work unless there is a 21 joint request from both countries. And the United 22 States has not submitted that request to the IJC. 23 Critics of the Devil's Lake project 24 are concerned that foreign organisms will enter 25 the ecosystem of the Red River and create havoc. 02256 1 But foreign species have already been introduced 2 to the Red River's ecology. And there is evidence 3 that Devil's Lake water has entered the Manitoba 4 system on at least four occasions. 5 Now, North Dakota has already spent 6 $25 million on its project. It's almost 7 completed. They previously spent $350 million to 8 raise roads and move or protect homes. And they 9 say if the damage doesn't stop, they will have to 10 spend another $900 million which, if that happens, 11 will bring a total expenditure on that project to 12 over $1.3 billion. 13 I do not believe that the United 14 States is going to submit a request to the 15 International Joint Commission. North Dakota has 16 spent too much money on their project. It's 17 almost complete. And the United States is simply 18 too powerful and indifferent to the concerns of 19 other countries. Its own self-interests come 20 before bilateral commitments and obligations, 21 which means that Devil's Lake water is going to 22 enter the Red River water shed. So what does this 23 all have to do with protecting Winnipeg? 24 Well, I feel there is a compromise 25 that is possible, a compromise that could 02257 1 significantly help save Lake Winnipeg, solve the 2 Devil's Lake problem, encourage cooperation 3 between Manitoba and North Dakota and protect 4 Winnipeg. And the compromise is, let Devil's Lake 5 flow into the Red River but there is a little 6 catch. The United States would have to contribute 7 significantly to the costs of building the Ste. 8 Agathe dyke, of managing that dyke and of 9 maintaining that dyke, and introducing into its 10 control structures the very filters that Manitoba 11 says it needs to prevent those nutrients and 12 pollutants from coming into the Red River and 13 entering Lake Winnipeg. 14 Five things immediately happen if this 15 occurs. First of all, there is a redundancy to 16 the floodway expansion. Now, the engineers in the 17 room know that redundancy is an engineering term 18 and it's a very important concept in any 19 engineering project. There is no redundancy in 20 the expansion of the floodway. But if you put up 21 a dyke in Ste. Agathe, you immediately have 22 redundancy. The threat of terrorist attack is 23 severely reduced. You are reduced by one-third 24 the nutrients flowing into Lake Winnipeg. Devil's 25 Lake is resolved. The cost of protecting Winnipeg 02258 1 is greatly reduced. And most importantly, 2 Mr. Chairman, by erecting a dyke at Ste. Agathe 3 you bring the dry side of the dyke closer to 4 residents of Southern Manitoba. And that allows 5 you to initiate a plan of evacuation involving 6 assigned spaces in multiple-use buildings erected 7 on the dry side of the dyke so that there is no 8 loss of life or possessions. 9 I spoke about this in my original 10 presentation to the Clean Environment Commission 11 in 2002 and I have appended that presentation to 12 my presentation. You have it there. So you can 13 refer to it at your convenience later on. 14 My last section, Mr. Chairperson, I 15 believe that the best approach to protecting 16 Winnipeg would be to build the Ste. Agathe dyke 17 and expand the floodway. How can we do that? 18 Well, the federal government has already committed 19 just last week $332.5 million to an expansion 20 project. Previously, the Province of Manitoba got 21 $120 million which it matched and that's supposed 22 to go to raising the West Dyke, improving the 23 bridges and so forth, all of which have to be done 24 anyway. 25 The federal funds could easily build 02259 1 the Ste. Agathe dyke, especially if the United 2 States paid for a substantial part of it. 3 Now, I go on to lots of advantages, 4 lots of advantages but I don't want to overstay my 5 time. So let me let you read those and point out 6 to you that when the original floodway was built, 7 Duff Roblin did not have the money to build that 8 floodway either. He adopted a pay-as-you-go 9 approach. You do what you can, you acquire the 10 funds, you do a little bit more. And there's no 11 reason why we can't adopt that approach to build a 12 dam in Ste. Agathe to expand the floodway and why 13 stop there. There are other projects that would 14 mitigate flooding in the Red River valley with the 15 mind-set that we're here for the long-term, not 16 four years down the road but 10,000 years, 100,000 17 years. 18 If Winnipeg is -- a low point in 19 Manitoba is at the confluence of two rivers, we 20 are never going to prevent flooding, we can only 21 manage it. Why not manage it to the best of our 22 ability and take your time. You build the dam 23 dyke at Ste. Agathe, you can do it quicker, 24 cheaper, get twice the protection, you protect 25 Winnipeg and now you go and expand the floodway. 02260 1 It is my opinion that the present 2 floodway expansion plans are flawed by logic, 3 doomed by history and lack financial 4 accountability. I believe both flood protection 5 measures should be undertaken because if they 6 don't, it is my recommendation that the Province 7 of Manitoba should dam or they will be damned. 8 That's the end of my presentation. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 10 Dr. Shapiro. I just have one question. Are you a 11 medical doctor or an academic? 12 MR. SHAPIRO: I'm a professor at the 13 University of Manitoba. I have been for 34 years. 14 I'm an animal behaviourist. I direct the Avian 15 behaviour laboratory and specialize in the study 16 of the Canada goose and mallard duck and I've been 17 doing that for 40 years. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Thank you 19 very much. 20 MR. DOERING: Might I make a comment? 21 THE CHAIRMAN: It's outside of our 22 procedure. 23 MR. DOERING: I would beg you to allow 24 me this. In my presentation, I believe I referred 25 to the residents of the north as having been 02261 1 liars. And I would like to say that I deeply 2 regret that comment, that that is their belief and 3 obviously my belief does not coincide with their 4 belief. And I guess for the record, I will let it 5 be known that I am a consultant to the Manitoba 6 Floodway Authority but I do not feel that that is 7 in any way in fact biased on my comments today. I 8 feel quite passionate about the need to provide 9 flood protection for the City of Winnipeg. And 10 again, I apologize for having perhaps used extreme 11 language for the residents to the north and south. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much and 13 the record will show that. Ms. Kennedy 14 Courcelles, please, no props. Come forward and 15 make your presentation. We don't need all of the 16 props. 17 MS. JOHNSON: While we're waiting for 18 Ms. Kennedy Courcelles, we will enter 19 Dr. Shapiro's presentation as Exhibit 80. 20 21 (EXHIBIT 80: Presentation by Dr. 22 Shapiro to the CEC) 23 24 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms. Kennedy Courcelles, 25 this is a very lengthy presentation. 02262 1 MS. COURCELLES: I have 11 pages, and 2 if I speak at a speed that she can type, it takes 3 me 22 minutes I believe. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, thank you very 5 much. Would you please state your name for the 6 record? 7 MS. COURCELLES: Cheryl Kennedy 8 Courcelles. 9 (CHERYL KENNEDY COURCELLES: SWORN) 10 THE CHAIRMAN: You may proceed. 11 MS. COURCELLES: Mr. Chairman, members 12 of the board, of the Manitoba Clean Environment 13 Commission, Manitoba Floodway Council, fellow 14 Manitobans, and Canadians. It is with great 15 honour that I come here today to represent those 16 who do not have a voice and/or no longer have the 17 spirit to tell the truth. My name is Cheryl 18 Kennedy Courcelles; I have a university degree 19 from the University of Manitoba studying under Dr. 20 Ramu. I majored in sociology, specialized in 21 family, minored in psychology and philosophy. I 22 am a spiritual advisor, I am a visionary person 23 and a strategic management coach. Further to that 24 I am an energy healer, an animal whisperer, an 25 artist and a connector. 02263 1 My husband Don and myself have built a 2 very successful Investors Group career over the 3 last 20 years. I have been a financial planner, a 4 national sales manager, a provincial and federal 5 employment counselor. I actively volunteer at 6 every level of life, and my most sacred and 7 rewarding has been my position of being a 8 dedicated mother, wife, conservationist, and 9 nature lover. 10 I am the daughter of an 11 entrepreneurial family. My father has been a 12 farmer, a commercial fisherman, and a successful 13 small business owner in Portage La Prairie. My 14 mother operated the student lodges at the 15 University of Manitoba Research Station and the 16 Delta Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Station for 17 over 25 years. My father-in-law built one of 18 Southern Manitoba's most successful agriculture 19 farms and farm equipment dealerships. He also was 20 amongst the first to introduce intensified hog 21 livestock operation into the Ste. Agathe area. My 22 mother-in-law has been both a teacher and a 23 bookkeeper. 24 I was here in Ste. Agathe for the 25 flood of 1997. I also weathered the Montreal ice 02264 1 storm with no power for 12 days. During this 2 short period of time our basement also flooded two 3 times unrelated to weather. I have personally 4 experienced back-to-back flooding discovery and 5 have lived in five different homes in two 6 different provinces, and all have flooded for one 7 reason or another. I can attest personally to the 8 damaging effects to one's health, be it the mind, 9 the body or the spirit that unwanted water can do. 10 I respect the former leaders for their 11 foresight and desires to protect Winnipeg. I 12 equally respect the present advisors for the 13 drive, dedication and desire to protect the city. 14 I commend you for your efforts and I thank you on 15 behalf of myself and my fellow Manitobans for the 16 energy and the processes that you have put forth. 17 From what I have witnessed and 18 experienced over the last two weeks in these 19 public hearings on the floodway expansion, I see 20 serious -- sorry, I see further serious effects 21 rippling in need of studying and action in order 22 to make this project sustainable or even morally 23 feasible. The existing structure, from its very 24 existence, has caused extremely adverse cumulative 25 effects to the very way of life to those who live 02265 1 beyond its protective walls. The safety, health, 2 and culture of Winnipeg's neighbours have been 3 negatively affected. The environment has been 4 altered negatively as well. The land gouged, the 5 river forced to scour and erode its saturated 6 banks. The floodway's mere existence has 7 negatively separated the city from the country, 8 both morally, spiritually, economically, and 9 environmentally, all under the assumption that the 10 city is worth more, or is more valuable than the 11 country. 12 The expansion of the floodway by 13 utilizing the existing proponents of its baseline 14 and right-of-way bring nothing either new nor 15 different as far as protection to the masses. 16 Does the existing floodway need some maintenance 17 to ensure its safe and proper operation? Yes, I'm 18 sure we all agree it does. Do we need to dig the 19 channel wider and attempt to hold unforeseen 20 floods based on past information that's never been 21 recorded? No, we don't. The existing structure 22 has and will continue to protect Winnipeg. This 23 province has a sewage infrastructure problem and 24 the water drainage problem, not a channel problem. 25 Adverse cumulative effects. The first 02266 1 negative effect of the floodway system and 2 expansion is an enormous one, the devastation of 3 the First Nations people. For the past 45 years 4 this floodway has sacrificed the people of Lake 5 St. Martin and Peguis Reserve. It has manipulated 6 their health in mind, body and spirit. It has 7 economically, residentially, culturally, and 8 environmentally disrespected and destroyed their 9 ways of life by sending them our polluted, 10 unwanted, and unnecessary artificial waters. From 11 the bottom of my heart, I am truly sorry for this 12 irresponsible abuse that has been left to continue 13 and be unaccountable for the past four decades. 14 Hopefully, with more than morally just leaders 15 such as Prime Minister Paul Martin and Premier 16 Gary Doer, this induced devastation shall 17 immediately come to an end. To put a dollar value 18 on this deliberate action of the floodway system, 19 one only needs to refer to Phil Fontaine's speech 20 in the House of Representatives on February 23, 21 2005, in which he speaks of the cumulative dollar 22 values of the net side effects of removing First 23 Nations people from their communities, their 24 wildlife, land, language, and again, turning them 25 into victims. 02267 1 The Manitoba Floodway Authority states 2 that artificial flooding effects are 3 insignificant. Fellow Canadians know in their 4 hearts that allowing or causing a situation to 5 occur that would create victims and then uprooting 6 those same people is not an insignificant act with 7 no negative repercussions. To add insult to 8 injury, the Peguis people have not only been 9 annually wading in our polluted waters from 10 artificial flooding, but they have been left out 11 of the loop of floodway protection, left out of 12 the loop of development, and are to be left with 13 having to deal with ice jam problems occurring due 14 to the existing and proposed floodway expansion. 15 It is with great sadness, sorrow and humility that 16 I, as a neighbour, I am to witness over a hundred 17 million dollars being spent on artificial flood 18 protection south of the city, when I know that too 19 little is being spent to protect our northern 20 communities. 21 It pains my spirit and the spirit of 22 the nation to report when fellow Manitobans 23 artificially flood the Red River, we know we 24 jeopardize the safety of the sacred burial ground 25 of Chief Peguis at St. Peter's Church. To date no 02268 1 flood or ice protection has been provided to our 2 founding forefather and noble friend of all of our 3 communities. Not only is this disrespectful and 4 irresponsible, it is absolutely unacceptable. It 5 is time that we honoured our heritage, not drown 6 and victimize it. Where are our Canadian cultural 7 and heritage practices, where is our decency? 8 Under the Peguis Indian Reserve 9 mandate, should the governments not be held 10 responsible to take care of this? I ask, who here 11 in Canada would care to trade moccasins with these 12 people and bear witness to their grandfather's 13 grave being eroded away by manmade flood waters? 14 How uncivilized are we to become that we, in such 15 blatant disregard, disrespect the dead. 16 The second red flag to the Manitoba 17 and Canadian people is the necessary and critical 18 issue of protecting and preserving the quality and 19 the quantity of the world's most precious and 20 declining resource, water. As states in these 21 public hearings, it's never been the intention of 22 the existing structure to destroy or infect our 23 provinces and Canadian natural water aquifers. 24 The people and actions in the 1960's did the best 25 they could with the knowledge and technology they 02269 1 had at the time. However, this is the millennium, 2 we now know more, and we have full Canadian 3 intentions on doing better. The existing and 4 proposed expansion of the floodway system has a 5 cumulative and immediate adverse effect of 6 long-term sustainability of the quality, safety 7 and quantity of Canada's natural resource. 8 In a century where we are globally 9 experiencing severe water shortages, it is both 10 unheard of, and morally unethical to continue to 11 allow or to further this destructive abuse of 12 water energy. The adverse effects of moving 13 forward with the floodway expansion shall be to 14 further provide both fecal and agricultural 15 bacteria and into this natural Canadian water 16 resource through the operation of the floodway 17 systems and the artificial flooding, including a 18 non-flood event operation. 19 The cost analysis shall have to 20 include the moral and ethical effect of globally 21 knowing unnecessarily draining 4 million litres of 22 drinkable water in a year. The dollar cost of 23 infecting and wasting the very heart of Canada's 24 pure water supply is both unbearable and 25 unaffordable. 02270 1 The near to long-term adverse 2 cumulative effect of knowingly polluting this 3 natural water resource is the sad and fatal 4 outcomes of both Walkerton and Orangeville, as 5 already stated on record in these hearings. 6 As with the First Nations people and 7 the burial grounds, immediate action is required 8 as part of the floodway expansion revised mandate 9 to fix at best as modern day global technology can 10 repair these existing aquifers that the original 11 and proposed floodway has cut into. This 12 necessary and immediate action should be in accord 13 with Prime Minister's Martin's L20 project and 14 current federal water management protection 15 practices. This correcting of the abuse of 16 Canada's core water resource shall lift the veil 17 of shame and blame off the province, its 18 government, and its people. 19 Thirdly, on behalf of Manitobans, 20 Canadians and North Americans, let's have an 21 objective look at the long-term cumulative adverse 22 effects that the proposed and thus existing 23 floodway systems in operation shall have and do 24 have on the environment. 25 What we know for sure is that there 02271 1 has never been a recorded history of a 700 year 2 old flood. There are geographical markings of a 3 300 year old flood found in land formations and 4 tree rings and written record of an 1826 flood. 5 The existing current protection system would, 6 shall, and did protect us from any human induced 7 and natural flood. What we know for sure, as for 8 provincial and federal jurisdictions, is that in 9 Manitoba we have a severely agriculturally related 10 polluted water drainage system in place, running 11 directly and deliberately into the Red and the 12 Assiniboine River, Lake Winnipeg and Lake 13 Manitoba. 14 The toxicity of the quality of the 15 water has been directly negatively impacted by the 16 drastic increase of intensified livestock 17 operations and current agricultural and manure 18 operation practices. 19 The bottom line is that Manitoba has 20 been subject to intensified municipal and regional 21 drainage ditches and agricultural levels are at 22 their breaking point. All of this is gathering in 23 everyday normal water conditions and being 24 funnelled at catastrophic speeds to the Red River, 25 thus in turn causing abnormal quantities of 02272 1 polluted water in our federal navigable Red River 2 waterway, which is flowing into Winnipeg at 3 unforeseen levels, which in turn causes panic, 4 stress and anxiety to the entire province's 5 safety, well-being, both emotionally and 6 economically. 7 The negative adverse effects commence 8 when this unnecessary polluted water hits Winnipeg 9 and whether the licenced or unlicensed operating 10 rules kick in and the flood gate is lifted, 11 sending forward a flowing river unnaturally 12 backwards and artificially and severely killing 13 every living egg, den, baby, cocoon and larvae in 14 it path. This artificial flooding of both the 15 existing and the proposed operating systems 16 directly and adversely affect Manitoba's, 17 Canada's, and North American's migrating wildlife, 18 be it the eagles, hawks, Monarch butterflies, fish 19 and so on. A federal red flag alert. 20 After the operations of the floodway 21 in the summer of 2004, the residents and studies 22 have shown a dramatic decrease in the nonexistence 23 of some of the wildlife normally found on the 24 rivers and lake edges. According to the books 25 "Butterflies of North America by Jim Brock and Ken 02273 1 Kaufman, and current information in the newspaper, 2 the Monarch butterflies have decreased in Mexico 3 and they are at one-third the amounts going back 4 there. 5 The Monarch, as they state in their 6 book, is likely to be seen in Southern Canada 7 southward. That's us. I just can't help feeling 8 partially responsible for the decline of the 9 Monarch butterfly from our polluted artificially 10 flooded waterways. 11 To continue to not address and not fix 12 the problems of why we are flooding and never did 13 before, other than the flood of 1826 and the 14 geological flood of 300, is to turn our backs on 15 the very cancer of the problem and to treat the 16 expansion of the floodway as a band aid solution 17 for festering diseases and "dis-ease" in epidemic 18 proportion. Refer to John Barry's book, The Great 19 Influenza, the epic story of the greatest plague 20 in history. There is a tsunami coming our way on 21 Canada central core water energy source. The sad 22 fact is we are individually, provincially, and 23 nationally doing it to ourselves, and as Jane 24 Jacobs describes in her book, Dark Ages Ahead, the 25 Death and Life of Great American Cities. Lester 02274 1 Brown also describes in his book outgrowing the 2 earth, the food security challenge in Age of 3 Falling Water Tables and Rising Temperature, as 4 well in the Lester book, Plan B, Rescuing a Planet 5 Under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble. We 6 find a correlation to the adverse cumulative 7 effects of polluted drain off waters in artificial 8 flooding in the World Watch Institutes as well, 9 the State of the World 2005, Redefining Global 10 Security. 11 To get a better understanding of the 12 long-term adverse cumulative effects on the 13 socioeconomic and environmental effects of 14 mismanagement of polluted water practices and 15 artificial flooding, we turn to legendary Rachel 16 Carsons in her 40th anniversary edition of the 17 book Silent Spring. And now to list a Canadian, 18 David Suzuki's Readers Book, A Lifetime of Ideas 19 and Leading Activists and Thinkers also needs to 20 be consulted. May I also refer to Jared Diamond 21 in his book, Guns, Germs and Steel, as he alludes 22 to the decline of civilization being directly 23 linked to the destroying of wood energy by cutting 24 down and not replanting trees. The Rise and Fall 25 of Easter Island from the Garden of Eden to 02275 1 Cannibalism. And the lesson for Adam and Eve was 2 that they did not plant the apple seed. No 3 long-term sustainability or respect of planting 4 the apple tree for the future. 5 As stated earlier in the hearings, the 6 local and regional water and environmental studies 7 have already been done and need to come out of 8 those filing cabinets. 9 To sacrifice, drown, and starve 10 precious wildlife and ecosystems is like asking 11 the Manitobans and Native people to sit back and 12 witness an animal Auschwitz, Hitler's unmorally 13 and inhumanely massacring of life. I personally 14 did not receive a direct answer on who is going to 15 tell the animals and the ecosystem that artificial 16 waters are coming to kill them. Will I have a 17 response as to who will tell my children and my 18 grandchildren that it is okay to morally kill our 19 animals, birds, fish, and tree friends for the 20 lack of an unrealistic band aid solution to 21 Manitoba's water crisis? My Winnipeg friends 22 would like to know who is going to feed these 23 starving, suffering wildlife once we have drowned 24 its habitat and its grocery store. 25 To believe that Manitobans, Canadians, 02276 1 Americans and global citizens are going to sit 2 quietly under the umbrella of insignificant 3 effects of artificial flooding to the very health 4 and long-term sustainability of our people, 5 quality of water, migratory, local wildlife, 6 fisheries, riverbanks, trees, and vegetation is 7 both naive and irresponsible. Again, the dollar 8 cost analysis would be in the billions. The Prime 9 Minister's vision of L20 dictates that he wishes 10 Canada to be a leader in disease and energy 11 management, and surely not to be the example of 12 what not to do. 13 We are depriving the heart of the 14 continent of responsible water protection and 15 management practices. And truth is really, we all 16 did the best we could do with what we had, and now 17 it is time to do better. 18 What is the price tag, I'd like to 19 know, of 24 eagles, two hawks, two owls, six blue 20 jays, 11 magpies, thousands of songbirds, four 21 snow hares, eight cottontail rabbits, 25 white 22 deer, families of skinks and raccoons, three 23 woodchucks or ground hogs, 10 red squirrels, 13 24 gray squirrels, numerous chipmunks, gophers, deer 25 mice, rats, shrews, unlimited migratory birds, 02277 1 including seven wild turkeys, two golden eagles 2 and one great blue herring? These are the animals 3 that are either currently living on our cohabited 4 ten acres of Red River property in Ste. Adolphe, 5 or animals that have lived in the past. I have 6 already seen two empty fox dens and skeletons from 7 last year's artificial flooding on one of our 8 walks. 9 How much money shall I claim for the 10 destruction of these animals, their habitats, and 11 the torture of hearing the animals cry, screech, 12 and howl in suffering and in pain from the loss of 13 their loved ones. This is neither insignificant 14 nor non-cumulative. This is horrific. 15 Please refer to the Lone Pine Field 16 Guide of Animal Tracks of Manitoba and Manitoba 17 Birds, the Freshwater Fishes in Manitoba by 18 Stewart and Watkinson, the Encyclopedia of North 19 American birds by Michael Vanner, and What Grows 20 Where in Canada's Garden, The Water and Wetland 21 Plan of Prairie Provinces, and How Mankind 22 Committed the Ultimate Infamy at Auschwitz by 23 Laurence Rees. 24 I'm sorry to have to be so blunt, but 25 that is the truth for the animal kingdom and 02278 1 mother nature's state of current affairs. 2 So how do we as responsible, knowing 3 Manitobans fix this unbalance of polluted waters 4 coming down the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, making 5 the city worried that its infrastructures of sewer 6 and storm shall not hold up and, therefore, 7 fueling the need to build a bigger, wider ditch of 8 the floodway? And I've been told a ditch is just 9 a grave with its sides kicked out of it. 10 So should we build a bigger, wider 11 grave around the city and be reactive to now 12 natural waters coming our way, or should we be 13 proactive and take a serious look at our American 14 counterparts who are successfully utilizing the 15 waffle system of water drainage from agriculture 16 usage. Please refer to the Prairie Public 17 Television Production movie of the Red River 18 Divide to physically see the waffle system and the 19 geologist's proof that there is no recorded 700 20 year flood. 21 When one studies the five core element 22 energies, the fire energy is situated in the 23 north, metal energy is in the west, water energy 24 in the South, wood energy is in the east, and 25 finally earth energy is situated in the middle. 02279 1 The only fundamental method of weakening the 2 effects of water energy is with wood energy. 3 Basically the trees, shrubs, and grasses suck up 4 the water, filter the pollutants, and our air, 5 providing shelter, food and filtering the 6 ecosystem. 7 Instead of paying the countryside to 8 be sacrificed and destroying everything with 9 significant cumulative effects, it would appear to 10 make more sense to be proactive and 11 environmentally friendly, restoring tree lines and 12 belts, and as it is indeed this country's and 13 province's mandate and vision to be more green. 14 To slow down municipal and regional 15 drainage ditches allowing the earth to filter out 16 some of those pesticides and herbicides, I believe 17 in order for the province to finally once and for 18 all get over the burdening stigma of us versus you 19 in dealing with adverse effects of all components 20 of the existing and proposed floodway at both 21 natural and unnatural states and in all operation 22 modes. We have to fix the burdens and debts put 23 on our fellow neighbours from the adverse past 24 effects. 25 Number 1, flood proof the First 02280 1 Nations people and their cemeteries. We owe them 2 that. 3 Number 2, protect and fix the 4 aquifers. 5 Number 3, flood proof the north and 6 figure out a cost effective management system to 7 prevent further flooding. 8 Number 4, build the roads and bridges 9 promised to the communities 45 years ago. 10 Number 5, provide adequate and safe 11 drainage to those affected areas. 12 Number 6, put some lids on those 13 affected drains that have the potential for backup 14 flooding. 15 Number 7, eliminate or minimize as 16 opposed to maximizing the environmental effects to 17 the wildlife and river banks. 18 Number 8, maintain a constant 19 sustainable water level so that life can carry on. 20 Number 9, end artificial flooding. 21 Number 10, do not kill our wildlife 22 and wash away our authentic Canadian heritage in 23 order to accommodate a walkway that was built 24 below flood levels at the Forks. It is 25 hypocritical to promote the Forks, what it stands 02281 1 for, First Nations people and animals coming 2 together, while disrespecting the very same. 3 Number 11, implement a waffling water 4 retention system and plant trees and grasses to 5 slow down and absorb the water to help return the 6 environment back to its natural state to eliminate 7 artificial flooding. And may I add in that point, 8 when we put the trees back, it will create the 9 jobs, it will collect the snow, it will be a make 10 work project for our government people and our 11 municipal people. 12 Number 12, adhere to the Federal Water 13 Protection Act. No one has a problem with water 14 arising from acts of God and flooding the valley. 15 We all have a problem with unnecessary artificial 16 flooding. 17 Number 13, the MFA should upgrade the 18 structure that integrally needs fixing to maintain 19 and operate the existing systems. 20 Number 14, have a province wide 21 contest or an idea session as to what to do with 22 the actual green space of the floodway ditch. 23 Example, perhaps I think we should change its 24 name, maybe it could be called the Red River 25 Greenway, and we could have walkways, but I do 02282 1 give full credit to the doctor that spoke before 2 me. That is definitely true. 3 And as a little aside, it is built on 4 Courchaine, and Courchaine in French means running 5 trees, and chaine means oak in French. 6 Number 15, set up a museum at the 7 Forks to proudly show off the new and improved 8 sociological environmentally friendly greenway 9 systems that protect and honour the province as a 10 whole. Then use the proceeds to maintain the 11 greenway infrastructures and parks. 12 Number 16, ensure all affected rural 13 municipalities and First Nation reserves sit on 14 the board of the Manitoba Floodway Authority to 15 ensure a one for all component and operation of 16 the system. 17 Number 17, ensure that if no new trees 18 are planted, that the MFA does something about 19 West Nile Virus and other potential disease 20 control methods needed to maintain back water so 21 it does not start an epidemic disease outbreak 22 like in John Barry's book, The Great Influenza. 23 Number 18, the MFA must monitor and 24 report on the water well quantities and quality of 25 water all over the province. 02283 1 Number 19, set up permanent 2 counseling in school systems, elderly homes, and 3 communities to try and begin to deal with the 4 long-term health damage of this artificial 5 flooding. 6 Number 20, let's be proud of the hard 7 work and effort that has brought this project and 8 current project plan this far. Let's be 9 honourable in taking the necessary steps further 10 so that our great, great grandchildren know what a 11 fox, a racoon, and a duck looks like too. We want 12 our children to be able to take a glass of water 13 from their kitchen taps and swim in our beautiful 14 lakes. We owe it to our kids to do the very best 15 we can. 16 And I, on the behalf of future 17 generations of Manitobans and Canadians, donate 21 18 current and appropriate books to detail exactly 19 the wildlife, nature, people, and national global 20 concerns and knowledge of some of the world' 21 finest doctors, masters, and activists in order to 22 help prove, and put on record for the seven 23 generations of Courcelles children that these -- 24 that I want them to know when I'm long gone that 25 these animals once existed. 02284 1 I am freely available to all levels of 2 this process to help bring equality and protection 3 and harmony to the people, land, and wildlife, and 4 spirit of this province and of this nation. I am 5 fully confident that we can heal this process and 6 proudly move on in a forward, purposeful intention 7 and action. 8 In conclusion, from a nurturing, I 9 indeed support Prime Minister Paul Martin's vision 10 of the global L20 project regarding an energy 11 sustainable Canada, and being a leading role model 12 nation in keeping pace with realities of economic 13 growth on this globe. 14 It is all for one and one for all. 15 And I pray that this tipping point is not one that 16 we will live to regret, but rather celebrate as a 17 unified province and nation. 18 I thank you for your time and patience 19 on behalf of the Manitoba people, the wildlife, 20 and nature, and may God bless each and every one 21 of us. Thank you. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 23 Ms. Kennedy Courcelles. We have no questions, 24 thank you. Mr. Vaughan Baird. 25 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, we'll add 02285 1 Ms. Courcelles presentation in as Exhibit 81. 2 3 (EXHIBIT 81: Presentation of Ms. 4 Kennedy Courcelles to CEC) 5 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. Baird, 7 can you please state your name for the record. 8 MR. BAIRD: Vaughan Baird. 9 (VAUGHAN BAIRD: SWORN) 10 11 MR. BAIRD: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I 12 am going to be brief. My submission is mainly 13 photographs. I regret I can't show them on the 14 screen. I provided you with one colour but you 15 have also photostats of the black and white. 16 I want to deal with just one factor 17 because most of the factors have been dealt with. 18 It's a question of lack of trust. And it has been 19 brought up by both Starr and Mrs. Clifton on this 20 regard. Whether we can believe the authorities 21 who are telling us things, they have not lived up 22 to their word with regard to numerous items 23 including compensation, but lack of trust. 24 Now the first photograph, I live in 25 Ste. Agathe first off. I lost 555 and 557, 02286 1 roughly 45 Acres five years under my own name and 2 five years -- and 48 years of Nisgar (ph) 3 Construction Ltd. And I want to say that with 4 regard -- when you have the authority, your 5 provincial engineer saying the water did not come 6 from the west is something you can't -- just can't 7 fathom that a government official would dig their 8 heels in and say you weren't flooded by the west, 9 you were flooded by the Red River. 10 Well, first photograph, it shows first 11 off my lawn, roughly over an acre there, covered 12 with flax and straw. And the flax and straw was 13 brought from the west, from the western dyke. And 14 it was a beautiful carpet, just a carpet of four 15 or five feet of flax and straw. But I am told by 16 the engineer of the province, it came from the 17 river. Flax and straw doesn't come from the 18 river. 19 Photo 2 shows highway 75 and shows 20 what this torrent of water which came from the 21 western dyke or the Z-Dyke tearing up highway 75 22 just west of me. And flood waters don't tear up 23 highways. I assure you. 24 Photograph 3. It shows a grain bin 25 that has been brought from the west and deposited 02287 1 on highway 75, and by the farmer who owned it 2 previously, the grain bin. And then the next one 3 deals with the very celebrated painting by the 4 artist showing the grain bin sitting on highway 5 75. It's in the Flood Museum, that painting. 6 Photo 4 shows where the water crashed 7 down my riverbank and cut it and also deposited 8 flax and straw at the base of it. 9 And photo 5 shows it again, the gorge 10 it made, and the straw and flax in the evergreen 11 trees. 12 Photo 6 shows the big machinery. And 13 I had 42 people working, cleaning up the mess that 14 had been created from this rush that came from the 15 west. I have had my eastern bank flooded numerous 16 times, not much, but it's flooded. And what do 17 you do? You clean up the sticks and that but you 18 get nothing like this caused by the western dyke. 19 Photo 7 shows how my lawn, my western 20 lawn was completely ruined. 21 Photo 8 shows how my roadway, asphalt 22 roadway was torn up by this torrent that came 23 through from the western dyke. 24 Photo 9 shows the roughly 14 feet high 25 cement Korean monument and it was knocked over by 02288 1 this rush current that came through and being put 2 back in place. 3 Photo 10 at the top shows one of the 4 Korean artifacts knocked over but the photo 5 underneath shows how the water from the flooding 6 affects my estate. 7 And photo 11 shows it after 8 restoration. You get an idea of both my eastern 9 lawn and photo 12 -- pardon me, the western lawn 10 and photo 12 shows the eastern lawn. 11 This question of credibility I think 12 you gentlemen have to take into real strong 13 consideration. We have had emotional submissions 14 made with reason and I am suggesting to you that 15 the question of dealing with the public, they 16 should be honest, straightforward and responsible 17 people, not misleading people. We were told that 18 we would be -- our question of compensation would 19 be considered. I have never got a call from them. 20 Some have got a call but no results, final 21 results. You go months. You wait month after 22 month to hear from the government to meet their 23 obligations and it doesn't happen. 24 You gentlemen have heard probably 25 enough on this flooding business so I'm just 02289 1 saying this one point and I thank you for your 2 consideration. Any questions? 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 4 Mr. Baird. We have no questions for you. Thank 5 you for your presentation. Mr. John Corp. Would 6 you please state your name for the record. 7 MR. CORP: My name is John Corp. 8 9 (JOHN CORP: SWORN) 10 11 MR. CORP: I wonder if I might start, 12 Mr. Chairman, with a question either through you 13 to Mr. McNeil. I spent the weekend reading 14 transcripts. And last, I think last Monday he 15 talked about -- he had indicated that rule 4, he 16 had some numbers on the effect. They back-tested 17 and they had some numbers, I think it was 22 times 18 out of 36. And then last Monday, he said that 19 that number was wrong. And I was just wondering 20 if that number has been corrected? 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. McNeil? 22 MR. MCNEIL: It is and I'll be 23 reporting on that in the next couple of days. 24 MR. CORP: And maybe then, 25 Mr. Chairman, and I'm not going to ask the 02290 1 question but maybe someone should ask the question 2 why that analysis was not done before rule 4 was 3 introduced? 4 So my name is John Corp. And I think 5 my presentation is going to be quite a lot less 6 passionate and less eloquent than previous 7 presentations this afternoon. 8 My wife and I live on Kilburn (ph) 9 Road and I have just brought this slide along to 10 indicate where we are. That's the highway 75, 11 that's Red River Drive there. And this dyke 12 around here, we share that dyke with our 13 neighbours. That's Kilburn Road going down there. 14 Our property is about 50 acres, 15 approximately one-third of which is contained 16 within the dyke. Oh, and I should say, this is 17 from a KGS slide in their report on summer 18 flooding in Winnipeg. Now, you should ignore the 19 blue for the moment. I'm going to get to that in 20 a minute. But their slide obviously takes into 21 account where the contours are but it doesn't take 22 into account the fact that there is a dyke around 23 the place. So we may look to live on a lake but 24 in fact, we don't. 25 The total length of the dyke is about 02291 1 a mile and a half and we have about ten acres of 2 property as landscape and the balance is pastures 3 for our horses and hay fields. And my purpose 4 this afternoon is to discuss two issues, 5 compensation and summer flooding. 6 By profession, I am a consulting 7 actuary which may account for the lack of passion 8 and eloquence. I have an office in the Richardson 9 Building and a staff of six. Now, in that 10 capacity, I fully understand the importance of the 11 floodway and its ability to protect Winnipeg. If 12 Winnipeg is flooded, my livelihood is, at best, 13 seriously interrupted and, at worst, gone. But if 14 in order to protect the City of Winnipeg, it is 15 necessary to flood my home and property, the Quid 16 Pro Quo should be a fair and objective 17 compensation program. 18 The program contained in the Red River 19 Floodway Act is, in my view, neither fair nor 20 objective. In fact, in our particular situation, 21 we would receive less financial assistance under 22 that Act than we got after the 1997 flood. 23 In 1997, the flood waters came over 24 the top of our dyke. We had about two feet on the 25 main floor of our house, five feet in the horse 02292 1 barn and 12 feet in the riding arena. We lived in 2 an RV for five months. And for the winter, we 3 lived in one room in the house. Our furniture was 4 moved back from storage almost exactly one year to 5 the day it was moved out. Suffice it to say, and 6 Dr. Doering used exactly the same words, the 7 emotional scars from that flood will be with us 8 both for the rest of our lives. 9 But having said that, we were a hell 10 of a lot more fortunate than a lot of other 11 people. I have a good enough job that I could go 12 to my bank and get an immediate line of credit and 13 start repairing the damage right away. Many 14 houses on Red River Drive still sit empty and in 15 shambles today. After a false start, we found a 16 wonderful contractor who has become a family 17 friend. And he restored our home and its 18 outbuildings over the next 18 months. 19 So why do I find the Red River 20 Floodway Act so inadequate? I should stress that 21 the Act hasn't been proclaimed as yet. And we 22 haven't seen a draft of the regulations and those 23 are going to cover a lot of the detail, and you 24 know what's in the details. Dr. Doering actually 25 had a check-mark against compensation. And I 02293 1 spoke to him before he left and said you have 2 never claimed against the government, have you? 3 And he said no. 4 The first issue I have is that 5 legislation provides compensation only if there is 6 artificial flooding. But the question is who 7 decides. Well, according to the legislation, the 8 government is going to decide. But the government 9 admitted to Mr. Farlinger's commission that there 10 was only about six inches of flooding, artificial 11 flooding, and they kept that going all the way 12 through to 2003. Mr. Farlinger's commission hired 13 independent engineering consultants which said it 14 was about two feet and they were right. 15 So the bottom line, and you have 16 talked about trust asking Mr. Starr about trust 17 and I never thought that I -- I am just a regular 18 guy. I never thought that I would have the same 19 distrust against government as I do. They lied to 20 us. And I'm not going to apologize for that. 21 Any decision on whether there is 22 artificial flooding or not must be made by a body 23 which is independent of government. 24 The next issue is with regard to 25 determination of the level of compensation, 02294 1 legislation that says it will be done by EMO. 2 Well, that's what they did in 1997 and EMO simply 3 can't handle it. I have no disrespect for EMO but 4 they were given far too much to do. And as an 5 example, in that flood, we had an adjuster come to 6 our place, an assessor I think they call it, and 7 it was his first day on the job. And we said, 8 well, what's your background? And he just 9 finished a diploma at Red River Community College 10 and then he had had three weeks of training. So 11 we said, well, what was your diploma in? And it 12 was Criminology. It's funny now but it wasn't at 13 the time. 14 And the third is about the issue of 15 the right to take legal action or rather the lack 16 thereof. In 1996, we had a pretty good flood. 17 Kilburn Road was cut off just where the blue bit 18 is and we had to sort of wade through it. Now at 19 that time, we contacted Water Resources and they 20 faxed us a schematic of our dyke which showed 21 elevations all the way around, the height and at 22 the bottom, and a notation that satisfied 23 applicable flood proofing standard. 24 In 1997, the projected crest of the 25 flood was about 6 inches above the lowest point of 02295 1 our dyke. So we did very much what 2 Mrs. Bartmanovich did, we got in a heavy 3 contractor. You can't just sandbag a mile and a 4 half dyke, and he built the thing up. But at the 5 end of that week, when we had to move out, it 6 became apparent that the water was a lot closer to 7 the top of the dyke. And it should have been 8 based on the schematic. And we subsequently 9 discovered that there had been a more recent 10 survey than the one we were provided which showed, 11 in fact, the dyke was not up to standard but was 12 rather two feet too low in places. 13 Now the mind boggles. They did a 14 survey of the dyke and they didn't show -- and it 15 showed that the dyke was too low and they didn't 16 tell the property owners. Talk about trust. What 17 were they doing, practicing? 18 Now, not only that, they didn't file 19 it properly. So when the poor guy opened the file 20 in 1996, he gave us presumably what was on top. 21 Well, needless to say, that gave us terrific 22 ammunition in a lawsuit. And we reached what was 23 a pretty satisfactory settlement. 24 Now, it took six and a half years to 25 get there and of course the government just didn't 02296 1 settle until two days before we were going to 2 trial. But why am I raising this issue? Well, 3 the Red River Floodway Act says that you cannot 4 sue the government for negligence in its operation 5 of the Act. 6 So, Mr. Chairman, the Floodway Act has 7 to be revisited and I'm looking for you and your 8 Commission to try and do something about it. 9 Now turning to the issue of summer 10 flooding. We have been affected in two ways. 11 First, we lose one of our pastures and I can 12 illustrate this. It was really nice of KGS to do 13 this for me. But you see that just there, that is 14 a pasture and it's a terrific pasture. It's in a 15 little valley and it's surrounded by trees. It's 16 just a great pasture because it's sheltered and 17 the horses love it, but it's low. And so when the 18 water comes in, that's where it goes first. 19 Now, we have other pastures so we can 20 put the horses in other pastures. But we get no 21 compensation for that flooding because we don't 22 run a commercial establishment. There is no 23 financial loss as a result of that, it's a 24 nuisance. 25 Now, it's amazing to me, you wouldn't 02297 1 like your back yard flooded every other year. And 2 you'd expect some compensation for it, and I think 3 you'd probably get it if you lived in the city. 4 But we don't because we're saving the City of 5 Winnipeg from expense. 6 And the other effect though -- that's 7 a nuisance. The other fact effect is much more 8 serious. As the slide shows, the water is against 9 our dyke just there. In 2002 and in 2004, the 10 dyke slumped in that location and in that location 11 only. About 150 feet fell away from the side of 12 the dyke. It was -- the height stayed the same 13 but on the side nearest the water, it fell away. 14 In 2002, we fixed it ourselves or we got someone 15 to fix it ourselves. 16 In 2004, we sort of -- the light went 17 on and we said hey, this is connected with the 18 fact that there is water against the dyke. And we 19 checked with an engineering and he said yes, and 20 earthen dyke is simply -- is a whole lot less 21 appropriate when you are getting summer flooding 22 than when you are getting spring flooding when the 23 dyke is frozen. And that made sense because we 24 had a pretty good flood in the spring of 2004 with 25 no negative consequences whatever. 02298 1 Now, following the flooding or during 2 the flooding, because the flooding went on for 3 eight weeks I think, we received a letter from 4 Water Stewardship which indicated that they will 5 be compensating people for damages from the summer 6 flooding. And we completed the appropriate forms 7 and an inspector came to review the thing. But it 8 seemed to us, it didn't make sense to do a simple 9 repair again if this was going to happen in the 10 next couple of years. In order to do that repair, 11 the heavy equipment has to come through our yard. 12 We don't want that to happen every couple of years 13 and we didn't really want the government to keep 14 paying for it every time it happened because they 15 said they were going to compensate us. 16 So what we did, we wrote a letter to 17 the minister and said we would like a more 18 permanent solution to this problem. We'd like to 19 hire an engineer and have him design a permanent 20 fix. And it may cost more up-front but in the 21 long-term, there will be savings we thought to the 22 province and a whole lot less aggravation for us. 23 Well, it took 11 weeks to get a 24 response. And for the last month, I called daily 25 the minister's secretary who said whether it's 02299 1 going to be tomorrow or the next day. Anyway, we 2 finally got our response. 3 The response said not only the 4 province was not prepared to pay for the long-term 5 fix, it wasn't prepared to pay for the short-term 6 fix. There is your compensation again. 7 So here is my situation, Mr. Chairman, 8 the actions of the province have caused damage to 9 our property for which they are not prepared to 10 pay. But if we don't get the dyke repaired and 11 the big one comes down in the next year or two, we 12 will almost certainly not be eligible for 13 compensation under the Floodway Act. 14 Now, I am going to get that fixed 15 obviously and I am going to send the bill to the 16 province. And if the province doesn't pay, then I 17 think we're back to court again. That's my 18 responsibility. I'm not looking for your help 19 with that. But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that 20 the whole process of changing the rules of 21 floodway operation is fundamentally flawed. 22 Rule 4 was prepared without any 23 consultation with either those it affects directly 24 or with the municipality in which they live. It's 25 also apparent that it was introduced without 02300 1 adequate study of the effects on upstream 2 residents. That the information that Mr. McNeil 3 has should have been prepared at the time that 4 this was done. 5 I would, therefore, ask in your report 6 that you would recommend that rule 4 be withdrawn 7 until such time as there had been public hearings 8 similar to this so that the effects can be fully 9 investigated. And moreover, that any future 10 changes to the rules of operation should not be 11 carried out without a full independent 12 environmental review. 13 Mr. Chairman, rule 4 is probably going 14 to affect my environment a whole lot more than the 15 expansion of the floodway. 16 In summary, we propose that the 17 compensation legislation be amended to provide an 18 objective program and to provide citizens due 19 process of law through the courts. We propose the 20 government acknowledge their possibility for both 21 spring and summer flooding and provide full 22 compensation accordingly, using an independent 23 process. 24 And finally, the government should 25 provide guidance and advice regarding flood 02301 1 protection in view of the changing attitudes and 2 flooding expectations. Thank you very much. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, 4 Mr. Corp. We have no further questions for you. 5 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, if we 6 could add Mr. Baird's presentation in as Exhibit 7 82 and Mr. Corp's as Exhibit 83. 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 9 (EXHIBIT 82: Presentation by Vaughan 10 Baird to the CEC) 11 (EXHIBIT 83: Presentation by Mr. John 12 Corp to the CEC) 13 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Unfortunately we still 15 have a couple of people scheduled for today. 16 Unfortunately, it is now just a few minutes to 17 five o'clock which is our adjournment time. So I 18 apologize to those people for not being able to 19 get on today but I assure you that we will get you 20 on in the next day or two and I will have the 21 Commission secretary contact you to arrange a 22 suitable time. 23 I think that brings our hearings to a 24 conclusion for today. We're back here tomorrow 25 morning at nine o'clock. 02302 1 2 (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 5:00 P.M.) 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25