02036 1 MANITOBA CLEAN ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION 2 3 4 5 6 7 RED RIVER FLOODWAY EXPANSION PROJECT 8 9 10 11 12 ======================================= 13 Monday, February 28, 2005 14 Sheraton Hotel 161 Donald Street 15 Winnipeg, Manitoba 16 ======================================== 17 18 Volume 9 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02037 1 APPEARANCES: 2 Clean Environment Commission: 3 Mr. Terry Sargeant - Chairman Mr. Barrie Webster - Member 4 Mr. Wayne Motheral - Member Mr. Doug Abra - Counsel 5 Mr. Dave Farlinger - Technical consultant Ms. Cathy Johnson - Secretary to Commission 6 Ms. Joyce Mueller - Secretary 7 Manitoba Conservation: 8 Mr. Trent Hreno - Chair, Project Admin Team Mr. Bruce Webb - Chair, Tech Advisory 9 Committee Mr. Stewart Pierce - Counsel 10 11 Manitoba Floodway Authority: 12 Mr. Rick Handlon - Counsel Mr. Jim Thomson 13 Mr. Doug McNeil Mr. Doug Peterson 14 Mr. Cam Osler - Intergroup Consulting Mr. John Osler - Intergroup Consulting 15 Mr. David Morgan - TetrES Consulting Mr. George Rempel - TetrES Consulting 16 Mr. Robert Sinclair - KGS Ms. Marci Friedman-Hamm - KGS 17 18 Participants: 19 Mr. Bob Starr - Ritchot Concerned Citizens Mr. Bob Bodnaruk - RM of Springfield 20 Mr. Steve Strang - RM of St. Clements Mr. Orvel Currie - Counsel to Municipalities 21 Mr. Doug Chorney - Coalition for Flood Protection North 22 Mr. Kerry McLuhan - Coalition for Flood Protection North 23 Mr. Rob Loudfoot - 768 Association Mr. Y. Shumuk - 768 Association 24 Paul Clifton - Paul Clifton Mr. Jeff Frank - Rivers West 25 Gaile Whelan Enns - Manitoba Wildlands Earl Stevenson - Peguis Indian Band 02038 1 Participants: (continued) 2 3 Mr. Jake Buhler - Cooks Creek Conservation Mr. Lloyd Crooks - Cooks Creek Conservation 4 Mr. Jon Stefanson - Cooks Creek Conservation Mr. Daryl Chicoine - Counsel 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02039 1 INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS 2 3 Presentation by North Ritchot Action Committee Dr. Rob Stewart 4 Mr. Paul Clifton 2045 Cross-Examination by MFA 2068 5 Questions by Panel 2071 6 7 Presentation by Concerned Citizens of Ritchot Mr. Bob Starr 2090 8 Cross-examination by MFA 2145 Questions by Panel 2148 9 10 Presentation by Mayor Stefaniuk 2163 Questions by Panel 2185 11 12 Presentation by Maxine Clifton 2190 13 Presentation by Rita Bartmanovich 2216 14 Presentation by Jay Doering 2234 15 Presentation by James Shapiro 2243 16 Presentation by Cheryl Kennedy Courcelles 2262 17 Presentation Vaughan Baird 2285 18 Presentation by John Corp 2289 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02040 1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS 2 3 74 Submission by Dr. Stewart to CEC 2089 4 75 Presentation of Ritchot Concerned 2190 Citizen's Committee 5 76 Presentation of Mr. Stefaniuk 2190 6 77 Presentation of Maxine Clifton to 2215 7 CEC 8 78 Presentation of Mrs. Bartmanovich 2234 to CEC 9 79 Presentation by Dr. Jay Doering to 2243 10 the CEC 11 80 Presentation by Dr. Shapiro to the 2261 12 CEC 13 81 Presentation of Ms. Kennedy 2285 14 Courcelles to CEC 15 82 Presentation by Vaughan Baird to 2301 the CEC 16 17 83 Presentation by Mr. John Corp to 2301 the CEC 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02041 1 INDEX OF UNDERTAKINGS 2 UNDERTAKING NO. PAGE 3 No undertakings given 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 02042 1 MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2005 2 Upon commencing at 9:00 a.m. 3 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, 5 everybody. Can we come to order, please. I'd 6 like to welcome everybody back, day one of our 7 third week. And as always, we have a busy agenda 8 for today. We have two registered participant 9 groups making their presentations today, the North 10 Ritchot Action Committee followed by the Ritchot 11 Concerned Citizens Committee. And then following 12 that, probably in the afternoon, we will have 13 about 10 or 12 individuals making presentations. 14 Before we turn to that, though, I 15 would just like to report on some business that 16 has ensued since Thursday and which arises out of 17 Thursday's proceedings. You will recall that on 18 Thursday afternoon, Mr. Jim Moir, who was 19 contracted to the Coalition for Flood Protection 20 North of the Floodway testified in respect of ice 21 jamming and challenged the conclusions reached by 22 the Floodway Authority. And as those of you who 23 were there will recall, there was a very decided 24 difference of opinion between Mr. Moir and the 25 Floodway Authority. 02043 1 At the end of his cross-examination, 2 my colleague on the panel, Barrie Webster, asked 3 Mr. Moir whether he might meet with Mr. Carson of 4 KGS, one of the Floodway Authority's engineering 5 consultants, whether they might meet to discuss 6 the modeling used by the Authority with a mind to 7 perhaps hopefully coming to a meeting of the 8 minds. 9 On Friday morning, Mr. Carson, 10 Mr. Moir, Rick Bowering of the Department of Water 11 Stewardship, Ken Mills, one of our consultants, 12 and Brian Peter of the MFA met. The meeting, as 13 it turned out, was very short and no resolution 14 was achieved. 15 As a result, the public, and in 16 particular members of this panel are left with a 17 huge uncertainty as to just what role the floodway 18 operation might play in ice jamming. 19 I am of the view that it would not be 20 productive to ask Mr. Moir to return for further 21 cross-examination and I am of the further view 22 that we need a third opinion. 23 One of the consultants we have been 24 using, Mr. Wim Wenders does have considerable 25 experience in this area; however, I do not feel 02044 1 that it would be appropriate for him to give 2 testimony as well as to advise us on such matters. 3 So the Commission will contract with 4 an independent engineering consultant to review 5 the material and to testify before us. And he 6 would be available for cross-examination by the 7 Floodway Authority, the Clean Environment 8 Commission and registered participants. 9 In consultations between Doug McNeil 10 and Rick Carson of the Floodway Authority and Dave 11 Farlinger of the Clean Environment Commission, an 12 available consultant has been identified. I'm 13 sure it would come as no surprise that it was not 14 easy to find somebody on short notice who would be 15 able to come here next week. However, they have 16 identified a Mr. Dave Andress, a principal with 17 Northern Hydraulic Consultants in Edmonton, a firm 18 with a good reputation in this area. 19 Mr. Andress will be asked to review 20 the materials provided by the Floodway Authority 21 as well as the material presented by Mr. Moir on 22 Thursday and the transcript of Mr. Moir's 23 testimony and cross-examination. He will appear 24 before us either next Tuesday or Wednesday. 25 That's all I have to say on that matter. 02045 1 Mr. McNeil, you have a comment on a 2 previous undertaking? 3 MR. MCNEIL: Thanks, Mr. Chair. 4 Actually, I think I'll wait a day or so to make 5 that comment. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Thank you. Then 7 I'll call upon the representatives of the North 8 Ritchot Action Committee to come forward and make 9 their presentation. At the front table, please. 10 We'll pause for a moment while technology is taken 11 care of. 12 Could you please introduce yourselves 13 for the record and then we'll have the Commission 14 Secretary swear you in. 15 MR. STEWART: I'm Dr. Rob Stewart. I 16 am the Chair of the North Ritchot Action 17 Committee. 18 MR. CLIFTON: Paul Clifton, North 19 Ritchot Action Committee. 20 21 (ROB STEWART: SWORN) 22 (PAUL CLIFTON: SWORN) 23 24 THE CHAIRMAN: You may proceed. 25 MR. STEWART: Thank you. The North 02046 1 Ritchot Action Committee was nominated and elected 2 in a town hall meeting in November of 1997. It 3 represents residents in the area with respect to 4 flood issues. We have been active ever since, 5 advocating for fair treatment of upstream 6 residents and trying to educate residents through 7 a series of seminars presented by invited experts. 8 We have had speakers from PFRA, EMO and CEAA come 9 out to talk to our community. 10 North Ritchot Action Committee, which 11 I usually refer to as NRAC, has been widely 12 recognized by such organizations as the Manitoba 13 Water Commission, the International Joint 14 Commission and the Community University Research 15 Alliance known as CURA for representing community 16 needs. 17 NRAC has made many presentations. We 18 have appeared before Manitoba Water Commission. 19 We have appeared many times before the 20 International Joint Commission including three 21 presentations to the Red River Basin Task Force. 22 We have spoken to CEC before about options for 23 Winnipeg's flood protection and several other 24 forums. 25 NRAC believes that the interests of 02047 1 upstream residents have been ignored and denied 2 for too long and that a fair and open 3 comprehensive and inclusive environmental review 4 is one of the ways of dealing with those issues. 5 We are currently participating in the 6 environmental assessment of the proposal to expand 7 Winnipeg's floodway, and that's what of course 8 brings us here today. We are here as unfunded 9 intervenors to voice the concerns of upstream 10 residents that the current EIS and CEC review did 11 not meet those criteria of a fair, open, 12 comprehensive and inclusive review. 13 We have presented our concerns over 14 floodway expansion to the Project Administration 15 Team which is leading the environmental assessment 16 and CEC has copies of these. So I think you are 17 well aware of our main concerns. 18 Our issues with the EIS intersect with 19 our concerns about the CEC process because we are 20 not confident that the CEC process is addressing 21 the real issues in the EIS. 22 Manitoba and Canada have determined 23 that a cooperative environmental assessment under 24 the Canada/Manitoba agreement on environmental 25 assessment cooperation will be undertaken for the 02048 1 Red River Floodway Expansion Project. The 2 agreement stipulates that the environmental review 3 will include, "The factors listed in subsection 16 4 paragraph 1 and 16 paragraph 2 of the Federal 5 Act." Section 16 of CEAA, the Canadian 6 Environmental Assessment Act, states that every 7 environmental review -- sorry, CEAA states what 8 every environmental review shall include. I won't 9 read into the minutes what section 16 says. I 10 think we're all pretty familiar with them now. 11 But looking at 16 in CEAA, under the 12 Canada/Manitoba agreement, the environmental 13 review of this project shall include an 14 examination of purpose of floodway expansion, an 15 examination of the alternatives to floodway 16 expansion, consideration of the operation of the 17 expanded floodway including an examination of 18 operating rules that govern that operation, 19 examination of environmental effects of the 20 proposed project, or in the parlance of CEAA, any 21 change that this project may cause in the 22 environment including any effects on health or 23 socio-economic conditions. 24 It shall include an evaluation of 25 cumulative environmental effects of the project in 02049 1 combination with other projects or activities that 2 have been or will be carried out. 3 It would include an examination of the 4 measures that are technically and economically 5 feasible and that would mitigate any significant 6 environmental impacts. And a program to ensure 7 that any mitigation measures referred to are 8 implemented. And it would include the 9 determination of the significance of environmental 10 effects of the project and any follow-up or 11 mediation as required -- follow-up, review or 12 mediation. 13 The terms of reference for these 14 hearings state that, 15 "Assessment for the project will be 16 required pursuant to the requirements 17 of the Canadian Environmental 18 Assessment Act." 19 They go on to indicate that the CEC 20 hearings shall consider potential environmental, 21 socioeconomic and cultural effects of construction 22 and operation of the Red River Floodway Expansion 23 Project. 24 However the Clean Environment 25 Commission informed participants on June 1st that 02050 1 the CEC review would specifically exclude 2 discussion and analysis of the purpose of the 3 project, alternatives to the project, operating 4 rules for the project, provincial compensation 5 legislation and any issues stemming from the 1997 6 flood, the flood that was the catalyst for the 7 current floodway expansion. 8 This is the only statement CEC has 9 released to our knowledge stating the issues that 10 would be included or excluded. And it's NRAC's 11 considered opinion that the current CEC review 12 prejudiced its outcome by the exclusion of the 13 very issues of interest to affected residents. 14 That was where matters stood for eight 15 months and up until the time that we wrote this 16 submission. The CEC transcripts haven't helped 17 clarify the situation about what CEC considers to 18 be relevant. For example, you have indicated that 19 future floodway operations are clearly within this 20 purview in one part of the transcript, and another 21 place, but summer operations are out. And the 22 calculation of natural levels is out but the 23 baseline use for the environmental assessment is 24 in. 25 It's hard to see how some 02051 1 consideration of natural escapes the capture of 2 baseline. 3 Regardless of what may or may not be 4 considered by CEC, since these hearings have 5 begun, you have heard presentations from the 6 proponent and other participants about the 7 purpose, alternatives, operation and compensation. 8 Indeed, you have been very tolerant and you have 9 heard about a great many other things as well. 10 But hearing things and giving them 11 credence in your deliberations are two very 12 different things. And it's still not clear to 13 NRAC what you will consider to be relevant 14 testimony and what you will consider to be 15 irrelevant. It's not clear what is tolerance for 16 venting and what is being given away. It makes 17 presenting here a little bit like a piņata game 18 and NRAC sees no value in flailing away 19 blindfolded. 20 So we're still uncertain which of our 21 issues, if any, CEC will consider relevant. So 22 rather than address technical aspects of the EIS, 23 we want to concentrate on its role and adequacy in 24 the environmental review. 25 If CEC has left some uncertainty about 02052 1 what's on the table, the Manitoba Floodway 2 Expansion Authority has left no doubt at all. 3 They declare virtually all the issues relevant to 4 upstream residents to be outside the scope of the 5 EIS. Health Canada's comment on the EIS 6 definition of significance applies I think to the 7 whole EIS. Health Canada said it's the definition 8 of significance. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, pardon me, 10 Dr. Stewart, do you have written copies of this 11 presentation? It's quite different than the 12 material that was provided to us on January 31st. 13 MR. STEWART: It's not very different 14 actually, sir. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: It's very difficult to 16 follow. 17 MR. STEWART: It has been rearranged 18 slightly and I'm leaving parts out. 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Well, if we have 20 difficulty following, you'll know why then. 21 MR. STEWART: There are also -- 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 23 MR. STEWART: This quote is in the 24 written submission. 25 "The definition of significance is 02053 1 biased towards highlighting the 2 benefits and minimizing adverse 3 impacts. The methods of application 4 of criteria for determination of 5 significance by the authors favours 6 the omission of important information 7 by considering a subset of only three 8 of the entire list of criteria for 9 determination of significance." 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Could we have order in 11 the room. No side conversations, please. Sorry. 12 MR. STEWART: And this is a comment 13 that isn't in the written submission. But the 14 proponent's selective and dismissive approach is a 15 constant theme from the consultations to 16 cumulative effects. 17 The current floodway proposal responds 18 only to the needs of the residents of Winnipeg and 19 purposefully responds only to those needs -- 20 sorry, purposefully and somewhat callously ignores 21 the interests of parties that have been most 22 affected by flooding in the past and will continue 23 to be affected in the future. 24 It's apparent that the design 25 philosophy for the floodway was fundamentally 02054 1 flawed from the outset as it did not consider the 2 protection of all residents living in the Red 3 River Valley, but rather started from the position 4 that it would only consider the protection of 5 Winnipeg, regardless of how that can be achieved. 6 Had the architects of the floodway 7 considered the protection of all residents, we 8 might not be here looking at a different project 9 and not be raising concerns. 10 We're back into the previous text. 11 The Floodway Expansion Authority maintains that 12 they undertook public consultations -- I'm sorry, 13 we're not. But consultation was only consistent 14 with their design philosophy and the options that 15 they are willing to address. As such, what was 16 supposed to be consultation amounted to a little 17 more than an unabashed promotion to the project 18 which they have already announced, designed and 19 evaluated in the EIS. 20 Under the subheading of cumulative 21 effects in the EIS now. The EIS pays lip service 22 only to the assessment of cumulative impacts. The 23 proponent maintains that the existing floodway in 24 its mode of operation, ancillary flood control 25 structures west of Winnipeg and Winnipeg's 02055 1 infrastructure are static features of the baseline 2 environment from which expansion can be assessed. 3 The MFA interprets this to mean the expanded 4 floodway has no impacts because all the nasty 5 things derive from the existing floodway. This is 6 a simple dodge to avoid dealing with those nasty 7 bits under cumulative impacts assessment. If one 8 were to take this argument to the absurd limits, 9 there never would be a need for a cumulative 10 effects assessment since all past projects and 11 activities will become part of the existing 12 baseline. 13 I don't know what the authors of CEAA 14 were thinking when they drafted the legislation 15 but I seriously doubt they would have spent so 16 much time outlining cumulative effects to have 17 them all wrapped up into baseline for future 18 activities. 19 The proponent's dodge doesn't actually 20 withstand any reasonable scrutiny. In simple 21 logic, regardless of whether it's cumulative 22 effects or defined some other way, there's only 23 two options for considering the floodway, the 24 current floodway. Either it ceases to exist and 25 is replaced by a new expanded floodway or it 02056 1 continues to somehow exist alongside of and 2 complementary to the expanded part of the 3 floodway. 4 If reason prevails and the expanded 5 floodway is seen as replacing the existing 6 floodway, then all environmental impacts arise 7 from the expanded floodway and all those impacts 8 must be included in any environmental assessment. 9 If reason does not prevail and we 10 accept the idea that one will be able to see a 11 division between the existing floodway and 12 expanded floodway and be able to ascribe various 13 impacts to the original component and the expanded 14 component, then the existing floodway and its 15 operation falls squarely under the requirement to 16 examine cumulative environmental effects that are 17 likely to result from the combination -- from the 18 project in combination with other projects that 19 have been or will be carried out. So the new 20 floodway operates either alone or in combination, 21 but in either case its impacts cannot be ignored. 22 Similarly, the Shellmouth Dam and 23 Portage Diversions are dismissed because the 24 expanded floodway does not impact on them, but 25 that dam and diversion impact on the need for and 02057 1 operation of an expanded floodway. Winnipeg's 2 infrastructure is entirely ignored although 3 changes are clearly planned for it, projects that 4 will be carried out. And they will impact on the 5 need for and operation of an expanded floodway. 6 Summer operation is dismissed even though it's 7 driven entirely by current weaknesses in 8 Winnipeg's infrastructure and clearly falls under 9 the consideration of alternatives to summer 10 operation of an expanded floodway. 11 The existing rules of operation states 12 specifically that upstream properties shall be 13 flooded both during some spring floods and during 14 summer operations. Ignoring the legal questions 15 about this premeditated assault, the rules of 16 operation are the direct cause of environmental 17 impacts on people living upstream. The rules were 18 changed in roughly 1999/2000 to further restrict 19 flows through Winnipeg. And the effect of that 20 change in light of a wider floodway needs to be 21 assessed. 22 But on top of this, the province is on 23 record as saying that these rules were only 24 guidelines meaning there's no statement enforcing 25 how the expanded floodway will be operated. It's 02058 1 unfathomable how an environmental licence can be 2 given to a project that has no legal obligation to 3 operate in a particular manner, especially when 4 that operation is stated to intend -- its stated 5 intent is to harm upstream residents. How can one 6 plan mitigation when the operation that causes the 7 impacts are so uncertain? 8 Section 20 you'll see it gives the 9 responsible federal authority to -- the 10 responsible federal authority to evaluate any 11 mitigation to ensure it is appropriate and, "Shall 12 ensure that any mitigation measurements are 13 implemented." The responsible minister cannot 14 possibly do that without secure knowledge about 15 how the floodway will be operated. 16 Exclusion of consideration of the 17 existing floodway and ancillary structures plan 18 changes to infrastructures and rules of operation 19 from the EIS contravenes the requirements of CEAA 20 and the intent of the cooperative environmental 21 assessment agreement. 22 In terms of alternatives, the EIS is 23 neither comprehensive nor rigorous in its review. 24 In the supplementary filing, the MFA states, 25 "Physical flood protection in the 02059 1 valley to the 1 in 700 year peak level 2 is not likely economically feasible." 3 In talking about other options, 4 Mr. Carson said during these hearings that we sort 5 of informally reviewed options. Mr. McNeil, in 6 response to a question about building better flood 7 protection upstream, said we did some very what we 8 call back of the envelope calculations, very very 9 rough. Clearly the possibility of engineered 10 technical mitigation for upstream residents is not 11 even considered. Any flood protection system for 12 the Red River needs to benefit all parties 13 affected. 14 Non-structural protection has also not 15 been considered. Mr. Paul Clifton and Mr. Rick 16 Bowering introduced data at these hearings and 17 figures that relate natural water levels to the 18 operation of the Shellmouth Dam and the Portage 19 Diversion. Mr. Bowering went on to say that 20 obviously we could target almost any kind of 21 relationship of sharing of the benefit of the 22 flood control works between residents south. The 23 reason given that this wasn't done, however, was 24 that the flood control works were built for the 25 City of Winnipeg. 02060 1 I don't want to debate the selfish and 2 outdated logic behind this reason, I only want to 3 demonstrate that alternatives were dismissed out 4 of hand or, at best, on the basis of true back of 5 the envelope calculations. These alternative 6 measures such as operation of the floodway for the 7 benefit of upstream residents without jeopardizing 8 the protection of the City of Winnipeg, that's 9 included in what has not been considered. And 10 again, it's a reflection of the design philosophy 11 built around having your cake and eating it too. 12 In terms of mitigation, I would just 13 reiterate that mitigation in the form of 14 structural or operational alternatives has not 15 been explored. Instead, the Manitoba Floodway 16 Authority relies on the Red River Floodway Act to 17 establish a provincial compensation program for 18 property damage and economic loss resulting from 19 artificial flooding associated with the operation 20 of the Red River Floodway. Here compensation for 21 damages is seen as mitigation. 22 Under the proposed legislation, the 23 government will determine if artificial flooding 24 occurred, how much flooding occurred, what damage 25 resulted and how much compensation is to be paid 02061 1 to the affected parties. The Act would remove or 2 severely restrict any recourse through the courts 3 for affected parties to challenge these provincial 4 actions. Any democracy, the courts are the final 5 arbitrators of injustice. One has to ask why such 6 a provision would be included in legislation 7 that's supposedly for the benefit of protected 8 parties. 9 Aside from being a breach of natural 10 justice, this fox and hen house arrangement does 11 not meet the requirements of CEAA. Under CEAA, 12 Section 20, the federal responsible authority must 13 ensure mitigation measures are appropriate and are 14 implemented but provincial legislation allows the 15 Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations 16 involving eligibility, appeals and reports. In 17 other words, nothing in this legislation is fixed 18 and there's no security offered to those who may 19 be damaged by floodway operation. 20 Clearly the responsible federal 21 minister has no control over provincial 22 legislation and cannot be assured that mitigative 23 measures will be implemented. 24 That leaves the EIS without a plan for 25 dealing with residual effects. From the 02062 1 perspective of upstream community, some of the 2 more obvious environmental impacts of the Red 3 River Floodway include perpetual anxiety about 4 what the next spring or next summer will bring in 5 terms of floodway operation, seen tangibly in 6 marriage dysfunction, physical illnesses such as 7 high blood pressure and sense of hopelessness 8 that's causing some people to leave the area. 9 It includes perpetual angst that we 10 are less deserving of protection from natural 11 flood levels of people living a few hundred metres 12 to the north. Perpetual anger that people living 13 upstream are required to sustain emotional, 14 physical and financial damage to benefit people 15 protected by the floodway. It includes economic 16 losses associated with both natural and artificial 17 flooding, physical losses associated with natural 18 and artificial flooding and social disruption 19 associated with both natural and artificial 20 flooding. 21 One purpose of an environmental 22 assessment under CEAA or under the Canada/Manitoba 23 agreement is it to ensure that the proponent has 24 adequately addressed these issues to ensure that a 25 credible review of the floodway project is being 02063 1 conducted. These minimum standards must be 2 satisfied. The review would examine the need and 3 purpose for this specific project including 4 increased flood protection upstream and 5 downstream. 6 It would examine alternatives to its 7 construction and to its operation. It would 8 examine alternatives to flooding some people to 9 save others. It would examine all cumulative 10 effects including other flood protection 11 structures existing and foreseen, and their 12 operations. It would ensure clear concise rules 13 of operation with input and buy-in from all 14 affected parties. It would ensure there are clear 15 consequences for breaching those rules and that 16 those consequences are binding for the duration of 17 the existence of the floodway. And it would 18 ensure negotiated land use rights which would 19 permit storage of water on private property. 20 NRAC's views on environmental 21 assessment provided in the EIS are documented in 22 our submissions to the PAT through the EIS review 23 overall -- I'm sorry, through the EIS review 24 process. Overall, NRAC's impression of the EIS 25 was that it did not even approach satisfying its 02064 1 intended purpose which should be to thoroughly 2 describe the environmental effects, mitigation, 3 significance from environmental effects of the 4 project such that decision makers and stakeholders 5 are fully apprised of the merits and shortcomings 6 of the project under consideration. 7 Instead, the environmental assessment 8 provided in the EIS spent more time ignoring and 9 obfuscating environmental effects of the project 10 or scoping them out of any meaningful 11 consideration than it did in attempting to 12 quantify or address the issues. 13 Overall, the environmental assessment 14 marginalizes every issue critical upstream 15 residents on the basis that any injustices of the 16 past operation of the floodway are somehow 17 immutable. This rationale is based on an 18 environmental assessment process so fundamentally 19 flawed that it renders the assessment of little 20 practical value. 21 It's critical to note that there's 22 never been an environmental assessment of the 23 environmental effects of the existing floodway, at 24 least with regard to impact on upstream residents. 25 The reason for such an omission is obvious. The 02065 1 floodway was never intended to flood upstream 2 residents. But somehow flooding upstream 3 residents was surreptitiously added to the program 4 operation, again without ever assessing the 5 environmental effects. 6 Now we find ourselves again facing the 7 prospect of flooding upstream residents without 8 addressing the environmental effects, without 9 meaningful dialogue, without acknowledging the 10 rights of those who would be flooded all through 11 some slight of hand. 12 CEC and the MFA are both guilty, we 13 think, of considering only certain aspects of 14 flood protection in Southern Manitoba. Certainly 15 the International Joint Commission, which was a 16 major impetus for the floodway proposal, 17 recommended increased flood protection for 18 Winnipeg. But the IJC left no doubt that 19 protecting large urban centres should "not affect 20 upstream or downstream flood levels," went on to 21 say clearly the protection of Winnipeg must be 22 given a high priority but it is equally clear that 23 proposals for additional flood protection for the 24 city or alterations to the operating rules for the 25 Winnipeg Floodway must take account of the full 02066 1 economic, social and human costs for other areas 2 that would be affected by such measures. 3 A transparent process of open 4 consultation must be established to ensure that 5 residents in such areas have an opportunity to be 6 integrated -- an integrated part of any 7 decision-making process. 8 The present process is not consistent 9 with what IJC envisioned and, as such, is an 10 affront to citizens living upstream. Consistent 11 with the IJC recommendation, NRAC has always 12 advocated working in concert with the government 13 to ensure the best possible solution for all 14 Manitobans. 15 Political expediency has given 16 precedence over comprehensive and inclusive 17 discussions, spending time and money to assess 18 recreational potential but not putting sufficient 19 effort into a proper EIS is particularly offensive 20 to folks upstream. But the haste to get the 21 shovels in the ground may yet lead to wasted time 22 and effort by choosing a restrictive perspective 23 instead of a comprehensive and inclusive review as 24 identified by senior ministers. The MFA has set 25 itself up for major revisions to meet those 02067 1 standards. I tell my kids, do it right or do it 2 twice. 3 There are so many omissions in the EIS 4 that CEC cannot reasonably recommend environmental 5 approval. Should CEC recommend approval, there 6 remains so much uncertainty around operation and 7 mitigation, so many exclusions to cumulative 8 effects, so little attention to alternative 9 structures and operations and persistent 10 significant public concern, the floodway expansion 11 will still require a comprehensive review through 12 the federal process. 13 NRAC remains committed to seeing 14 improved flood protection for Winnipeg coupled 15 with an increased protection and a reduction of 16 harm outside the city. 17 MR. ABRA: Dr. Stewart, you are going 18 too fast, sir. The court reporter is having 19 trouble keeping up with you. 20 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry. NRAC remains 21 committed to seeing improved flood protection for 22 Winnipeg coupled with increased protection and 23 reduced harm outside of the city and stands firm 24 in its resolve to work with government and all 25 affected parties for the mutual benefit of 02068 1 everyone. NRAC believes that the current CEC 2 review has been prejudiced by the exclusion of 3 some issues, the issues of interest to affected 4 residents, we continue to provide our comments 5 through the federal process. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Dr. Stewart. 7 Does the Floodway Authority have any questions of 8 Dr. Stewart? 9 MR. MCNEIL: Yes, Mr. Chair, just a 10 couple of questions for clarification of what 11 Mr. Stewart mentioned. On page 4 of his 12 submission under the subheading cumulative 13 effects, in the fifth paragraph -- do you have a 14 copy of your submission? 15 MR. STEWART: I don't actually, 16 technological glitch, I didn't bring the piece of 17 paper and Paul is just retrieving one. 18 MR. MCNEIL: In any event, I'll read 19 from your submission. You state and I quote, 20 "The rules were changed in 1999/2000 21 to further restrict flows through 22 Winnipeg, and the effect of that 23 change in light of a wider floodway 24 needs to be assessed." 25 Are you aware that through subsequent hydraulic 02069 1 analysis, and the fact it was confirmed that the 2 city did in fact see the design flow of 3 80,000 cubic feet per second downstream of the 4 confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers in 5 the '97 flood, thereby meeting the requirement of 6 going to rule 2? Were you aware of that 7 confirmation that the design flow was met in 1997? 8 So in fact, the rules weren't revised to further 9 restrict flows. Rule 2 says, hold it at 10 80,000 cubic feet per second until you get to the 11 end of rule 2. So I just wanted to make that 12 clarification. 13 Also in the following sentence, the 14 province, and I quote, 15 "The province considered these rules 16 to be no more than guidelines, 17 document 11-Bowering, meaning there is 18 no statement enforcing how the 19 expanded floodway will be operated." 20 Were you present during Mr. Bowering's testimony 21 in week one of the hearings, or have you had a 22 chance to read the transcript wherein he clarified 23 that the rules are the rules and in fact not 24 guidelines? 25 MR. STEWART: I wasn't in attendance 02070 1 at the meeting. I have read Mr. Bowering's 2 retraction of the guidelines, and I have also seen 3 your comments that they are hard and fast. 4 MR. MCNEIL: Good. Thank you. 5 MR. STEWART: And I guess I wonder 6 what makes them any more hard and fast than they 7 were in the past? 8 MR. MCNEIL: The rules, as you quote 9 in your document, were approved by the province in 10 2000. As well the federal government approved 11 those rules for operation of the floodway in 2000. 12 MR. STEWART: And my read of the 13 Manitoba Environment Act indicates that any 14 alteration to the project should require an 15 environmental licence. I also don't know whether 16 that environmental licence was given for the 17 rules, and we are currently undertaking a process 18 to find out if the appropriate environmental 19 assessment was done at the federal level. 20 The opinion that there should be an 21 environmental assessment of any changes to the 22 rules as required by both Manitoba and federal 23 legislation is endorsed by supplementary filing 24 actually which says in section 8, pages 32 and 33, 25 with respect to control of summer river levels in 02071 1 Winnipeg, it's assumed that this will be a project 2 requiring a licence for a change in the floodway 3 operation rules and that the environmental issues 4 will be dealt with as part of the environmental 5 licensing process. And I haven't seen any 6 evidence that, in fact, that environmental 7 assessment was done, either in Manitoba or in 8 Canada, for the changes of those rules in '99 and 9 2000. 10 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, I don't think 11 it's appropriate to enter into debate at this 12 time, so I have no further questions. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Barrie. 14 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 15 I have a couple of questions for you. 16 First of all, Dr. Stewart, to what extent has your 17 organization been consulted or involved in the 18 process to establish the rules of operation of the 19 floodway? 20 MR. STEWART: Our committee requested 21 to be completely involved in the consultation 22 process and that request was denied. There was 23 attendance by two of our members to a half day out 24 of the ten days of meetings. Our contribution at 25 the time was primarily to encourage the people who 02072 1 were reviewing the rules of operation to come out 2 and talk to the community. 3 MR. WEBSTER: So there has been 4 involvement, not by the organization, not by NRAC, 5 but by individuals who are members of NRAC? 6 MR. STEWART: No. When I say 7 individuals, I mean some committee members 8 attended. And our representation was to encourage 9 the people who were reviewing the rules to come 10 out and talk to the people in the community about 11 them, get their input and their concerns, and also 12 make the process known to them. 13 MR. WEBSTER: And to what extent did 14 that take place? 15 MR. STEWART: It didn't. 16 MR. WEBSTER: Not at all? 17 MR. STEWART: Not at all. I would add 18 to that -- am I allowed to do this? In approving 19 the rules of operation, then Minister of the 20 Environment, David Anderson, strongly recommended 21 to then Minister Lathlin that he hold public 22 consultations on those rules and that has also not 23 been done. There were at least 80 written 24 submissions to Minister Lathlin's office 25 requesting that he hold public meetings, I like to 02073 1 think of them as town hall meetings, town hall 2 meetings on the rules of operation, and that was 3 not done. 4 MR. WEBSTER: So what you're telling 5 us is there was no consultation at all? 6 MR. STEWART: I think that's a fair 7 summary. 8 MR. WEBSTER: You've made a strong 9 point about the difficulties facing residents in 10 the area upstream of the floodway in terms of what 11 we might call mental health, anxiety, and so 12 forth. We have had some extensive discussions 13 which have related to, within this hearing, 14 relating to calculated natural levels of flooding 15 versus artificial flooding. And I wanted to ask 16 you whether you were aware of those calculated 17 levels since -- they have to be calculated since 18 there is an effect of the Shellmouth Dam and the 19 Portage Diversion on the levels that are 20 experienced in the Red River. Are you aware of 21 those natural and artificial levels that have been 22 presented -- calculated and presented? 23 MR. STEWART: I'm aware that they have 24 been done. I would say that I am a biologist, so 25 I may not understand all the technical details. 02074 1 But I understand enough to know and to believe 2 Mr. Bowering when he says that there are many 3 opportunities for sharing those flows. And there 4 is a very basic part of me that says that natural 5 should be the amount of water coming down the 6 Assiniboine, you know, what water really exists. 7 And my main point here is the design philosophy, 8 the operation philosophy has not taken into 9 consideration that they could do some good 10 upstream, that they could lower water. 11 Now we're talking about artificial 12 flooding, and I think Mr. McNeil said that it's 13 almost a catch phrase for artificially high. 14 Well, it could be artificially low too. And we're 15 not suggesting that we'd jeopardize Winnipeg to do 16 that. But as Mr. Bowering says, there's a wide 17 array of options there that were not considered. 18 MR. WEBSTER: We have also heard about 19 the concept of holding back water with what's been 20 called a waffling concept. Are you referring to 21 that in terms of artificially lowering the river, 22 is that what you're thinking of? 23 MR. STEWART: No, I was following your 24 comment about Assiniboine flow and Shellmouth and 25 Portage and so on. It's my perspective, it is our 02075 1 perspective that this is a whole flood protection 2 system, that the Winnipeg Floodway is only one 3 component of Winnipeg's protection. And that by 4 operating that system in a different way, upstream 5 residents could gain some benefit without costing 6 protection of Winnipeg anything. And my point 7 here is that that hasn't been considered because 8 it's been dismissed out of hand that, sorry, they 9 were built for Winnipeg's protection. That was a 10 stance when it was originally done. It sounds a 11 bit like a six year old saying, but mommy gave it 12 to me, I don't have to share. 13 Well, we're now 36 years past that, we 14 are 42. We have a different perspective on 15 things, and not sharing because mommy gave it to 16 me when I was six doesn't cut it. 17 MR. WEBSTER: Let me ask you one more 18 question then. There is anxiety with respect to 19 the runoff that affects the flooding in the Red 20 River for all of us who are in the Red River 21 basin. And I wanted to know whether, in fact, 22 your concern is with the operation of the floodway 23 and the expanded floodway, or whether it's in fact 24 more oriented towards the unpredictability of the 25 natural conditions that generate floods in the 02076 1 valley, in the basin. 2 MR. STEWART: I think everybody in the 3 valley has to be aware of that unpredictable 4 natural flooding, that's a consequence of being 5 here. 6 What our main concerns are, is that 7 the expanded floodway will continue, promises to 8 continue doing harm through artificially high 9 water levels, and at the same time refuses to 10 provide any benefit by possible operation to below 11 natural, below -- artificially low levels. And I 12 think that's our main concern. 13 The uncertainty is starting to 14 disappear. The information that Mr. Clifton and 15 Mr. Bowering tabled recently, the flows in the 16 Shellmouth and so on, indicate that roughly ten 17 times in the lifetime of the floodway, people 18 upstream have had artificially high water in 19 spring operations. So that's about a 33 per cent 20 average. It's not rare, that's for certain. 21 Now, I know Mr. McNeil had said that 22 he had data that 22 times out of the last 36 23 years, summer operation would have caused 24 artificial flooding. And I know he was going to 25 come back. I haven't seen that in the 02077 1 transcripts, but let's say about 20. Well, 20 and 2 10 is 30 out of the last 36. The uncertainty 3 about being flooded artificially upstream is gone. 4 We can count on it 80 per cent of the time; 80 per 5 cent of the years we'll have, based on historical 6 record, some form of artificial flooding. 7 Now with an expanded floodway maybe it 8 will only be 77 per cent, but the point remains 9 that we are pretty certain we're going to be 10 flooded just about every year. 11 MR. WEBSTER: Thank you. 12 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Stewart, do you 13 take any comfort from at least the claims by the 14 Manitoba Floodway Authority that artificial 15 flooding will be lower with an expanded floodway 16 than with the current floodway? 17 MR. STEWART: We take some solace in 18 that, but not enough, inasmuch as being told that 19 we are going to be beaten up a little less 20 severely, a little less often is really not very 21 much comfort. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: What would you propose? 23 MR. STEWART: In terms of? 24 THE CHAIRMAN: As an alternative or as 25 a way to deal with that fact? 02078 1 MR. STEWART: I think what I would 2 propose here, and I will say again I'm a 3 biologist, is that the design philosophy has to be 4 expanded. Because there are people more expert 5 than I in seeing how this could actually be done. 6 The technical aspects I think are beyond me. 7 In terms of what to do with the 8 people, I think they have to have -- they have to 9 be acknowledged that this is going to harm them 10 for the greater good. There has to be some kind 11 of negotiated easements that makes it actually 12 legal to store water in my living-room. 13 I think the compensation aspect of 14 mitigation, what -- so the first part of my answer 15 deals with the technical mitigation, and I can't 16 tell you what the specifics are. I have the 17 feeling, and I've heard Mr. Bowering say that 18 there are ways of doing it, so I'll leave that 19 with him. We need the easements, I guess they 20 would be called legally, the legal right to flood 21 assist. The compensation package has to be 22 negotiated with the people who are being 23 victimized. 24 And this isn't a huge number, I mean, 25 that's part of our problem, right, we are a 02079 1 minority in the province. So it shouldn't be 2 difficult to talk to all of us, lay all the cards 3 on the table, this is what we're going to do, what 4 do you want? And I think we need the town hall 5 meetings to find out what people want. 6 One of my thoughts is that there could 7 be a grandfathered buyout, where you negotiate the 8 current market value and you negotiate -- maybe 9 even put that in a trust fund, but we know in the 10 next couple of years that if we lose our houses, 11 then we are gone and that's the money we get. Why 12 I say that has to be done up-front and 13 grandfathered is because the last guy on the 14 street has pretty low property value. 15 But I think the most important part of 16 it all is to get people to come out and say, this 17 is the bad side of what we're doing, how are we 18 going to make that right for you? And that hasn't 19 happened. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Stewart, is it your 21 view that the federal government should conduct a 22 review, a panel review of this project? 23 MR. STEWART: Yes, it is, and I think 24 we are leaning that way. I mean, I think -- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: We being NRAC? 02080 1 MR. STEWART: Sorry, I think the whole 2 process is kind of headed that way. I guess I 3 said it in my presentation, that it's hard to see 4 how the project could be approved right now, 5 because there's work to be involved to go back and 6 fill those gaps in the EIS. You know, it does 7 strike me as being a lot of work. And I don't 8 know the jurisdictional relationships here, but it 9 seems to me that if you accept those kinds of 10 arguments and say, sorry, we need some more work 11 done, then why don't we go to the federal panel on 12 the next iteration right away? And it's my read 13 that the federal requirements are a little more 14 rigorous. So if you can get over the biggest 15 hurdle, you got over the shorter hurdle, and that 16 makes most sense in getting the project under way. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: So your view is that 18 the federal process would fill in these gaps? 19 MR. STEWART: My personal opinion is 20 that there is a lot of work yet to be done on the 21 EIS, and if you agree with that and say come back 22 to me in two months when you've got it done, then 23 we haven't necessarily satisfied the requirements 24 of CEAA. And CEAA may after that say, "yes, but." 25 So if you're going to ask that major changes be 02081 1 done, and I think it would be unsafe to say, we 2 will approve you on the basis that these things 3 will be done, if you require things to be done and 4 to be demonstrated to be done, then perhaps that 5 should be demonstrated to the next level up to 6 avoid the possibility of still having to do a 7 federal panel. 8 I wandered around a bit there. I 9 don't know if you caught that or not. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure how you 11 arrived at some of your numbers in your October 12 2004 report, which at least as I read them are 13 quite different than what the Floodway Authority 14 has presented to us. You talk about a one in 225 15 year flood, there being something in the order of 16 1.5 metres of artificial flooding. You also talk 17 about by the time rule 3 is implemented, upstream 18 residents are inundated by as much as 8 feet of 19 artificial flooding. 20 Now, the evidence that we've heard 21 from the Floodway Authority is that at least until 22 a one in 700 year flood, the artificial flooding 23 will be lowered than the current? 24 MR. STEWART: I'll see if I can get 25 what you are referring to, but I would also say 02082 1 that I'm not in a position to discuss very many 2 technical details. 3 THE CHAIRMAN: You make these 4 statements in your October report. 5 MR. STEWART: Yes. I think this is in 6 reference to the figure 5.3.4. 7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it is that figure. 8 MR. STEWART: If you'll just excuse me 9 for a second, I'll grab that binder. 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. It's on 11 page 11, I think the graph is on page 10 of 22 and 12 then some of your figures are on page 11 and 12. 13 MR. STEWART: And your question was? 14 THE CHAIRMAN: I am just wondering how 15 you get your figures that the expanded floodway 16 causes -- this is in the last paragraph on page 17 11, just above the cartoon, which says, 18 "At the same time, the expanded 19 floodway causes something in the order 20 of 1.5 metres of artificial flooding 21 during the one in 225 flood." 22 The next page, the top paragraph, 23 "By the time rule 3 is implemented 24 upstream residents are inundated by as 25 much as 8 feet of artificial 02083 1 flooding." 2 MR. STEWART: The origin is the figure 3 5.3-4, and the horizontal dotted line is upstream 4 flood protection level. The blue curve, I 5 believe, shows flows -- or sorry, shows water 6 elevations with the expanded floodway. And it 7 crosses our flood protection level some place 8 between the one in 120 and the one in 125 -- 9 sorry, the one in 225. 10 Rule 3 kicks in at 778, which is where 11 the green line takes the sharp horizontal angle. 12 And in my neighbourhood the flood protection level 13 of '97 plus two is about 774. So by the time rule 14 3 starts, we are already 4 feet over our flood 15 protection level. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Over your flood 17 protection line, yes, but that's not necessarily 18 artificial flooding, as I understand this. 19 Now, I will ask, when we have the 20 Floodway Authority back on the stand next week for 21 redirect or re-examination by this panel, I will 22 ask that question of them. But as I recall them 23 explaining it to us the week before last, the top 24 line is what's natural, and then those bottom 25 lines are with the existing and the expanded 02084 1 floodway. And that the artificial flooding 2 doesn't really level off until you get to a one in 3 700 year flood. 4 I mean, I think I'll have to ask those 5 questions of the Floodway Authority to get an 6 explanation of that, and I will do that next week. 7 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, would you like 8 me just to clarify now while you are looking at 9 the graph? 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. 11 MR. MCNEIL: So you are looking at 12 page 10 of 22 of the North Ritchot Action 13 Committee's submission, and figure 5.3-4 which 14 came out of the EIS, and the KGS Aces, UMA 15 studies. The lower line which ends at a 16 horizontal dotted line, dashed line, that lower 17 line is the state of nature water level, for all 18 those floods, those various flows. And the line 19 that takes off from that natural line at about, 20 just below the one in 100 year flood. 21 THE CHAIRMAN: The rule 2 line? 22 MR. MCNEIL: The rule 2 line, that's 23 rule 2 as it exists today with the existing 24 floodway. And then at approximately elevation 25 237, it flattens out and goes horizontal, that's 02085 1 the existing floodway. That's how the rules would 2 be applied. 3 And the line in the middle, which is 4 curved, takes off from the natural waterline at 5 the one in 120 year flood, and then takes a curved 6 upward approach and then levels off at 237. That 7 would be the operation for those flows with the 8 expanded floodway. 9 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. So there will be 10 artificial flooding beyond about a one in 120 11 flood? 12 MR. MCNEIL: That's correct. 13 THE CHAIRMAN: But it's lower than, or 14 it's less artificial flooding than with the 15 existing floodway? 16 MR. MCNEIL: Correct, for all flows up 17 to the 700 year event. 18 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. So that would 19 explain your statements in here. It's a 20 comparison to the existing floodway, which I asked 21 you that question earlier. 22 I have no further questions. 23 MR. MCNEIL: Mr. Chair, I just have a 24 couple of questions arising out of the 25 Commission's questions and the responses. 02086 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 2 MR. MCNEIL: In the first place, 3 Mr. Stewart, with respect to public 4 representation, are you aware that the Government 5 of Manitoba, specifically the Minister of Natural 6 Resources, in November of 1998, appointed the Red 7 River Floodway Operation Review Committee, and are 8 you aware that an elected official from the RM of 9 Ritchot, Ms. Valerie Rutherford, sat on that 10 committee among elected officials from the RM of 11 Morris, Macdonald, and then government officials? 12 MR. STEWART: I'm aware of that. I am 13 also aware that our request that we'd be able to 14 provide Councillor Rutherford with technical 15 assistance was rejected. 16 MR. MCNEIL: Who was it rejected by? 17 MR. STEWART: I believe it was Water 18 Resources Branch. 19 MR. MCNEIL: Anyway, the fact is that 20 the Minister established that committee that 21 elected representatives that represent all 22 residents of the RM of Ritchot, or rather one 23 elected official, Ms. Rutherford, sat on that 24 committee. And I recall that Mayor Bob Stefaniuk 25 also attended many of those meetings. So your 02087 1 concerns could be heard from the committee up 2 through your elected officials. 3 On a second question, Mr. Chair, 4 Mr. Stewart had indicated that preventing 5 artificial flooding was dismissed out of hand. 6 And I apologize if I didn't quote him exactly. In 7 fact, the flood protection studies for Winnipeg 8 report that is dated November 2001 has three 9 specific references to dealing with artificial 10 flooding, or preventing it, as options to floodway 11 expansion. And I specifically refer to appendix 12 B, section B.9.2, and it's called rule 2, raising 13 water level above the state of nature. And I 14 refer specifically to table B-21, comparison of 15 floodway expansion schemes in alternative rule 2 16 operation modes. And that in fact for the 500, 17 700, 1,000 and 1,200 year floods, KGS did look at 18 limiting water levels upstream of the inlet 19 control structure to the natural level. 20 So for the one in 700 year flood 21 protection for Winnipeg, to limit the water level 22 upstream of the inlet control structure to state 23 of nature would cost an additional $500 million, 24 over and above the $660 million. So it was 25 considered in the report and government took that 02088 1 into account. 2 And, Mr. Stewart, are you aware of 3 these references in this report? 4 MR. STEWART: I had missed those. 5 MR. MCNEIL: Thank you, Mr. Chair. 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 7 MR. STEWART: If I could just respond? 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. 9 MR. STEWART: The consultation, or 10 lack of consultation that went into the rules of 11 operation makes me think of something that you had 12 asked, that we talked about in compensation. And 13 I noticed that both Mayor Stefaniuk and 14 Mr. Bowering noted the other day that those 15 deliberations were thought to be interim rules and 16 they were adopted unilaterally after that. 17 With respect to compensation, I think 18 why this example is important is that when the 19 community is represented in discussions of 20 compensation, it should be by somebody who is 21 selected, elected for exactly that specific 22 purpose, so that the expertise to represent is 23 there, and discuss technical issues or legal 24 ramifications or compensation. And it's not 25 necessarily somebody who was elected on a 02089 1 different platform as a councillor. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 3 Do any of the registered participant 4 groups have any questions of the North Ritchot 5 Action Committee? Seeing none, I thank you for 6 your presentation here today. I would like to, I 7 don't know whether you will take any comfort in 8 it, Dr. Stewart, but I would like to assure you 9 that in spite of your misgivings about the Clean 10 Environment Commission process, we are very open 11 to consider all relevant matters before us. I 12 don't share your interpretation of the June 1st 13 meeting and what you call restrictions on our 14 mandate. We will give this as thorough a review 15 as we are able to. 16 MR. STEWART: Thank you. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 18 MS. JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, could we 19 add Dr. Stewart's submission as Exhibit 74. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 21 22 (EXHIBIT 74: Submission by Dr. 23 Stewart to CEC) 24 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Next up is Ritchot 02090 1 Concerned Citizens. Do you have technological 2 matters to set up? It's 10 after 10:00. How long 3 will your presentation will be? 4 MR. STARR: 45 minutes. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps we'll take a 6 ten minute break now, rather than breaking later, 7 we will take a ten minute break now, come back at 8 20 after, and then you can proceed then. 9 10 (Proceedings recessed at 10:10 a.m. 11 and reconvened at 10:30 a.m.) 12 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we come to order 14 now? I apologize for the delay, but a minor 15 glitch. 16 Appearing now is the Ritchot Concerned 17 Citizens Committee. Could you please introduce 18 yourself for the record, and then we will have the 19 Commission secretary swear you in. 20 MR. STARR: My name is Bob Starr. And 21 I'm the chairman of the Ritchot Concerned Citizens 22 Committee Incorporated. 23 24 (BOB STARR: SWORN) 25 02091 1 MR. STARR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 2 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, I have 3 watched -- first of all, I will just warn you, Mr. 4 Sargeant, there is a little preamble of my 5 observations over the last two weeks. 6 I have watched with interest the 7 conduct of these hearings and have tried to review 8 the transcripts, however, my participation has 9 been limited, because I'm the owner of a small 10 business and it has simply not been possible for 11 me to commit three full weeks to the hearing 12 process. I have made a couple of observations 13 about the hearing, however, and would like to 14 share these with you at my outset today. 15 Firstly, I have watched with interest 16 the focus of attention on possible downstream 17 effects. I can understand the fear and concerns 18 expressed by downstream residents, who fear for 19 their water supply and other important impacts of 20 the project. But as someone who experienced the 21 '97 flooding disaster and its aftermath, I hope 22 you will understand and appreciate my focus on 23 impacts upstream of the inlet control structure. 24 Thousands of homeowners affected by past 25 artificial flooding would like to think that their 02092 1 concerns would be given high priority in the 2 conduct of these hearings. It is important that 3 upstream residents receive fair consideration in 4 your deliberations and are not treated as 5 throw-aways in the floodway expansion project, as 6 we have in the past. For us future artificial 7 flooding is 100 per cent certain, and based on our 8 experience for almost 35 years, we take no comfort 9 from assurances by the Floodway Authority and the 10 province that the unproclaimed Red River Floodway 11 Act will look after us. 12 Secondly, we have heard a great deal 13 about baseline, incremental impacts, and 14 cumulative effects. I am far from being an expert 15 on such matters, but I have come to understand 16 through this hearing process that current 17 legislation and guidelines are in place to 18 conserve and protect the environment, while 19 sustaining our resources for future generations. 20 My understanding is that this 21 legislation dictates that existing works serve as 22 the baseline for determining the cumulative 23 impacts of man's intervention and development of 24 the landscape. While this may be the case, I 25 question whether or not such baseline 02093 1 considerations are in our collective best 2 interests unless the baseline is fully and 3 completely understood. 4 I say this, Mr. Chairman, because of 5 our concern for the baseline for evaluating the 6 impacts of the floodway expansion project. Using 7 the existing floodway as a baseline provides the 8 opportunity for the Floodway Authority to bury the 9 designed and planned water elevation of 778 feet 10 just upstream from the inlet control structure as 11 part of the existing project, even though this 12 elevation has never been experienced, was never 13 the subject of an environmental assessment and 14 could not be achieved in the '97 flood of the 15 century. 16 This elevation is of paramount 17 importance to upstream residents, as this level of 18 flooding and proposed summer operation of the 19 control works are at the very heart of our 20 concerns for natural versus artificial flooding. 21 Some of us who are not experts in 22 environmental assessment have had difficulty 23 trying to understand the concepts of baseline, 24 incremental impacts, cumulative effects, being 25 applied from a starting point that is far higher 02094 1 than anything ever studied or experienced and, 2 therefore, not fully understood. As one person 3 attempted to explain to me, cumulative assessment 4 is like adding straws to a camel's back, you want 5 to understand how many straws, and when the 6 addition of straws are likely to break the camel's 7 back. Continuing with this analogy, my question 8 is this: Shouldn't we, as a society seeking 9 decisions in the common good, determine the health 10 and strength of the camel before we add any more 11 straws? 12 Mr. Chairman, my presentation which 13 was filed with the Commission several weeks ago 14 deals with these concerns and others, and I would 15 refer you to that document now. I will not read 16 it word for word, but I will go through it 17 systematically with a few additions, comments, and 18 examples. And I would invite you and the 19 Commissioners to stop me at any time and ask 20 questions. I will go to that main document now. 21 The particular interest of the Ritchot 22 Concerned Citizens Committee: The Ritchot 23 Concerned Citizens Committee represents concerns 24 of people who live immediately upstream from the 25 floodway inlet. Our interest is to provide the 02095 1 CEC evidence focusing primarily on the potential 2 socio-economic impacts of the proposed project on 3 our residents, drawing on our experiences gained 4 from the impacts of the 1997 flood and the 5 operations of the floodway both before and since 6 that date. 7 Our position taken: Our committee 8 fully understands and supports the intention to 9 improve flood protection measures for the City of 10 Winnipeg. However, the proposed project as 11 described in the EIS is not acceptable, because it 12 will inflict artificial flooding on the people we 13 represent without any specific provisions for 14 prevention, compensation, mitigation, and once 15 again demonstrates inadequate thought, analysis, 16 understanding and actions on the part of the 17 authorities responsible for floodway construction 18 and operation. 19 Our residents' perspective is critical 20 because we bore the brunt of the '97 flood of the 21 century and it is 100 per cent certain we will be 22 flooded again and again after that. 23 At this point I would like to refer 24 the Commission to the brochure, it is in our black 25 binder with supplementary documents, and there is 02096 1 a little brochure in there called "The Facts 2 Behind the Floodway." 3 Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, we feel 4 this is a very critical document and I refer to it 5 fairly frequently today. It does not have a 6 publication date, however it mentions the floodway 7 was used in 16 springs up to 1995. And I picked 8 up my copy after the '97 flood at Water Resources. 9 Residents tell me it was also available in a box 10 right on the inlet control structure for the 11 public to pick up after the '96 flood. 12 For now I would direct you to the 13 second question and answer. The question asked 14 is: Does operating the floodway aggravate 15 flooding south of Winnipeg? And we have to 16 realize this is the province answering these 17 questions. So does operating the floodway 18 aggravate flooding south of Winnipeg? Their 19 answer, no, the floodway inlet control structure 20 is operated to keep the water level south of the 21 floodway at or below what it would be under 22 natural conditions. 23 This, Mr. Chairman, Commissioners, 24 should be the baseline, the highest natural level 25 that was part of the existing environment, not 02097 1 MFA's pie in the sky baseline that was a 2 theoretical, emergency level that only a handful 3 of engineers knew about. Residents have always 4 been told the floodway was never operated above 5 natural and this document by the province proves 6 that. 7 I would also like you to go to -- this 8 is out of the EIS -- further to my baseline 9 argument, on page 19 of section 8, and apparently 10 it is after the fourth bullet. There is the 11 passage in there, 12 "Although the existing floodway can 13 pass a maximum of a 225 year flood, it 14 is not reliable due to submerged 15 bridges and inadequate freeboard on 16 the West Dyke." 17 What I have come to understand, Mr. Sargeant, is 18 this proves that the MFA baseline of 778 was 19 simply impossible in 1997, and not even possible 20 today, because no engineer would operate to that 21 level and risk a veritable tsunami going through 22 Winnipeg. 778 today was just a number that was 23 contemplated in a severe emergency. 24 Because the MFA used the theoretical, 25 never attained, never studied elevation of 778 at 02098 1 the inlet as the baseline for the environmental 2 studies, even for the so-called cumulative effects 3 assessment in the EIS, our experiences which are 4 based largely on elevation 771.5, in the flood of 5 the century, have been trivialized. We believed 6 that the 778-foot level could never be reached 7 without the enhancements made since '97 that were 8 never looked at from an environmental perspective. 9 Elevation 771.5 is the highest level ever 10 attained. To use a level six and a half feet 11 higher than the flood of the century as the 12 baseline for the EIS is completely unjustifiable 13 and unacceptable. 14 In 1997, many of our properties, 15 lives, and relationships were devastated when 16 elevations at the inlet control structure were 17 raised to 771.5. Yet the EIS says nothing about 18 what damages might be at 773, 775, 777. These are 19 levels that to upstream residents are beyond 20 comprehension. Rather the EIS is based on the 21 fantasy that at 778, upstream residents ought to 22 be relieved and thankful for the bigger ditch, 23 since we won't be any worse off than we would be 24 with the existing floodway. 25 And the CEC has been asked to buy into 02099 1 this fantasy and weigh impacts at 778, with no 2 quantification of impacts below a level that I 3 repeat is six and a half feet higher than the 4 flood of the century. 5 It is important for the CEC and 6 residents of Winnipeg to understand that the 7 Ritchot Concerned Citizens Committee is not 8 opposed to flood protection for Winnipeg. We 9 understand better than most the concept of 10 sacrifice for the greater good. All we are asking 11 is to be treated openly, honestly, and fairly, 12 which I'm sorry to say would be a striking 13 departure from our past experiences. 14 We are not the only ones disagreeing 15 with the baseline, as these hearings have shown. 16 Indeed, all funded intervenors met with Federal 17 Government representatives and Mr. Larry Strachan 18 from Manitoba Conservation, July 21, '04 and 19 October 5th, '04. The purpose of those meetings, 20 which were well documented, was to express 21 intervenors' concerns regarding the narrow 22 definition of environmental effects and baseline 23 used by MFA. 24 In fact, at the October 5th meeting, 25 all intervenors were so concerned they unanimously 02100 1 asked that the proposed project be reviewed by an 2 independent Federal panel. The project 3 administration team, PAT, completed its review of 4 the EIS November 1, '04. And it is of great 5 concern to our committee that the PAT, even though 6 it was by that time fully aware of intervenors 7 concerns, would say that the PAT generally concurs 8 with the assessment approach outlined in the EIS. 9 After reviewing the responses by MFA 10 to information requests, it is apparent other 11 intervenors have the same or similar concerns as 12 we do. And we noted even the CEC also asked many 13 of the same questions. On the one hand this is 14 encouraging because it shows that CEC and others 15 are aware of the problems Ritchot residents will 16 face. On the other hand, however, a large number 17 of information requests resulted in responses 18 which were, to paraphrase -- sorry, but that 19 concern or issue does not fall into the tiny 20 basket for concerns or issues that meet MFA's 21 interpretation of environmental effects of the 22 project, or don't worry about that, just believe 23 us when we say that you will be treated fairly, 24 even though we cannot provide any details, or 25 plans, or procedures, or timetables, or any 02101 1 specific information whatsoever about how such 2 fair treatment will be achieved. 3 Our committee believes the most 4 effective arguments regarding the interpretation 5 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act are 6 made in submissions by the North Richot Action 7 Committee and by Health Canada. We would 8 especially ask the CEC to consider these 9 submissions carefully. 10 I would like to give you a brief 11 history of Ritchot and the Red River Floodway. 12 One cannot properly assess the socio-economic 13 impacts of the project without some background on 14 the RM of Ritchot before any manmade flood 15 prevention measures were in place. And as well 16 the original intent and history of the Red River 17 floodway has to be examined. 18 The RM of Ritchot has a rich history 19 that developed just as early as Winnipeg's, and 20 our committee has found no documentation to 21 indicate that it was any more or less prone to 22 flooding than the City of Winnipeg. We asked MFA, 23 this in our interrogatory number 39, and they 24 essentially agreed. This is something that has 25 bothered us since 1997. Residents were told, you 02102 1 shouldn't live in the flood prone area, you built 2 too low. Ritchot was not any lower or more prone 3 to flooding than the City of Winnipeg. First 4 person interviews with long term residents 5 upstream from the inlet control structure confirm 6 this. Many of the people we interviewed still 7 live on land inherited from families that 8 originally settled there before Manitoba was a 9 province. Their recollections are clear and 10 unanimous, the RM of Ritchot was never more prone 11 to flooding than Winnipeg. The area upstream from 12 the inlet control structure never had frequent 13 flooding events until after construction of the 14 Red River floodway. 15 The floodway concept was originally 16 recommended by the Manning Royal Commission in 17 1958. The concept was fairly simple, a giant 18 ditch to allow excess water to flow around 19 Winnipeg. The Commission never considered 20 environmental effects or the socio-economic 21 effects of upstream artificial flooding as there 22 were to be none. 23 The existing floodway was constructed 24 between 1962 and 1968. It was more than just a 25 giant ditch, it included gates to limit the Red 02103 1 River flow through Winnipeg and to force some of 2 the water into the ditch. 3 The existing floodway was first 4 operated in the spring of 1969. Unknown to 5 upstream residents, this operation altered our 6 futures forever. 7 In response to our interrogatory 8 number 46, the MFA revealed that artificial 9 flooding occurred the very first time the floodway 10 was operated to the extent of .9 feet. It is 11 extremely important for the CEC to note this 12 because it is so typical of the experiences of 13 upstream residents. And apparently this set the 14 pattern for the next 35 years. In spite of the 15 countless letters, numerous meetings with 16 technical people and politicians, access to 17 information requests, legal challenges, and all of 18 the rest that we have been forced to endure, this 19 response to our information requests provided in 20 late 2004 is the very first time upstream 21 residents have been told that artificial flooding 22 occurred in 1969. 23 In July 1969, immediately after the 24 first operation of the floodway, Canada asked 25 Manitoba to provide a program of operation as per 02104 1 the original construction agreement. The record 2 shows that Manitoba did not provide the requested 3 program of operation until over a year later in 4 August of 1970. And Canada didn't approve it. 5 Indeed, it was not until April 26, 6 2001, that the Honourable David Anderson, Minister 7 of the Environment, provided the first ever 8 Federal approval for the program of operation, 39 9 years after the 1962 construction and maintenance 10 agreement, and 32 years after Ritchot residents 11 experienced the first artificial flooding. 12 Between 1969 and 2001 there were eight 13 years in which artificial flooding occurred, as 14 per our interrogatory number 46. Over this same 15 period, Ritchot residents were consistently told 16 that the floodway is never operated beyond natural 17 levels, in response to any concerns expressed to 18 the contrary. 19 Over the years operations have been 20 changed to benefit the City of Winnipeg with 21 resulting negative impacts on upstream residents. 22 For example, summer operations were ordered by the 23 province in 2002 and 2004. These actions were 24 outside of any rules of operation and resulted in 25 considerable stress and financial loss to upstream 02105 1 residents. 2 Mr. Chairman, I have only scratched 3 the surface of a very ugly history, a harmless 4 diversion ditch with no impacts whatsoever that 5 has grown into a project that forced artificial 6 flooding on thousands of unsuspecting upstream 7 residents, until in 1997 the induced artificial 8 flooding became so severe as to cause the total 9 destruction of hundreds of upstream homes and 10 businesses, and inflicted long term health and 11 other socio-economic effects permanently on 12 upstream area residents. 13 Now that I have given you a brief 14 history of Ritchot before it flooded any worse 15 than Winnipeg, I would refer the Commission to the 16 charts that I handed out this morning, and I will 17 show you how a harmless diversion ditch has grown 18 into a destructive dam. 19 Mr. Sargeant, members of the 20 Commission, these charts are from the EIS 21 supplementary filing and they are from annex E, 22 water surface elevations. These are just black 23 and white copies. They are clear and in colour in 24 the EIS. These charts show the water surface 25 elevations for various flood events under calm 02106 1 conditions, that is no allowance for wind setup or 2 wave action. What I have done is pull five of 3 them out to examine, as they give us a really good 4 picture of what will happen in Ritchot for a 700 5 year flood event. What I have done is highlight 6 the 700 year level and the ring dyke elevation for 7 five ring dyke communities starting at the 8 Turnbull Drive dyke and moving upstream to 9 Ste. Agathe. I have taken the 700 year level and 10 added three feet for freeboard, for wind setup and 11 wave action. I chose three feet instead of the 12 standard two feet because these are ring dyke 13 communities and I feel that's a minimum safe 14 freeboard. 15 I then subtracted that new level from 16 the current ring dyke elevation to see how much 17 these dykes would have to be increased to have at 18 least a reasonable protection in a 700 year flood. 19 The figure I came up with is in red at the top of 20 each page. 21 And if you follow me so far, I would 22 like to just review them quickly with you. The 23 first one, the Turnbull Drive dyke, if they wanted 24 to stay safe in a 700 year flood would have to 25 raise their current protection 10 feet. That's 02107 1 not possible with that dyke, it is too close to 2 the river and it is too close to the homes. 3 Grande Pointe has a new dyke, a newly 4 constructed ring dyke. That dyke for a 700 year 5 event is 6.7 feet too low. And I'm not familiar 6 with it, it might be able to be raised that much. 7 There may be homes too close. 8 St. Adolphe for a 700 year flood has 9 to be raised almost 7 feet. I know that cannot be 10 done. There are homes too close to go that high, 11 and in some cases it is too close to the river. 12 Niverville has to come up 6.1 feet, 13 and Ste. Agathe, who we all watched go under in 14 1997, could well happen again, they have to go up 15 almost 4 feet. 16 Mr. Chairman, my point in reviewing 17 these charts is to show you the devastation that 18 will occur in Ritchot when elevations 778 is held 19 at the inlet. Over 2,000 homes could be lost 20 affecting 5,000 residents, hundreds of farms and 21 businesses go under. Ile des Chenes, which has 22 never flooded, goes under. You simply cannot 23 possibly flood proof to the insane levels that I 24 have shown you on these charts. 25 There is a promise by the province to 02108 1 increase these dykes in an emergency. However, 2 even if there was no rain or snow to prevent heavy 3 equipment from working, it is physically 4 impossible in most cases as the dykes are too 5 close to buildings or the river or other 6 obstructions to go that high. MFA says these 7 levels will be rare events. We question that. If 8 it is so rare, why are we bothering to expand the 9 floodway? 10 Mr. Gilroy, in his opening remarks 11 said there was a 37 per cent chance in the next 50 12 years of a big flood. Our risks are a lot greater 13 than that. It has been 179 years since the 1826 14 flood. We are due for a big one. 15 As you can see from these charts, even 16 a 225 year flood would sacrifice most of Ritchot. 17 If you look about the middle of the page for the 18 225 year flood, expanded floodway, and quickly 19 flip through, now those are the ring dyke towns 20 which are generally a bit higher than the 21 individual flood protection. The individuals 22 living outside of those towns are even more 23 susceptible. 24 But, Mr. Chairman, there is even more 25 uncertainty to add to this. I would like to read 02109 1 you something from our interrogatory number 22. 2 Interrogatory number 22, our question is, please 3 provide a detailed description of data collection, 4 use of computer models, operation related 5 communications, and operational decision making 6 during a flood event. In the description, please 7 explain how the natural rating curve is used. 8 Please advise whether the natural rating curve is 9 adjusted in any way during a flood event, or 10 whether judgments are ever made to depart from it 11 to account for no known differences between actual 12 events that are unfolding and the assumptions and 13 uncertainties studied and quantified in its 14 derivation. Complicated question. All I want to 15 refer to is the end of it. 16 At the end of it they say the natural 17 rating curve is not adjusted during the flood, it 18 is applied directly. The only time when the 19 natural rating curve cannot be used is when the 20 river levels are affected by ice. However, ice is 21 normally gone at the inlet structure by the time 22 floodway operation commences. So this is not an 23 issue. 24 It is a huge issue, Mr. Chairman. All 25 big floods have very thick ice and very thick ice 02110 1 tends to jam. It was a huge issue in 1997 and ice 2 did jam the floodway. 1826, the ice was 3 especially thick. What I'm trying to say here is 4 in any flood year an ice jam can block the 5 floodway entrance. It happened in 1997, and as a 6 result the inlet level rose over 10 feet in about 7 12 hours, in the dark of the night while we all 8 slept. We woke up to roads under water. We 9 couldn't get stuff in or out. 10 Now with the ability to hold 778 at 11 the inlet, an ice jam hugely increases Ritchot's 12 chances of experiencing devastating flood levels. 13 And there is still more uncertainty to throw into 14 this whole mix, there are the effects of the West 15 Dyke. 16 Can I read something from 768's 17 submission, even though they haven't presented 18 yet? 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Briefly. 20 MR. STARR: It is very brief. This is 21 from Green Mountain Hydrotech, 768 Association's 22 submission on the effects of the West Dyke. 23 "The full effect of the West Dyke 24 extension starting from the pre-April 25 '97 condition to the future proposed 02111 1 design may have significant effects on 2 flood levels locally and over a wider 3 area during extreme flood events such 4 as the 700 year flood, but this does 5 not appear to have been tested by any 6 modeling to date." 7 So we have got the ice jams, we have got the West 8 Dyke. And then Green Mountain Hydrotech also 9 talks about the modeling uncertainties. 10 "There is a concern that the Mike-2 11 model would not be able to simulate 12 water levels nearly as accurately as 13 the Telemac model. The main reason 14 for this is Mike-2 is a one 15 dimensional model and is not as well 16 suited to simulate flows across the 17 regular flood plain surface as a two 18 dimensional model such as Telemac 2D." 19 So there is the ice jams, the West Dyke, modeling 20 uncertainties. 21 Mr. Chairman, the effects from 22 artificial flooding in Ritchot are going to be 23 horrible. However, as we discussed in the EIS, 24 the effects of artificial flooding are felt -- 25 sorry, as we discovered in the EIS, the effects of 02112 1 artificial flooding are felt as far south as 2 possibly the U.S. border. We raised this question 3 with MFA in a phone call, December 10, '04. 4 Mr. Doug McNeil responded December 22, '04, and 5 also copied CEC. I will read you first the 6 paragraph that triggered our question and then Mr. 7 McNeil's reply. 8 This is from page 7-1 in the 9 supplementary filing of the EIS. The paragraph 10 that triggered our question is, 11 "The one in 700 year flood level will 12 be 6.5 feet higher than the 1997 peak 13 level immediately upstream of the 14 floodway inlet control structure and 15 tapering to approximately 1.7 feet for 16 the reach of the Red River between 17 Aubigny and Emerson. Many of the 18 community's homes and businesses 19 between Aubigny and Emerson have 20 permanent flood protection that may be 21 sufficient in a one in 700 year level, 22 and if not, additional flood 23 protection measures, whether temporary 24 or permanent, may be required." 25 So this paragraph is the first time we 02113 1 have seen any indication of artificial flooding 2 going further south than just beyond Ste. Agathe. 3 So we had to ask MFA the question, does it 4 actually go all of the way to the U.S. border? 5 I will read from Mr. McNeil's response 6 December 22nd. 7 "When the water level at the inlet 8 control structure is at 778 during a 9 one in 700 year flood event, for 10 either the existing or the expanded, 11 there is the same small amount of 12 artificial flooding at Aubigny 13 tapering to no artificial flooding at 14 Emerson. More specifically, the 15 artificial flooding amounts to .3 feet 16 at Aubigny, .6 feet at Morris, and 17 .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste, and no 18 artificial flooding at Letellier and 19 Emerson." 20 Mr. Chairman, members of the 21 Commission, Mr. McNeil's response raises some 22 very, very large questions. Number one, as the 23 EIS has not studied the effects of the West Dyke, 24 as I showed you, or ice jams, or almost anything 25 upstream, and there is a margin of error in all of 02114 1 the artificial calculations, and as 768 2 Association expert states that a two dimensional 3 model would be more accurate, how can we be 100 4 per cent certain that in a 700 year flood with 778 5 at the inlet that we are not artificially flooding 6 into the U.S.? 7 From Mr. McNeil's response, we have to 8 assume that .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste doesn't 9 just stop there, it would have to taper out to 10 nothing at Letellier -- this is only about ten 11 miles from the U.S. border. Leaving the U.S. 12 question behind, I'm more concerned that the flood 13 study region is not large enough. I stand to be 14 corrected, but I believe there was no public open 15 houses held south of Ste. Agathe, and I see nobody 16 registered at these hearings from south of 17 Ste. Agathe. 18 We are very concerned that a large 19 upstream population is not aware of the artificial 20 flooding they will face. Because the Indian 21 Reserve Number 2, Roseau River, is right in the 22 middle of the .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste, and no 23 artificial flooding at Letellier, are they 24 affected? It is crucial for all upstream 25 residents to know if they are affected by 02115 1 artificial flooding. 2 Obviously, more upstream studies are 3 required so that the cumulative effects of the 4 West Dyke and all other contributing factors are 5 considered. Detailed inundation charts for 6 upstream areas need to be done as they were for 7 downstream. I would suggest a detailed colour map 8 for the areas affected by artificial flooding 9 similar to the one done by the '98 Water 10 Commission. This map shows very clearly right 11 down to .1-foot, and that is what is needed, I can 12 assure you, because my home was lost in '97 by 13 about that amount of water. I will show you that 14 later in a photo. The map should also show 15 clearly the margin of error for the artificial 16 levels. 17 We note the margin of error at the 18 inlet for approximately a 700 year flood is minus 19 1.0 to plus 0.8. This is a range of almost two 20 feet of uncertainty. Now I remind you about 21 .1-foot put my house under. We do not know what 22 the margin of error is further upstream. For 23 example, if we take .3 feet at St. Jean Baptiste 24 how much margin of error do we add to that? If 25 the Red River Floodway Act is to look after all of 02116 1 these people, they need to know this, and they 2 need to know exactly how far upstream this 3 artificial flooding goes. 4 It is very disturbing to see that 5 there are no damage calculations done for 6 artificial flooding upstream. As the province has 7 promised to pay 100 per cent of these costs, you 8 wonder if they have any idea what they are getting 9 into. So I went out on a limb, Mr. Chair, and I 10 did some very rough calculations, but don't hold 11 me to it, they are very rough, but somebody has to 12 give you an idea of what we are looking at here. 13 So for a 700 year flood, 778 at the 14 inlet, there are 2,000 homes in Ritchot that could 15 go under. I know that there has got to be 2,000 16 homes between Ste. Agathe and St. Jean Baptiste, 17 so we have got 4,000 homes. And I know something 18 about the damages from '97, so I took 4,000 homes 19 at 250,000 for building and contents, it comes to 20 $1 billion. 21 Now, let's add in the municipal 22 buildings, the churches, the community centres, 23 the commercial buildings, the agricultural 24 buildings, and of course all of the contents of 25 these various buildings, and then there is the 02117 1 business losses which are promised to be covered 2 in the Floodway Act. My guess, but it is kind of 3 an educated guess, is that we are at a potential 4 $2 billion cost easy. 5 Now, remember, we have got a 37 per 6 cent chance in the next 50 years of this 7 happening, and an ice jam could greatly increase 8 those chances. How is the province going to pay 9 this? Are we really doing the right thing with 10 this floodway expansion, or should we look at the 11 billion dollar so-called third option? 12 Of course we can not begin to put a 13 dollar value on the social costs that would 14 result, Mr. Chairman, these are only monetary 15 costs. However, I will give you a good idea of 16 how devastating those social costs can be later. 17 I will now take you back to our main 18 presentation, and I'm starting at a section called 19 section 3, mistrust of all governments. 20 The lack of evident consideration for 21 upstream interests, as I have just shown you, is 22 breathtaking. The lack of openness by the 23 province forced upstream residents to raise their 24 own money and retain our own independent experts 25 to get honest answers in 1997. Following the 02118 1 flood in '97, Water Resources advised upstream 2 residents that there had been a few inches of 3 artificial flooding. The Premier at the time, 4 Gary Filmon, is on record as saying that as a 5 trained professional engineer specializing in 6 hydrology, he was convinced that operation of the 7 floodway did not cause upstream damages. 8 On September 9, '97, the North Ritchot 9 Restoration Committee, I was chair at the time, 10 hired the firm Charles Howard & Associates to 11 conduct an independent review of the '97 flood. 12 We were the first ones to do this as we wanted 13 honest answers. Residents had long suspected the 14 province was not telling the truth. It was not an 15 easy thing, Mr. Chairman, in 1997 to raise money 16 from flood damaged people in order to hire Chuck 17 Howard. 18 The Howard report concluded that 19 levels upstream of the floodway inlet may have 20 been as much as three and a half feet above 21 natural. 22 Finally, in June of '98 the Manitoba 23 Water Commission admitted up to 2.1 feet of 24 artificial flooding, and then introduced another 25 very important aspect that had not been previously 02119 1 admitted, uncertainty. A study by Klohn-Krippen 2 upon which the Manitoba Water Commission based its 3 figures stated that the calculations were subject 4 to an error of plus or minus .5 feet. 5 In view of experiences such as these 6 over the past 43 years, I hope that the Commission 7 can begin to understand why residents of Ritchot 8 have developed a strong mistrust of both the 9 Provincial and Federal Governments. This is not 10 healthy, it affects our members mental health, 11 even municipal politics, and is preventing 12 residents of the RM of Ritchot from participating 13 fully, as a healthy population should, in everyday 14 life as a Canadian citizen. 15 The total lack of consideration for 16 upstream residents who sacrificed their homes and 17 health in '97 to save Winnipeg, and who ultimately 18 will have to do so again, is appalling. The level 19 of mistrust for Government must be alleviated by 20 allowing all concerns, past, present, and future, 21 to be addressed in the environmental assessment 22 process for floodway expansion. 23 Aspects of flood proofing programs 24 provide a very good example of the lack of 25 consideration for upstream residents. In May of 02120 1 1997, Canada and Manitoba committed to an 2 agreement titled the 1997 "Red River Valley Flood 3 Proofing and Dyke Enhancement," which was 4 originally signed in March of '98. The program 5 was universally applied in the Red River Valley, 6 but did not recognize the upstream area that is 7 subject to artificial flooding. The upstream 8 residents in the RM of Ritchot, outside of town 9 dykes, are the ones that will surely be sacrificed 10 again to save Winnipeg, yet these residents are 11 the only ones in Ritchot being saddled with long 12 term debt of flood proofing deductible and costs 13 that far exceeded the maximum covered by the 14 program. In essence, these residents are being 15 forced to flood proof high enough so they can 16 withstand the artificial flooding that will keep 17 Winnipeg dry, largely at their own expense. 18 Our committee is and has always been 19 committed to working with Canada and Manitoba to 20 address Ritchot's concerns in a clear, transparent 21 process. We would really like to believe that 22 Canada and Manitoba are equally committed, but we 23 have not yet seen one single shred of evidence 24 that this is the case. 25 Now I'm at section 4, our 02121 1 socio-economic effects of artificial flooding in 2 1997. As victims of the 1997 flood, members of 3 our committee are all too familiar with the 4 socio-economic impacts of natural flooding versus 5 artificial flooding. Hundreds of families in 6 Ritchot lost entire homes or experienced severe 7 damage as a result of artificial flooding in '97. 8 I would remind the CEC again that this 9 occurred at elevation 771.5 and that the EIS 10 baseline is 778. While the EIS touches on some of 11 the socio-economic impacts generally associated 12 with flooding, it does not adequately address the 13 issues arising from artificial flooding, nor does 14 it contain the results of any studies on long term 15 effects. 16 These, and some of our other key 17 concerns, are extremely well documented in the 18 Health Canada response to the EIS dated 19 October 15, 2004. I won't repeat them, but I 20 would really strongly urge the CEC to read it. It 21 is only about six pages. 22 Rather, I thought it would be helpful 23 to provide some more personal insights into some 24 of the initial and ongoing socio-economic impacts 25 from the '97 flood. 02122 1 Many homes in Ritchot were lost by 2 mere inches. Many men have related to me the 3 sense of failure and guilt they will carry with 4 them forever as they blame themselves for the loss 5 of irreplaceable family items, and the resulting 6 trauma and upheaval that their families went 7 through in rebuilding. I have personally heard 8 words from many men in the community to this 9 effect. My last words to my wife and kids as they 10 were evacuated were, don't worry, I will keep the 11 house dry. These men feel that they failed their 12 families. However, they fought with one hand tied 13 behind their backs because they did not know about 14 the artificial flooding. However, they still feel 15 they failed their families. And I can attest to 16 the mental health, mood disorders, substance 17 abuse, and failed marriages resulting from this. 18 Women, as the health guardians of the 19 family, seemed to suffer the most. Some of the 20 men, feeling defeated by the artificial flooding, 21 buried themselves in their jobs, leaving their 22 wives to cope with family issues and contractors 23 in the rebuilding process. I personally sat down 24 with couples and tried to explain to the husband 25 that he was leaving too much for his wife to 02123 1 handle. I was not trained at all to do this, but 2 residents seemed to feel more comfortable with me 3 than the province's trauma team, again, perhaps 4 because of their feelings of deep mistrust. 5 In addition to uncertainties in the 6 calculations of artificial flooding, as mentioned 7 earlier, there are other levels of uncertainty 8 that flowed into the lives of upstream residents 9 along with the 1997 flood of the century. 10 For more than a year after the moment 11 that I finally realized that my house would be 12 lost, I was completely uncertain as to the cause 13 of the flooding, and for much longer than a year, 14 whether and to what extent I would be compensated. 15 That is real stress -- if I would be compensated 16 at all, and I say that's real stress. 17 The EIS barely touches on this, and in 18 fact notes that many of the socio-economic impacts 19 of artificial flooding are worse than natural 20 flooding, but then it dismisses it because the 21 delays, bureaucracy, stonewalling and cover-up are 22 not a direct effect of the project. 23 Professors Karen Grant and Nancy 24 Higget (ph) of the University of Manitoba were 25 interviewing women in the Red River Valley in 02124 1 1998. Their early results indicated post 2 traumatic stress disorder, depression, and marital 3 stress. And there is no reference to this at all 4 in the EIS. 5 The level of stress and anxiety for 6 upstream residents arising out of their dealings 7 with the Manitoba Emergency Measures Organization 8 is well documented. The irony of severe stress 9 and anxiety caused by the very organization that 10 was supposed to help flooded residents and thereby 11 relieve their stress and anxiety seems to have 12 escaped Provincial officials. Eventually, the 13 problems were so serious that the organization now 14 known as EMO became the subject of an Ernst & 15 Young report. However, volume 2 of the report has 16 not been made public, although we understand that 17 a few of its recommendations may have been 18 implemented. 19 Our committee has not seen evidence of 20 any changes at EMO, but even so we are now told to 21 accept the assurances in the EIS that everything 22 is just fine, and we should have no worries about 23 EMO administering the standard DFA program as well 24 as the proposed Red River Floodway Act. 25 Again, the fact that volume 2 of the 02125 1 Ernst & Young report and any follow-up reports 2 have not been shared does nothing to overcome the 3 feelings of suspicion and mistrust. Our 4 experience leaves us with no alternative. 5 It is the long term effects of the 6 artificial flooding that are most troublesome. 7 Residents are suffering long term health effects, 8 some for life, from asthma, mental health problems 9 and severe exhaustion. Long term debt incurred 10 directly as a result of uncompensated losses 11 suffered from the '97 flood is causing many stress 12 related health effects. Many residents have lost 13 any hope of retirement or vacations as they 14 struggle with second mortgages, flood proofing 15 loans, and increased taxes on the new homes that 16 replaced the ones that were destroyed. 17 Mr. Chairman, many don't realize most 18 of us have two mortgages, one on the home that's 19 buried done below, and another mortgage on the new 20 home. Just because the home was flooded and 21 destroyed, the bank didn't say we didn't have to 22 pay the mortgage. So a lot of us have two. 23 The cumulative effects of all of the 24 above combined to affect many of the residents and 25 their ability to cope with their jobs. Owners of 02126 1 small to medium businesses were especially hard 2 hit as their homes and source of income were 3 destroyed at the same time. Some businesses have 4 gone bankrupt, others will never recover, as the 5 owners have lost their creative energy. For some, 6 the most productive earning years of their life 7 have been stolen from them by the artificial 8 flooding, and there is simply not enough years 9 left, if you are in your 50s, to replenish lost 10 retirement funds. 11 There is stress and concern over the 12 property value of their new homes. The studies 13 quoted in the EIS are not comparable to our 14 situation. They are done in the States and they 15 are not artificial flooding. 16 Unsuspecting residents that put 17 retirement funds into rebuilding in 1997, based on 18 assurances from the province that their new houses 19 were in compliance with all flood related 20 criteria, are sure to have their property values 21 eroded by the fact, only publicly admitted in 22 2004, that they now live in an area subject to 23 artificial flooding. Our very flood proofing 24 hills and dykes serve as a giant buyer beware 25 sign. 02127 1 Artificial flooding has changed the 2 esthetics of our community forever. I note in the 3 EIS, when they talk about trying to raise some of 4 the dyking within the City of Winnipeg, that a 5 real concern is the esthetics will be ruined and 6 there will be objections to the two feet or so 7 that will have to be raised. I will show you in a 8 minute some of the pictures of our area, Mr. 9 Chairman, and really our area has been destroyed. 10 The local flood proofing has really 11 scarred the landscape with hills and dykes that 12 are dangerous and impossible to maintain. The 13 hundreds of deep ponds that are a result of our 14 building hills and dykes are mosquito breeding 15 grounds, and worse they are a very real source of 16 drowning danger to pets, children and wildlife. 17 At this point I would like to refer 18 you to our black binder of documents and I will 19 just refer you to some photos. Just going through 20 these quickly, Mr. Chairman, pictures one and two 21 of these pictures are all of my house. You can 22 see how just an inch can be the difference. This 23 is where the water came over my dyke in '97. What 24 you are seeing actually is about a week after the 25 water came over, so there is some erosion. That 02128 1 water came over only by about an inch and then 2 eroded. So that little spot you see there did my 3 whole house in. So when we talk about .3 feet in 4 St. Jean Baptiste and how far does it go, it is 5 very critical. Pictures three and four is the 6 home during the '97 flood. What I want to show 7 you is a pond. There is a very large picture of a 8 pond. This is the pond that we had to dig to 9 get -- 10 THE CHAIRMAN: Which number is that? 11 MR. STARR: It is number nine. So 12 photo number nine is about a two acre pond, this 13 pond is not full yet, but it is 40 feet deep. 14 Directly behind this pond are a couple on the 15 right side with a day care, and I don't have the 16 money to fence in this big pond, but we have 17 already lost wildlife. My neighbour has lost a 18 pet. And it is a very real concern. 19 These ponds are everywhere. If you 20 look to the right, you will see a little bit of 21 water in one corner. Literally every home has one 22 of these ponds, so it is a real source of concern. 23 If you look at some of the before and 24 after pictures, 10 and 11 compared to 12 and 13, 25 you can see some of the devastation. Particularly 02129 1 what I want to show you is the mold in number 12. 2 Mold was a huge problem in '97, so huge that the 3 province developed a mold team, and you could even 4 have a second EMO claim if you had mold. Many 5 houses were actually redone twice, some even a 6 year or more later. But the mold is very evident, 7 you can see more of the evidence as we go through 8 here. 9 If you take -- when I talk about the 10 esthetics of our community, if we look at 14 and 11 15 compared to 18, 19, you can see where the 12 bulldozer is having to take down dozens of 30, 13 40-foot blue spruce that I had because the flood 14 proofing hill went right to the edges of our 15 property. 16 Finally, what we end up with, photo 17 number 21, I think you saw the yard that we had 18 before. Now we have got this clay mound, it is 19 highly compacted, we can't grow anything on it. 20 It runs from one side of our property to the 21 other. We can't drive our vehicles to the back, 22 to the pond you saw in the back, I can't get 23 vehicles back there. 24 So everyone, including MFA, seems to 25 make a big deal of this wonderful flood proofing 02130 1 program, but it is no picnic living on these 2 hills. Getting up them in the winter is no fun, 3 and they are even dangerous for the emergency 4 vehicles. I believe that the RM is putting 5 winches on some of the fire trucks because of 6 these hills. 7 These clay hills, like I said, are 8 horrible to try and grow anything on. What this 9 means is that the mature trees we all lost as they 10 were cleared for flood proofing can pretty well 11 never be replaced. This damage to the natural 12 environment is very depressing for residents who 13 moved here for the natural beauty of the area. 14 Not only are they suffering financially, they 15 don't even recognize the community that they live 16 in anymore. 17 The economics of future development in 18 Ritchot is severely hampered by artificial 19 flooding. The restrictions imposed by the 20 province since '97 and the huge cost of flood 21 proofing will stop any meaningful development. 22 Our committee can only wonder at the 23 lost economic prospects for Ritchot, which 24 prospered before artificial flooding. We watch 25 booming new developments in Lorette, Headingley, 02131 1 La Salle, Stonewall, Stony Mountain, and we 2 understand why the same sort of development is not 3 happening in Ritchot. Many families, some of them 4 my neighbors with large tracts of farm land in 5 Ritchot, closer to the city than these other new 6 developments, have watched their dreams of 7 financial security vanish as prospective 8 developers shun the area. The EIS denies all such 9 impacts. 10 Where we live, quite close, about two 11 kilometres from the floodgates, neighbors on both 12 sides of us have large tracts of land that run 13 from the Red River west to LaBarriere Park, if you 14 are familiar with that, very beautiful property, 15 and now they can't do anything with it. I would 16 say closer, more beautiful and bigger than the 17 Waverley West development -- so you can imagine 18 the kind of losses they have taken. All they can 19 do is farm it now. 20 Following the '97 artificial flooding, 21 mold caused long term health effects in many 22 residents. Again, not mentioned in the EIS. Many 23 residents now suffer from asthma and other 24 respiratory problems. There is no doubt that some 25 will develop emphysema, chronic obstructive 02132 1 pulmonary disease, their lives will be impaired 2 and they will be shortened. 3 Unsettled claims and lawsuits have 4 caused horrible socio-economic impacts to some of 5 the people upstream of the inlet control structure 6 that were affected by artificial flooding in '97. 7 A claim filed by 22 parties, including 47 8 individuals and businesses, is one I will comment 9 on because I was part of the original claim. 10 Most, if not all of these claimants 11 lived immediately upstream of the inlet and took 12 the full brunt of the artificial flooding and 13 resulting velocity of the flood waters. The 14 claimants fought hard and many were sacrificed by 15 mere inches. Some homes originally thought 16 salvageable were uninhabitable due to mold that 17 eventually developed. The claimants did not sue 18 frivolously, they were forced to do so as a result 19 of huge losses, and a province that would not deal 20 with them. 21 The province promised to address 22 outstanding issues from 1997, and has not. The 23 province promised to investigate a shameful 24 mediation process, and has not. This is the same 25 province that we are to trust for future 02133 1 compensation. 2 I would like to refer you to the 3 supporting documents again, and I'm going to read 4 you an exchange between Minister Ashton and Maxine 5 Clifton in the minutes from the legislature from 6 the reading of bill 23, the Floodway Act. 7 It is a little difficult to find, 8 there are a lot of pages there, but it is only a 9 few sentences. I'm on page 1946 of those minutes. 10 Do you want me to go ahead and read it? 11 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 12 MR. STARR: This is Minister Ashton 13 speaking. 14 "One thing I do want to assure you is 15 we did take the initiative recently of 16 putting in place a mediation process 17 which did result, I know, in some 18 settlements. There are still some 19 ongoing concerns about the process 20 that was put in place. I know you had 21 not contacted me on this...", 22 he is speaking to Maxine Clifton by the way, 23 "...but some other people had who were 24 part of the process. I do not know if 25 this is your view or not, but I was 02134 1 asked to review the mediation process. 2 We will be doing that as well in 3 addition to the process that did take 4 place with Justice Nurgitz. I do want 5 to indicate that I have given the 6 undertaking to look at the mediation 7 process. I know at least one claim, 8 and even though they did sign, I 9 believe, a settlement, they felt there 10 were problems. So we are going to 11 take a look at the process itself, 12 because it was intended to try and see 13 if there was some way outside of the 14 court process." 15 Now that was June 26, '05. Nothing 16 has been done with that at all. 17 THE CHAIRMAN: '04. 18 MR. STARR: Sorry, '04. Mrs. Clifton 19 in response says this. 20 "The mediation was an underhanded 21 attack. There was no mediation. 22 Judge Nurgitz freely admitted that he 23 did not have a chance to mediate or 24 act as a judge. Half of the claimants 25 out of our group were bullied into 02135 1 accepting a single digit settlement. 2 The rest of us could not do that. 3 That is all I will say." 4 And then Paul Clifton after that says, 5 "We are talking about a legislated 6 right to take my rights away, to take 7 judicial review through the courts." 8 He is talking about the Floodway Act, and then he 9 says he is going to go into more detail where 10 Maxine is not. 11 "Under this judicially assisted 12 mediation, there were ten families 13 that were brutalized by the Province 14 of Manitoba. They were offered the 15 thought, if you settle now we will not 16 charge you costs. They took these 17 folks with an aggregate loss of 18 2.4 million, and out of the ten 19 families they pieced up 365,000. On 20 average that is about 10 per cent of 21 their loss, and they were forced to 22 sign a confidentiality agreement that 23 they could not even tell their mother 24 that they were brutalized by the 25 province." 02136 1 The reason for me reading you that is 2 to show you the broken promises, to show you we 3 tried but we can't seem to trust the province. We 4 have had promises for separate consultation on 5 compensation. It didn't happen. Promises for 6 separate consultations on summer operations, never 7 happened. Promises to settle things from '97. 8 As I know most of the 44 claimants 9 personally, I can attest to the following impacts 10 that I believe were directly related to the '97 11 artificial flooding. This may not be a complete 12 accounting because they are only the ones of which 13 I have intimate knowledge. So of the 44 claimants 14 that sued, I want to show you the health effects 15 that they are suffering or have suffered. Because 16 there is no studies done upstream, this is the 17 only little study that there is. Out of the 44 18 claimants, there have been two deaths, one stroke 19 resulting in partial blindness, one attempted 20 suicide, one business bankruptcy, one divorce, two 21 with heart problems, three with high blood 22 pressure, one with auto immune disease, four with 23 severe depression, three with loss of retirement, 24 and six have had their jobs threatened or impacted 25 by the province or affiliate. 02137 1 Three out of this affected group are 2 presenting to you today, Mr. Chairman, and I'm one 3 of them. The impacts on this small group of 4 people were and are severe. Their sacrifice in 5 1997 helped save Winnipeg $7 billion in monetary 6 damages in the avoidance of immeasurable emotional 7 and stress related problems. It is completely 8 beyond me why they are still being hung out to dry 9 by the province and that steps have not been taken 10 to settle these outstanding issues immediately. 11 Surely, this is not what Manning or Roblin 12 envisioned, or what Winnipeggers expect. 13 It is critical to note that this is 14 the only small example of health effects caused by 15 artificial flooding that I can provide, as there 16 are no long term health studies in the EIS. 17 The proposed project will do this 18 again and again and again to people. Section 5 is 19 our comments on summer operation -- am I running 20 too long? 21 THE CHAIRMAN: We are not on a 22 timetable or deadline. 23 MR. STARR: The years 2002 and 2004 24 proved especially stressful for upstream 25 residents. Raising the gates during the summer 02138 1 was contrary to everything that we had ever been 2 told or promised about the floodway and how it 3 would be operated. The socio-economic effects of 4 summer operations were much larger than portrayed 5 in the EIS. Once more this operation served to 6 deepen the mistrust, especially the province. 7 Over night the lives of upstream residents were 8 changed again. All of the uncertainties that we 9 feel before the spring runoff are continued now 10 through summer and fall. And we are now forced to 11 go through claim procedures on almost a year round 12 basis. We all know how stressful these hearings 13 alone can be. We have been going through this for 14 eight years now. 15 Now the NRAC committee before me 16 brought up that we are going to see flooding about 17 80 per cent of the time. We are going to be 18 filling out compensation forms every second year 19 for the rest of our lives. It is ridiculous. 20 To make matters worse, promises made 21 by the province in 2004 to cover all damages from 22 artificial flooding are not being kept. My 23 personal claim with respect to a section of river 24 bank approximately 200 feet by 60 feet was denied 25 without even an inspection. This alone raises 02139 1 concerns about any promised baseline studies for 2 future summer operations. How can a baseline be 3 established for the river bank along my property 4 after this collapse that nobody even bothered to 5 investigate? The mistrust fostered by the summer 6 operations has convinced upstream residents that 7 this was an experiment by the province to observe 8 just how much damage occurs, and to make summer 9 operations part of the existing environment. 10 The Red River Floodway Act is the only 11 measure proposed in the EIS for mitigation or 12 compensation for artificial flooding. Our 13 committee can provide only general comments 14 because the Act contains nothing specific to 15 provide comments about. There are no regulations, 16 procedures, details or guidelines. We believe 17 that granting a licence to develop a project in 18 the absence of any specific plans to mitigate or 19 compensate for intentional upstream flooding would 20 be unprecedented in Canada. 21 Probably about two or three more 22 minutes, Mr. Chairman. 23 THE CHAIRMAN: Fine. 24 MR. STARR: The Red River Floodway Act 25 is so full of uncertainties, all slanted in the 02140 1 province's favour, that it must not be proclaimed 2 in its present form. If proclaimed, we believe 3 that the Act will be a source of continuing stress 4 and anxiety for upstream residents, worse than the 5 nightmare of '97 because it requires a distinction 6 between the effects of artificial and natural 7 flooding. 8 In a meeting that I had with Mr. Paul 9 Anderson from EMO, 2004, he agreed when I gave 10 examples that it would be a very difficult program 11 to work with. It is going to be extremely 12 difficult, if you have got three feet of water on 13 your main floor, Mr. Chairman, to try and figure 14 out, wi