07296 1 MANITOBA CLEAN ENVIRONMENT COMMISSION 2 3 VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 4 Volume 31 5 6 Including List of Participants 7 8 9 10 Hearing 11 12 Wuskwatim Generation and Transmission Project 13 14 Presiding: 15 Gerard Lecuyer, Chair 16 Kathi Kinew 17 Harvey Nepinak 18 Robert Mayer 19 Terry Sargeant 20 21 Tuesday, June 8, 2004 22 Radisson Hotel 23 288 Portage Avenue 24 Winnipeg, Manitoba 25 07297 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 2 3 Clean Environment Commission: 4 Gerard Lecuyer Chairman 5 Terry Sargeant Member 6 Harvey Nepinak Member 7 Kathi Avery Kinew Member 8 Doug Abra Counsel to Commission 9 Rory Grewar Staff 10 CEC Advisors: 11 Mel Falk 12 Dave Farlinger 13 Jack Scriven 14 Jim Sandison 15 Jean McClellan 16 Brent McLean 17 Kyla Gibson 18 19 Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation: 20 Chief Jerry Primrose 21 Elvis Thomas 22 Campbell MacInnes 23 Valerie Matthews Lemieux 24 25 07298 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 2 3 Manitoba Conservation: 4 Larry Strachan 5 Trent Hreno 6 7 Manitoba Hydro/NCN: 8 Doug Bedford, Counsel 9 Bob Adkins, Counsel 10 Marvin Shaffer 11 Ed Wojczynski 12 Ken Adams 13 Carolyn Wray 14 Ron Mazur 15 Lloyd Kuczek 16 Cam Osler 17 Stuart Davies 18 David Hicks 19 George Rempel 20 David Cormie 21 Alex Fleming 22 Marvin Shaffer 23 Blair McMahon 24 25 07299 1 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 2 3 CAC/MSOS 4 Byron Williams 5 Mona Pollitt-Smith 6 7 O-Pinon-Na-Piwin Cree Nation 8 Headman Chris Baker 9 10 CASIL 11 Leslie Dysart 12 13 Association of Displaced Residents of South Indian Lake: 14 Dennis Troniak 15 Angus dysart 16 Vern Anderson 17 Carol Kobliski 18 Nelson Hart 19 20 Interpreters 21 Jimmy D. Spence 22 Charlie James Spence 23 24 25 07300 1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS 2 3 EXHIBIT NO. PAGE 4 5 6 CAC/MSOS 1012: Closing Argument 7 - June 8, 2004 - Book of 8 References 7354 9 10 CAC/MSOS 1013: Speaking Notes: 11 Overview: Uncertainty 7354 12 13 CAC/MSOS 1014: Written Commentary on 14 Environmental Impact 15 Statement - CAC/MSOS 7354 16 17 TREE/RCM 1011: Closing Statement from TREE 18 and RCM Regarding the 19 Need for and Alternative to Wuskwatim 20 Advancement 7389 21 22 MMF 1005: Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation v. 23 British Columbia (Hydro 24 and Power Authority) 2001 7390 25 07301 1 INDEX OF EXHIBITS 2 3 EXHIBIT NO. PAGE 4 5 MMF 1006: Aboriginal Plant Use 6 in Canada's Northwest Boreal Forest 7 (excerpt) Robin J. Marles, Christina 8 Clavelle, Leslie Monteleone, Natalie 9 Tays, Donna Burns. Natural Resources 10 Canada 7390 11 12 OPCN-1003: O-Pipon-Na-Piwin Cree Nation 13 closing remarks - Manitoba Clean 14 Environment Public Hearing - 15 Wuskwatim Generation and 16 Transmission Projects 7406 17 18 CASIL 1015: Closing remarks of CASIL 7457 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 07302 1 2 INDEX OF UNDERTAKINGS 3 UNDERTAKING NO. PAGE 4 5 CAC/MSOS-95: Provide cite of Dr. 6 Higgins' and Mr. Harper's evidence re NUGs re 7 specific example of hospitals or other large 8 commercial or industrial operations 9 producing steam 7330 10 CAC/MSOS 96: Advise of client's views 11 to an expanded role for the Clean Environment 12 Commission as the independent monitor for all 13 projects which affect the environment 7351 14 CAC/MSOS 97: Advise why it would be 15 different, on the environmental side, if the CEC were 16 put in a position and given the necessary resources 17 to monitor the economic advantages 7352 18 CAC/MSOS 98: Advise if the CAC/MSOS 19 clients happened to see conflict between applied 20 research and western research and traditional 21 knowledge during the course of the hearings, if they 22 discussed it at all 7353 23 24 25 07303 1 Tuesday, June 8, 2004 2 UPON COMMENCING AT 9:08 A.M. 3 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we 5 shall begin. Rory will just go over the schedule for 6 today first. 7 MR. GREWAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 8 There's just been one change to the schedule. The 9 Boreal Forest Network has rescheduled from this 10 morning at 10:00 a.m. till tomorrow at 11:00 a.m. 11 and that's meaning that we go with the Consumers 12 Association of Canada first, followed by Time to 13 Respect Earth's Ecosystem, Resource Conservation 14 Manitoba, both offering closing statements. And 15 there will be a lunch break. And then we have 16 O-Pipon-Na-Piwin Cree Nation, Community Association 17 of South Indian Lake and the Association of Displaced 18 Residents South Indian Lake for the afternoon and 19 that will conclude the day. 20 THE CHAIRMAN: So we begin with the 21 Consumers Association. And I see that we have some 22 able presenters up front and take it from there. 23 MR. WILLIAMS: Good morning, Mr. Chair, 24 members of the panel. As you probably remember, my 25 name is Byron Williams and with me is my colleague 07304 1 and soon to be learned friend Ms. Mona Pollitt-Smith 2 from our office. Back in the back row as usual are 3 Ms. Gloria Desorcy from the Consumers Association and 4 Mr. Chuck Cruden from the Manitoba Society of Seniors 5 who keeps protesting that he is retired from that 6 function but I can't get rid of him. 7 Mr. Chairman, what we propose to do is I 8 will lead off, addressing what CAC/MSOS were funded 9 to do which is the addressing The Need For and 10 Alternative analysis from their perspective. And 11 then Ms. Pollitt-Smith will bat clean up and provide 12 a brief overview of her arguments in terms of the 13 EIS. 14 There are two handouts that are with you 15 this morning and I can advise you that Ms. 16 Pollitt-Smith, along with myself, have prepared a 17 more comprehensive written argument in terms of the 18 EIS which is just being bound as we speak. So that 19 will be filed with Mr. Grewar I expect at the 20 mid-morning break. 21 I've set my clock and I think that's 22 appropriate, Mr. Chairman, because I want to start by 23 taking you back in time. I want to take you back in 24 time to an age of greater innocence. I want to take 25 you back to the period between 1970 and 1975 when a 07305 1 group of idealistic representatives from the 2 province, from the Federal Government, from Academia 3 as well as an army of consultants prepared a report, 4 a summary report for the Lake Winnipeg, Churchill and 5 Nelson River study board, Canada and Manitoba, April 6 1975. A report which, with the benefit of hindsight, 7 a Hydro witness has characterized at page 4591 of the 8 transcript as impressive and leading edge for its 9 time. In some, a very impressive piece of work. 10 Unfortunately, as my colleague Ms. 11 Pollitt-Smith will discuss in her part of the 12 argument in the later stages of this submission, this 13 leading edge comprehensive work absolutely failed to 14 recognize the insidious impact of methylmercury 15 poisoning. And it failed to foresee the devastating 16 impact that mercury poisoning would have on the 17 affected communities and upon the domestic and 18 commercial natural resources harvesting in that area. 19 Sadly, the environmental, psychological 20 and economic scars, a project such as the Churchill 21 River Diversion, are still with us today. And they 22 have been acutely felt within this room as part of 23 the living, breathing reality of this hearing. 24 On behalf of my clients, I bring this to 25 your attention not as an attempt to refight old 07306 1 battles, or again, not as an attempt to taint Hydro 2 with the stigma of once mistaken/always wrong. 3 Rather, we started by walking back in time to 4 highlight the truism that the decision before you 5 with regard to both the Need For and Alternatives 6 analysis and the Environmental Impact Statement is 7 not an adjudicative issue subject to scientific 8 certainty, rather, and I'll refer you to tab 1 of the 9 Book of References that I provided you, as a Nova 10 Scotia Court of Appeal found citing with the approval 11 comments of the Federal Court of Appeal in the 12 Alberta Wilderness decision, 13 "...given the nature of the task, we 14 suspect that finality and certainty in 15 environmental assessment can never be 16 achieved." 17 Our clients share this view and they 18 believe that those observations are equally 19 applicable to the Need For and Alternative analysis. 20 And the importance of this point became 21 clear to me when I belatedly began to prepare my 22 closing arguments. Because the first document I 23 turned to was Manitoba Hydro Exhibit 1000, this 24 pretty and rather daunting document that we went 25 through on the first day of the hearing. And I have 07307 1 to confess to you that when I first read this 2 document, I wondered to myself, do we really need to 3 have a hearing? For surely, the answers were all 4 here in the pretty tables, the lovely graphs. No 5 doubt, statistics all calculated to the nth degree of 6 statistical certainty. And I have no doubt that in a 7 few years, we'll be looking back at Hydro's work in 8 terms of Wuskwatim and observing that it was leading 9 edge for its time and it was a very impressive piece 10 of work. 11 That being as it may, Mr. Chairman, and 12 members of the panel, my client's first piece of 13 advice to you is that notwithstanding the pretty 14 documents, notwithstanding the 10 feet of supporting 15 materials, notwithstanding the armada of experts and 16 opinions that have been before you, we're asking you 17 to recognize what this process is all about. It's an 18 exercise in judgment, not in certainty. 19 In the words of the Joint Ontario Panel, 20 and this is at tab 2 of my client's Book of 21 References in the second page, "this determination 22 involves value judgments." I'm pointing to paragraph 23 94. There is no absolute best, no absolute preferred 24 choice. This is at the bottom of the second page, 25 paragraph 94. 07308 1 "It is the task of this Board to rely 2 on its judgment and experience, as 3 well as the evidence and submissions, 4 in making this decision. In view of 5 the purpose of the Act, public input 6 may be a critical consideration in the 7 approval decision." 8 My client's suggestion that the record 9 before you is fraught with uncertainty and that you 10 run the very real risk of being wrong is not an 11 invitation to a regulatory paralysis. We're not 12 suggesting that you make no decision because you 13 might be wrong nor is it an invitation to regulatory 14 agnosticism. Just because there's no absolute best 15 choice in terms of the Need For and Alternative 16 analysis does not mean that we should not endeavour 17 to identify a preferred alternative amongst an 18 adequate set of reasonable and suitable alternatives. 19 What it means is that in your act of 20 informed judgment, you must take into account a 21 variety of factors. And as you seek to weigh and 22 assess the evidence and the masses of material before 23 you, my clients would ask you to keep in mind in 24 assessing this evidence the following five factors. 25 The first factor is to keep in mind the 07309 1 specific nature of the issue you're being asked to 2 address, for the fact is that some questions are more 3 amenable to certainty than others. 4 We can be more confident in our 5 prediction about the directional relationship between 6 interest rates and inflation over the next year than 7 we can about the outcome of the federal elections in 8 Canada and the United States and the consequential 9 impacts those will have on environmental premiums. 10 So the nature of the issue before you is something 11 important to keep in mind. 12 And a second factor to keep in mind, and 13 this is especially relevant both in the alternatives 14 analysis and in my friend, Ms. Pollitt-Smith's 15 cumulative effects analysis, is to keep in mind and 16 focus upon the process by which Hydro has arrived on 17 its recommendations on the specific issues. 18 Is it an approach that is accepted as 19 best practice or a standard practice? And just as an 20 example, when you look on the Need For and 21 Alternatives side, we know that tools such as 22 levelized cost and internal rate of return are 23 standardized tests employed by utilities across 24 Canada. 25 By contrast, we know that portfolio 07310 1 analysis also is something that is recommended by 2 regulators and by tribunals across Canada but it's 3 something that Manitoba Hydro hasn't performed 4 appropriately in the context, The Need For and 5 Alternative analysis. So it's important to keep in 6 mind the methodology by which Hydro has addressed the 7 issue. 8 The third factor that we'd ask you to 9 keep in mind is the nature and the tenor of the 10 debate that you heard during this hearing. And in 11 this regard, my clients are fervent believers in the 12 principle of the competition of ideas. They believe 13 that regulators achieve the best results when the 14 proponents' evidence is fully tested. First of all, 15 through the objective testing of counsel for the 16 Commission, secondly, through vigorous challenge by 17 funded participants in terms of expert evidence and 18 cross-examination, and thirdly, by informed community 19 participation. 20 And we note with approval that my friend, 21 Mr. Bedford, seems to endorse these values as well. 22 And I refer you to the transcript, I believe it's 23 page 1914 or 1913 when he commented, 24 "Now that all those who have been here 25 for two weeks now can appreciate how 07311 1 much richer discussion is, how much 2 more useful expert testimony is and 3 how much better informed Commissioners 4 are when those who question have 5 worked hard and have been able to 6 prepare. And conversely, those of us 7 who have been here for the last two 8 weeks can all appreciate how much less 9 useful questioning is when there has 10 been little or no preparation." 11 And my clients can only hope that Mr. 12 Bedford's client, Manitoba Hydro and the province 13 will endorse those principles and those thoughts the 14 next time that a regulatory process such as this 15 comes up for consideration. 16 In terms of the competition of ideas, my 17 clients are relatively confident on the Need For and 18 Alternatives side that through the work of this Clean 19 Environment Commission and the objective expert 20 evidence both of TREE and the CAC/MSOS witnesses, we 21 can have a fair degree of confidence that the issues 22 have been fully and fairly canvassed; and if not, 23 consensus reached, at least we have narrowed the 24 issues. 25 My clients regret to say that they cannot 07312 1 express the same degree of confidence in terms of the 2 EIS where though the CEC was thorough in its 3 objective testing of the case, it appears as if Hydro 4 and certain participants were flying at different 5 altitudes in terms of their argument. And my clients 6 think that is a fundamental importance as you look in 7 terms of your recommendations and in terms of issues 8 like monitoring. 9 The fourth factor that my clients 10 consider to be of importance is what is the end 11 product of this competition of ideas? And again, we 12 can point favourably to the Need For and Alternatives 13 side where agreement was not reached but the issues 14 were narrowed and some degree of consensus was 15 reached on issues such as the hurdle rate between CAC 16 and Hydro, issues such as the appropriate target for 17 DSM where CAC and TREE ultimately agreed, and even in 18 terms of the narrowing gap of load forecasts where 19 agreement was not reached between any of the Hydro, 20 TREE or CAC/MSOS but the issues were narrow. 21 By contrast in yesterday's rebuttal 22 evidence by Hydro/NCN, it demonstrated again the 23 unanswered questions on the EIS side such as what are 24 the best practices for cumulative effects analysis? 25 What does Dr. Duinker really think? Those issues are 07313 1 still far from clear. 2 The final kind of key factor that I would 3 ask you to consider on behalf of my clients in 4 weighing the credibility of the expert evidence 5 before you is the experts themselves. Were the 6 experts well informed? Were they objective? And I 7 have to admit to my own bias on this particular 8 aspect of the case because I am going to recommend to 9 you the opinions of Dr. Higgin and Mr. Harper for a 10 variety of reasons. And the first is that they 11 demonstrated a thorough mastery of the record. And 12 they displayed an objective fairness which was 13 enriched by their experience. 14 And I think it's important as you weigh 15 the evidence of these witnesses to review their 16 qualifications which are set out in the transcript at 17 pages 5449 through 5454. Because with all respect to 18 the other witnesses, I don't think that two witnesses 19 alone brought such an element of diversity to this 20 hearing. Experience in the Hydro industry, 21 experience in government both in the Department of 22 Energy and in the Renewable Energy and Conservation 23 Branch in Ontario, business experience both with 24 Hydro and in the natural gas industry, experience 25 representing and providing advice to consumers in 07314 1 terms of the work at ECS. And Dr. Higgins also was a 2 regulator, sitting in a very similar position as 3 yourselves. 4 So when you weigh the evidence, please 5 consider the balanced perspective, the credibility of 6 Dr. Higgin and Mr. Harper because they know of what 7 they speak. And they had no ideological axe to 8 grind. 9 Now when I was in between snapshots of 10 the hockey game last night as I was preparing this 11 argument, I asked myself am I talking too much like a 12 lawyer? Am I putting too much emphasis on 13 credibility and on process? And perhaps you're 14 asking the same question as well. Does process 15 matter? As long as we get the right answer, does it 16 really matter how we get there? 17 In my client's view in this hearing above 18 all, process matters. 19 The first reason it matters so 20 fundamentally in this hearing is because of history. 21 And I referred previously to the psychological scars 22 of many in Northern Manitoba. The cumulative 23 psychological legacy of projects like the CRD. And 24 it's important to remember that regardless of how 25 benign Wuskwatim may or may not be, it is built upon 07315 1 a messy, soiled experience in the Churchill River 2 Diversion. And the starting point for many 3 individuals in those communities affected by 4 Wuskwatim is a distrust for big Hydro and for big 5 science. 6 So process matters because one of the key 7 objectives of this hearing must be to ensure those 8 for whom history matters, that the process is 9 thorough, balanced, and transparent. 10 We have to inspire public confidence. 11 It's too much to expect we can heal the wounds but 12 maybe we can assuage the fears and give the 13 communities up north a sense that the mistakes of the 14 past are less likely to be repeated. 15 Process also matters because of the 16 precedent being set by this hearing. This panel more 17 than I, I'm sure, are familiar with the grand vision 18 for northern hydroelectric development, Notigi, Gull, 19 and the mother of all generating stations, Conawapa. 20 And your recommendations in terms of analytical 21 process as well as results are going to be critical 22 to Manitoba Hydro as it considers future endeavours 23 to its government regulators and to future members of 24 the Clean Environment Commission. 25 The third reason process really matters 07316 1 in this hearing is transparency. In my client's 2 perspective, it's fundamentally important that we 3 make it clear why we are engaging in a particular 4 course of action. And I want to use the example of 5 wind. Because as we will discuss later, the record 6 of this hearing in my client's submission is clear. 7 Hydro-led wind development cannot be justified 8 economically at the current time when consideration 9 is given to the potential benefits versus the 10 potential risk. 11 This doesn't mean that there cannot be a 12 provincial initiative in that area. There are many 13 social and environmental reasons why the province may 14 choose to embark on a wind initiative. But the fact 15 that wind is not currently economically sound raises 16 important questions of who should pay. Who should 17 bear the financial risk for wind development? Should 18 it be private parties? Should it be the government 19 which is engaging in these actions for policy 20 reasons, environmental reasons? Or should it be 21 Hydro rate payers? And I suspect you know my 22 client's perspective on that. 23 The final reason my clients wish to 24 emphasize that process matters relates to 25 accountability. Process matters and your 07317 1 recommendations for follow-up matters so much in this 2 hearing in order that we can ensure the potential 3 economic benefits of Hydro development in terms of 4 Wuskwatim are realized by Manitobans and by Manitoba 5 rate payers and that the objectives in the 6 legislation of economy and efficiency are achieved. 7 My clients believe this is particularly 8 important because while they have come to the 9 conclusion that Wuskwatim is economically viable 10 based on the likely benefits versus the likely risks, 11 they have also concluded that the rewards from a 12 Hydro perspective are not as great as outlined in 13 this pretty document. And they are concerned that 14 the risks, as originally enumerated by Hydro, are 15 somewhat understated, although that was revised 16 during the course of the hearing. 17 And they are also concerned that Manitoba 18 Hydro has failed to fully recognize and achieve the 19 full potential of demand-side management, both 20 economically and in terms of efficiency, in terms of 21 conservation. 22 Based on these conclusions and concerns, 23 my clients believe it's so important that there be 24 continued regulatory oversight by the Public 25 Utilities Board to ensure that the economic benefits 07318 1 of Wuskwatim are realized and that the great 2 potential for DSM is not squandered or lost or 3 overlooked in a mad rush to build another dam. 4 With these less than brief preliminary 5 remarks, I wish to turn to the Need For and 6 Alternative analysis and the conclusions of my 7 clients CAC/MSOS. And I want to just comfort the 8 panel that I don't intend to offer you a mere rehash 9 of the direct evidence provided by Mr. Harper and Dr. 10 Higgin. I do want to indicate that my clients fully 11 endorse the recommendations as set out in their 12 evidence at pages 5557 through 5563. 13 What I hope to do in the next half an 14 hour or so is elaborate on some of the items which -- 15 I started late, Mr. Chair. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: You've still got about 40 17 minutes. 18 MR. WILLIAMS: I'm giving my colleague, 19 Ms. Pollitt-Smith, the last ten. What I hope to do 20 in the 30 minutes that I have allotted to myself is 21 to elaborate on top some of the matters which my 22 clients believe are particularly germane to the CEC's 23 recommendations. And I don't want to sound too much 24 like Prime Minister Martin, as he currently is, but 25 one thing that my clients wish to make absolutely 07319 1 fundamentally perfectly clear relates to their 2 conclusion that the project is economically 3 acceptable. Because that conclusion is based on 4 their understanding of the need for the project 5 which, as expressed by Mr. Harper at pages 5460 and 6 5557 of the transcript, is to take advantage of an 7 opportunity in the export market, thereby promoting 8 economy and lower rates for Manitoba consumers. Put 9 another way by Mr. Harper at page 5596 of the 10 transcript, "The benefits to the rate payers are the 11 real drivers for this project." 12 And we would note that a similar point 13 seems to be made by Manitoba Hydro in the third tab 14 of Exhibit MH 1000 at page 3 where it points to the 15 economic benefits of increased exports. And at page 16 4, it points out in the first bullet that significant 17 profits keep Manitoba rates low. 18 My clients wish to emphasize this point 19 in terms of the objective of the hearing. Because in 20 their view, there are considerable financial, 21 business and market risks associated with this 22 project. And they recognize that if the doomsayers 23 are right or if Manitoba Hydro fails to fully achieve 24 the benefits of this project, then that they, the 25 rate payers, not the province, are likely to be on 07320 1 the financial hook for the downside of this project. 2 From my client's perspective, they will bear the 3 primary risk in terms of the potential for increased 4 rates. 5 My clients believe that these risks are 6 acceptable provided that the potential benefits are 7 shared with rate payers. And they recognize, and as 8 Hydro has demonstrated in this hearing, that the 9 potential benefits can be shared with rate payers in 10 a combination of ways, lower rates or rate increases 11 that are lower than what otherwise might be expected. 12 They might also be reflected in a lower debt/equity 13 ratio, thereby reducing a driver for increased rates. 14 My clients note, though, that nowhere in 15 the record of this proceeding is there the suggestion 16 by Hydro/NCN that the profits from exports from 17 Wuskwatim will be used for dividends to the province. 18 So accepting the need from a rate payer's 19 perspective is contingent on the profits for export 20 opportunities being used for the purposes of economy 21 for keeping rates low. 22 On this point, my clients suspect that 23 TREE will argue, as Dr. Miller suggested at page 5655 24 of the transcript, that keeping rates low is 25 inconsistent with the objective of promoting 07321 1 efficiency. They would point out, though, that in 2 the context of promoting efficiency, conservation and 3 the objective of leaving a smaller footprint, there 4 are other more effective ways to do it. And that 5 point is made by Mr. Torrie in his response to CNF 6 interrogatory number 12. When he pointed out that 7 depending on the relevant importance of energy 8 commodity prices to the total end-use service cost, 9 electricity and other energy commodity demand may not 10 be as sensitive to commodity price as a more narrowly 11 focused orientation might predict. And he observed 12 that for general manufacturing and non-electrically 13 heated homes and buildings, electricity is a 14 relatively small cost. Typically less than 2 per 15 cent of value added from general manufacturing and 16 often much less than 10 per cent of the cost of 17 owning and operating a non-electricity heated house 18 or commercial building. And he pointed out that this 19 is one of the reasons why there is such a large 20 pent-up supply of economic DSM. 21 So with all respect to Dr. Miller, my 22 clients concur with Mr. Torrie that merely raising 23 rates is not a panacea to achieving the objective of 24 efficiency. In their view, I think echoing the view 25 of Mr. Torrie, direct investment in DSM is a much 07322 1 more efficient way to go. 2 The clients also on this last brief 3 comment on the subject also wish to remind those who 4 advocate raising rates in the interest of efficiency. 5 That behind these raised rates, there are real people 6 on low or modest incomes who may be adversely 7 affected by a narrow, simplistic attempt to increase 8 efficiency by raising rates. 9 Moving from the Need For to the 10 Alternatives analysis, there are three threshold 11 questions which my clients believe must be addressed. 12 And they must be addressed before we move to 13 assessment of the viability and reasonableness of 14 Wuskwatim. The first question is did Hydro fail to 15 adopt the correct approach in assessing the 16 reasonableness as compared to other alternatives of 17 Wuskwatim? And if so, does that failure undermine 18 the validity of its proposal? 19 And I'll go through the next two 20 questions and then I'll come back to the first one. 21 Secondly, did Hydro overstate its load 22 forecast so as to fatally undermine its proposal? 23 And thirdly, did Hydro err in adopting a 24 partnership perspective in weighing the benefits of 25 Wuskwatim, particularly given the fact they used a 07323 1 Hydro perspective and methodology in assessing its 2 risks? 3 Back to the first question, did Hydro 4 adopt the wrong analysis or perform the wrong 5 analysis in weighing the reasonableness of Wuskwatim 6 against other alternatives and what are the 7 consequences of that? I'll recommend for your 8 consideration Mr. Harper's discussion of this at 9 pages 5463 through 5465 of the transcript. And my 10 clients believe his comments there are of great 11 importance not just for this hearing but for future 12 ones to come. 13 In essence what Mr. Harper says is that 14 he has no material concerns with how Hydro screened 15 the potential alternatives. But he takes issue with 16 Hydro's attempt to justify its preference for 17 Wuskwatim and he does so by pointing out, first of 18 all, what they did. And that's set out in the 19 transcript at pages 5463, 5464. He notes that Hydro 20 argued, first of all, that Wuskwatim was economically 21 viable even after taking into account the risks 22 associated with the project. Then Hydro went on to 23 say that continuing with Wuskwatim did not preclude 24 Hydro from exploring other alternatives. And 25 thirdly, by suggesting that any negative financial 07324 1 impacts were manageable, and in the long term, there 2 were positive financial impacts and rate benefits to 3 customers. 4 Mr. Harper goes on to point out what he 5 considered Hydro failed to do. What it failed to do 6 was to provide a comprehensive justification of the 7 Wuskwatim project from a portfolio perspective. And 8 by portfolio perspective, he referenced using a short 9 listed alternatives to develop alternative portfolios 10 of options each of which would be suitable for 11 satisfying the identified need. And then evaluating 12 them on a level fair playing field against a criteria 13 which had been set out initially including economic, 14 financial and other criteria. 15 Mr. Harper goes on to argue, there's a 16 number of cites for this but one is page 5514, that 17 Hydro has essentially failed to establish that 18 Wuskwatim is a preferred alternative. 19 In making this suggestion, conclusion, 20 Mr. Harper is supported by the evidence of Mr. Torrie 21 and it appears throughout Mr. Torrie's written and 22 direct evidence, and in particular pages 5697, 5698. 23 And Mr. Harper goes on to say that by failing to 24 perform a portfolio analysis, assuming that a 25 particular alternative, in this case Wuskwatim, is 07325 1 the preferred alternative, could bias results as one 2 looks at the economic and financial aspects as 3 opposed to when you have just short listed 4 alternatives and are looking at each of them on a 5 level playing field. 6 And he goes on to note at page 5467 that 7 the adoption of a more comprehensive approach in this 8 case, particularly with regard to what he sees as 9 preferred alternatives of DSM, SSE and non-utility 10 generation, would require more information than is 11 currently available on the future potential for 12 expanded DSM programs, NUGs or supply-side 13 enhancements. 14 In essence, he concludes that Hydro's 15 work on this, one of the most essential and basic 16 analytical questions, is incomplete and that it 17 cannot be completed given data limitations. 18 Now Hydro may argue and they may make 19 reference to the Terms of Reference and they may 20 suggest that they don't have to establish that 21 Wuskwatim is a preferred alternative, only that it 22 has been selected on reasonable grounds including 23 economic viability. However, with respect to any 24 such argument by Manitoba Hydro, in my client's view, 25 such a proposition is inconsistent with existing 07326 1 environmental and regulatory practice in other 2 jurisdictions. 3 And we'd refer you to, in the Book of 4 References, tab 2 through 4 of those references. And 5 I'll start with tab 2, a site from the Re West 6 Northumberland Landfill decision of the Ontario Joint 7 Board. The Ontario Joint Board, I believe it's a 8 municipal board and the environmental assessment 9 board sitting together. 10 And in particular, I refer you to 11 paragraph 93(a) where the Board's conclusion was 12 that, 13 "The undertaking must be the preferred 14 alternative among an adequate set of 15 reasonable and suitable alternatives, 16 having regard to the purpose of the 17 Act." 18 It's not enough to say that Wuskwatim is 19 economically viable. It's critical to establish that 20 it's preferred among an adequate set of reasonable 21 and suitable alternatives. 22 Now, as you'll note in paragraph 94, and 23 I read this quote to you before, this process is a 24 process not of scientific certainly. There's no 25 absolute best or preferred choice. But it's 07327 1 important particularly for future hearings, for the 2 Wuskwatims or the Conawapas to come, that the process 3 is properly established now. 4 And for guidance as well, we'd refer you 5 to tab 4, the Resource Planning Guidelines of the 6 British Columbia Utilities Commission where you can 7 see a very similar approach is recommended and 8 followed. And I won't go through it all which would 9 take me well into next year. But at page 3 under 10 Resource Planning Guidelines, you can see the first 11 step is identification of the planning context and 12 the objectives of a resource plan. Stage 5 and 6 are 13 development of multiple resource portfolios and 14 evaluation and selection of resource portfolios. And 15 if you read the notes under those two sections, and I 16 won't drag you through them, you'll see why this is 17 so important. Establishing portfolios and analysing 18 the trade-offs between portfolios and how they 19 perform under uncertainty will facilitate determining 20 which portfolio performs best relative to the stated 21 objectives. So this is more than an academic issue 22 of process. 23 Now I would note that in the context and 24 the specific fact situation of this proceeding, Mr. 25 Harper notes, and that's at page 5465 and 5466 of the 07328 1 transcript, that, 2 Hydro and NCN contend that in this 3 particular case, the issue really 4 doesn't arise since the export 5 opportunity is large enough to 6 accommodate and develop all of the 7 short-listed options. 8 And he says that, 9 If this is the case, then the approach 10 is reasonable provided there are no 11 limitations on either Hydro's 12 financial or intellectual capital that 13 will preclude pursuing all of these 14 opportunities at the same point in 15 time. 16 But I would note as well though that as 17 set out on page 5605 and 5606 of the transcript, Mr. 18 Harper makes his recommendation observation with some 19 trepidation. 20 So just to sum up on this section. From 21 my client's perspective, the preferred alternatives 22 in this hearing are DSM, supply-side enhancements and 23 non-utility generation. 24 However, based on the sensitivity 25 analysis performed by Hydro and the risk benefit 07329 1 assessment, Wuskwatim appears to be an acceptable 2 alternative and there appears to be room within the 3 opportunity of the greater export opportunities for 4 DSM, SSE and Wuskwatim. 5 MR. MAYER: I really hate to interrupt 6 but I heard Mr. Harper comment on the supply-side 7 enhancement in DSM. I only heard the reference to 8 NUGs in relation to wind power which Dr. Higgin says 9 is not, at this point, financially viable and still 10 it can't compete with hydro power even with the 11 subsidies. 12 MR. WILLIAMS: And I'm just keeping track 13 of the time so I can see how long my response is to 14 Mr. Mayer. 15 THE CHAIRMAN: For his interruption, I'll 16 double the time that you lost. 17 MR. WILLIAMS: Feel free to interrupt 18 then. I would note, I don't think in terms of if you 19 review Dr. Higgins' and Mr. Harper's direct evidence, 20 oral evidence, and I can certainly provide you the 21 cite, they spoke of non-utility generation in a 22 couple of instances. And they used a specific 23 example of hospitals or other large commercial or 24 industrial operations producing steam. And I can 25 certainly provide that cite to you, Mr. Mayer. 07330 1 (UNDERTAKING CAC/MSOS-95: Provide cite of Dr. 2 Higgins' and Mr. Harper's evidence re NUGs re 3 specific example of hospitals or other large 4 commercial or industrial operations producing steam) 5 6 MR. WILLIAMS: So in essence, while my 7 clients disagree with the process and we think it's 8 important that the Commission make a recommendation 9 for future proceedings, given the size of Wuskwatim 10 built in with what appears realistic in terms of DSM 11 and SSE, it appears that Hydro in this case can have 12 its cake and eat it too. 13 I want to turn to the second threshold 14 issue I raised which relates to whether the load 15 forecast is so flawed. And when Hydro suggested it 16 could have its DSM cake and still build Wuskwatim, 17 that suggestion was strenuously challenged by Mr. 18 Torrie who suggested, in his written evidence, that 19 Hydro's load forecast was overstated to such a degree 20 that it was strongly arguable that Hydro could 21 achieve its export opportunities and fulfil them 22 without building Wuskwatim. 23 Now in terms of Mr. Torrie's comments, 24 and I'll be brief because time is running quickly, it 25 is important to note that there's some material 07331 1 validity to them and Mr. Harper acknowledged that. 2 Especially he shared some of Mr. Torrie's concerns in 3 terms of the commercial load forecast. But as Mr. 4 Harper notes at pages 5581 and 5582 of the 5 transcript, at the end of the day, he had more 6 comfort in the numbers presented by Manitoba Hydro 7 than the numbers presented by Mr. Torrie. And one of 8 the key reasons for that was that the reference 9 starting point that Mr. Torrie had, through no fault 10 of his own, was 1,000 gigawatt hours lower than the 11 reference starting point of Manitoba Hydro. And that 12 allowed Mr. Harper to conclude that notwithstanding 13 the real and valid concerns that Mr. Torrie advanced, 14 he had some confidence that the final load forecast 15 was closer to the Hydro number than the Torrie 16 number. 17 And I have more on that subject but time 18 runs on. 19 The final threshold issue that my clients 20 wish to address is what perspectives should be taken 21 in assessing the economic viability of the project. 22 And Hydro of course argues that the benefits of the 23 project should be assessed from the perspective of 24 Hydro/NCN from the partnership's perspective, while 25 the risks should be assessed using Hydro's hurdle 07332 1 rate policy and their weighted cost of capital. 2 Again, as a starting point, I refer you 3 to Mr. Harper's evidence on this, pages 5467 through 4 5473. And also as well to Mr. Bedford's polite but 5 unsuccessful cross-examination of Mr. Harper on this 6 point which is at pages 5600 to 5602. 7 Now while my clients understand why Hydro 8 would like to adopt a partnership perspective, both 9 because it yields a higher internal rate of return 10 and also because it avoids, to a certain degree, the 11 messiness of getting into the partnership agreement, 12 they think that perspective is fundamentally wrong. 13 And it's an important message to send to Hydro and to 14 the government that addressing the financial benefits 15 of the project from a partnership perspective while 16 addressing the risks from a Hydro perspective does 17 not make good common sense, is imprudent, is 18 inconsistent analytically and is not mandated by the 19 terms of reference. 20 And the most important element of that my 21 clients wish to emphasize is a point of common sense. 22 And I always think Mr. Adams, during the course of 23 this hearing, has demonstrated a lot of common sense. 24 So I refer you to his comments starting at page 914, 25 915 of the hearing when he conceded freely that the 07333 1 assessment of a generation opportunity and its 2 viability could be materially affected by the nature 3 of ownership. That was in the context of wind, the 4 private versus public debate. And while he wouldn't 5 agree with me that it would be crazy to evaluate the 6 economic viability of a project from the perspective 7 of a private sector company, he did agree with me 8 that it would be imprudent, in essence he agreed that 9 it would be imprudent to address the financial 10 viability of a project from a perspective other than 11 Manitoba Hydro. It would be an imprudent business 12 practice. And of course it would be because it 13 doesn't provide a true economic picture of the risks 14 and benefits experienced by Hydro. 15 And it doesn't make common sense because 16 in this case, as we've heard through the testimony of 17 Mr. Thomas and Mr. Wojczynski, the perspectives of 18 Hydro and NCN are somewhat different. Mr. 19 Wojczynski, and I believe it's at page 109 of the 20 transcript, said that the primary driver for Hydro in 21 this project is profits. 22 Mr. Thomas, given the needs of his 23 community, focuses on three pillars, job 24 opportunities, contract opportunities for business 25 and the profits from Hydro. And he refused to put a 07334 1 premium on one over the other. And that's at page 2 908 of the transcript. 3 So in essence, you have different 4 perspectives for Hydro and for NCN. 5 And it doesn't make analytical sense to 6 use the partnership perspective for the benefits but 7 the Hydro perspective for the risks because, in 8 simple terms, that's an apples to oranges comparison. 9 MR. MAYER: With respect, Mr. Williams, 10 before you go much farther on that, if some of the 11 legal opinion is correct that Hydro would have a 12 great deal of difficulty in maintaining its limited 13 liability should the partnership fail because of its 14 active involvement in the project and in operating 15 it, isn't it at least prudent to take the risk as 16 Hydro's risk because the evidence appears to be 17 clear, that NCN would probably be successful in 18 maintaining its restricted liability in the event of 19 a partnership failure. So isn't it prudent for Hydro 20 to assume that it will have to bear the risk should 21 something go wrong? And at the same time, 22 understanding that if it is successful and the 23 profits are significant, that they have to understand 24 that those profits have to be shared, and therefore, 25 shared with its partner? And therefore, isn't it 07335 1 again more prudent to assess, even from Hydro's point 2 of view, the profitability of the project, which is 3 its primary goal, based on the fact that it will have 4 to share some of those profits with its partner? 5 MR. WILLIAMS: Mr. Mayer, I think you're 6 making my point. And I agree with you totally that 7 the risks faced by Manitoba Hydro that it should take 8 a hard look at its particular risks. And the second 9 part of your argument was that it should recognize 10 that it has to share the profits. And I agree 11 exactly. So it should be looking at its benefits 12 versus its risks. And your point, it should be 13 looking at the risks that its benefit -- excuse me. 14 Given that it's the primary risk taker, 15 the evaluation of whether that risk is worthwhile has 16 to be based upon the benefits that it will receive. 17 What point will be served by assessing its risk based 18 upon the benefits of the partnership? Because the 19 benefits of the partnership are higher. Hydro 20 Wuskwatim enjoys a -- or NCN enjoys a 21 disproportionate share of the benefits. 22 So, Mr. Mayer, if you want to evaluate 23 the risks you face, you should be weighing it against 24 your potential benefits, not the potential benefits 25 of someone else. 07336 1 MR. MAYER: I have your point. 2 MR. WILLIAMS: Now, in Mr. Bedford's 3 polite cross-examination of my witness, or my 4 client's witness, Mr. Harper, he tried to suggest, I 5 believe, that it was okay because while the economic 6 analysis was done from a partnership perspective, the 7 financial analysis was done from a Hydro perspective. 8 But I guess there's two problems with that. The 9 first is, as Mr. Harper pointed out, risk analysis is 10 about comparing and the economic viability analysis 11 is about comparing one alternative against another. 12 And even to the extent that some financial risk is 13 considered in the financial evaluation, it's not a 14 comparison against other alternatives. 15 Moreover, as Ms. Wray pointed out at page 16 975 of the transcript, financial analysis does not 17 involve her rates. And that's a key point. 18 So while Mr. Adam noted that it would be 19 imprudent to address the benefits of a project from 20 anyone else's perspective but Hydro's own, financial 21 analysis does not truly assess the risks and benefits 22 of the project versus other alternatives. 23 Mr. Chair, I'm giving myself about seven 24 more minutes on this point and then I'm going to turn 25 to my friend, Ms. Pollitt-Smith. I think we can 07337 1 finish our arguments. Is that appropriate? 2 THE CHAIRMAN: You're very close. 3 MR. WILLIAMS: If I take eight, will you 4 let me get away with it, sir? 5 We certainly don't intend to address all 6 the alternatives referenced in the Hydro analysis. 7 But in my client's perspective, there are two that 8 are worthy of note. And the first, not surprisingly, 9 is DSM. 10 From my client's perspective, there are 11 some truth about DSM that are self-evident. The 12 first is that there's material potential for greatly 13 enhanced DSM and a consequent positive contribution, 14 both to the objectives of efficiency and economy. 15 And it's notable that at page 5696 of the transcript, 16 Mr. Torrie seems to appear to agree with Dr. Higgin 17 in terms of the potential of DSM. He appears to 18 agree that three times DSM is an achievable stretched 19 target. So that's a figure that we would recommend 20 to the panel for its consideration. 21 I think Dr. Higgin and Mr. Torrie also 22 agree on another important conclusion, observation. 23 And that is that DSM is not receiving the priority 24 from Hydro that it deserves. From my client's 25 perspective, in terms of the Need For and 07338 1 Alternatives analysis, the performance of Hydro's DSM 2 panel was a most disappointing aspect of that element 3 of the hearing, both in providing clarity to the 4 issues and in providing confidence that there is a 5 strong sense of direction within the corporation. 6 And we offer those comments with respect. 7 And we will refer you to the transcript 8 from the first week, Mr. Abra's attempt to garner 9 information on DSM or the transcript of the second 10 week, Mr. Torrie's attempt. 11 And whether the performance of that panel 12 is merely the function of inexperience or reflective 13 of Hydro's priorities, it's not clear. What is clear 14 is that for a variety of reasons, and some of these 15 are set out at pages 1031 to 1033 of the transcript, 16 a DSM plan that is to be reviewed and updated 17 annually is now two to three years out of date. And 18 there is a general rate application to my horror that 19 is starting next week and it doesn't appear that a 20 DSM plan will be ready and available for that either. 21 And this is ironic from my client's 22 perspective and also deeply distressing given the 23 vast potential that DSM offers and also the positive 24 social aspects it offers in terms of efficiency. 25 So from my client's perspective, it's 07339 1 important that clear direction or recommendations 2 flow from this Commission to the government, applying 3 pressure to Hydro to address DSM on an urgent basis 4 in order to address the lost opportunities that 5 exists. 6 I want to turn finally to wind, or almost 7 finally to wind. And in my client's respectful view, 8 the arguments surrounding wind as an alternative of 9 Wuskwatim is notable for the disconnect between the 10 objective evidence and the rhetoric in this 11 proceeding. And as a starting point, though, I think 12 we can probably all agree with Dr. Higgin that wind 13 is desirable for many environment and social reasons. 14 And if you look at the record carefully 15 at the expert evidence rather than the opinions, I 16 think you will find a surprising degree of consensus 17 on the economics of wind and on the best way to 18 promote wind generation. 19 And if you look to Mr. Wojczynski's wise 20 comments at page 1092 to 1100 of the transcript, I 21 think it's fair to say that Mr. Wojczynski and Dr. 22 Higgin would agree that there are a number of large 23 uncertainties relating to wind that make wind a much 24 riskier prospect than Wuskwatim. They relate to 25 capital costs, to transmission costs, uncertainties 07340 1 relating to firming and shaping costs, the nature and 2 extent of the federal subsidy and the level of 3 output. These are all uncertainties surrounding 4 wind. 5 And as Dr. Higgin and Mr. Harper 6 concluded, wind generation is a medium to high risk 7 venture requiring at least a 10 hurdle rate. And if 8 you refer to Exhibit CAC/MSOS 1008, you'll see that 9 nowhere, even under the most optimistic of 10 assumptions does the internal rate of return for wind 11 come within the range of that 10 per cent minimum 12 level. 13 For those still harboring the view that 14 wind is financially, economically realistic is a 15 sum-up comment. Ask them to point and look at the 16 comments of wind advocates such as Mr. Hornung who 17 notes at pages 4077, 4085 and 4088 that there is a 18 gap in terms of wind economics that is likely to 19 persist for another 10 to 20 years. 20 Mr. Chairman, in my right that I can turn 21 it over to my friend, Ms. Pollitt-Smith? Okay. My 22 clients, just in summary from CAC/MSOS's perspective, 23 they presented comprehensive evidence on May 12th 24 with a comprehensive series of recommendations which 25 they recommend for your consideration. Rather than 07341 1 go through those recommendations today, we chose to 2 highlight some of the key points of the argument 3 which we wish the panel to consider and we'd leave 4 those to your consideration. And I turn it now to my 5 friend, Ms. Pollitt-Smith. 6 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: How much time do I 7 have? 8 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead. 9 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: Okay. I think I 10 should get some penalty time for all the questions 11 that were driving me nuts while I was sitting here 12 suffering. 13 What I am proposing to do is I've 14 prepared a written argument that will be available 15 hopefully at the break and this is more serving as 16 the coming attractions to the main show that you'll 17 be getting. Oh, no. It's longer than that, Mr. 18 Mayer, it's much longer. This is what I'm going to 19 be presenting now. It should take me about 10 20 minutes to go through or maybe a minute or so more 21 because I don't want to drive the court reporter 22 nuts. So I shall commence. But it is basically an 23 overview of my main written argument. 24 Ultimately, the questions concerning the 25 environmental impacts of this project may not be 07342 1 answered until the hydroelectric dam is built and 2 operations commence. 3 Despite the accumulation of data and the 4 qualifications of those interpreting it, predicting 5 what will happen to the environment when it is 6 disrupted by development is inherently uncertain. 7 While the proponents have presented many volumes of 8 material and analysis which they feel demonstrates 9 that the project will have no significant adverse 10 effects on the region, there always remains an 11 element of uncertainty in the process, variables that 12 cannot be deciphered with complete accuracy or 13 consequences that remain unimagined until the 14 detrimental effects are felt. 15 While uncertainty is infused in the 16 process of prediction, the degree of uncertainty may 17 be bolstered by the methodologies employed in 18 conducting studies or analysing the information 19 obtained. For this project, there is some question 20 concerning whether the cumulative effects methodology 21 was ultimately the best analytical framework. 22 Ultimately, the analysts employed to conduct the 23 assessment must use their best professional judgment, 24 but such judgment relies on subjective opinion. 25 While there is a certain amount of professional 07343 1 expertise and experience involved which would 2 mitigate uncertainty, it must be acknowledged that 3 experts often disagree on what's best sometimes. 4 These uncertainties may be mitigated 5 somewhat through a thorough and transparent review 6 process before the project is approved. Any failings 7 in professional judgment may be corrected or at least 8 brought to light through a process where concerned 9 members of the public can produce evidence or 10 cross-examine the evidence provided by the proponent. 11 Where such a process exists and has been fairly 12 carried out, uncertainty may be tempered. 13 Should doubts remain concerning the 14 proponent's plans, the ultimate failsafe is the 15 implementation of extensive mitigation measures, 16 monitoring and adaptive management. Such measures 17 may be imperative and of necessity applied with 18 greater rigour if the information provided by the 19 proponents is not thoroughly tested during the 20 hearing process and questions still remain as to its 21 adequacy. 22 While we have heard from many 23 participants during the course of this hearing, two 24 views have predominated: the future promise of the 25 Wuskwatim project, and the cataclysmic impacts of big 07344 1 Hydro. While the proponents have focused their 2 presentation of evidence on the examination of the 3 former, many participants have opted to push the 4 outer boundaries of the scope this hearing and 5 advocate the latter view. These views may seem 6 diametrically opposed at first glance, however they 7 are only peripherally related and the consequences 8 has been a genuine lack of meaningful dialogue at 9 times. 10 Both views are relevant and may offer 11 valid perspectives for the Commission's consideration 12 but the lack of substantial interrelation of these 13 themes has resulted in two very different and 14 oft-times one-sided conversations taking place. 15 While this has resulted in a good deal of information 16 being presented to the Commission, the value of much 17 of the information to this process is lost due to the 18 lack of critical engagement and assessment of the 19 information. 20 While the historical background of the 21 Hydro development in the region and its ongoing 22 detrimental impacts has served as a valid warning 23 concerning future development, it speaks only 24 tangentially about the specific environmental and 25 socioeconomic impacts that the project under review 07345 1 will have and fails to evaluate the information 2 presented in the EIS itself. 3 In the end, there has been no real case 4 for why this dam should not be built. The 5 participants have adequately set the stage concerning 6 the impacts of past projects on the region and its 7 people but they have not established that this 8 project will breach a critical environmental or 9 socioeconomic threshold. 10 While public concerns may be perfectly 11 valid, there has been presented no evidentiary case 12 to substantiate the concerns that the project will 13 further exacerbate the effects of the CRD or 14 challenge the proponent's assertions that the project 15 will operate within the parameters of the already 16 existing regulated system and have no impacts on that 17 system. 18 The Terms of Reference set out that there 19 are essentially two areas where this Commission must 20 make recommendations. The Commission must consider 21 whether or not to recommend the issuance of 22 environmental licence and the Commission must 23 consider whether to recommend any measures designed 24 to mitigate or any monitoring measures that should be 25 employed. 07346 1 In determining the question of whether an 2 Environment Act licence should be issued, it should 3 be noted that the EIS has stated and the proponents 4 have affirmed throughout the process that any adverse 5 effects from the project will be insignificant or 6 rendered negligible through the employment of planned 7 mitigation measures. 8 Further, there has been little evidence 9 put on record by the participants that puts the 10 quality or content of the EIS itself or its 11 conclusions into question. 12 On the balance of information presented, 13 the proponents may need to be taken at their word. 14 Ultimately, as set out in the EIS, the Wuskwatim 15 Generation Station will be a small project. It is 16 operating within a regulated system and will work 17 within the operational paramaters of that system. 18 There is on the record no clear evidence that it will 19 impact upon the system operations in a significantly 20 detrimental manner. 21 As to the question of any follow-up 22 mitigation or continuing research, it should be noted 23 that the information contained in the EIS has not had 24 to withstand the rigour of a thorough competition of 25 ideas, as was discussed by Mr. Williams in his 07347 1 closing statement. 2 If the EIS is to be accepted at face 3 value, it is imperative that there be further testing 4 and monitoring of its assumptions. This is 5 especially important given the issues of trust and 6 credibility that have come up during the course of 7 this hearing. 8 There must be regular evaluation of the 9 performance of adaptive management measures as well 10 as regular evaluation of the success of mitigation 11 measures. The proponents should not be left alone to 12 do this monitoring. Some third party oversight 13 should be provided. 14 There has been plenty of discussion 15 concerning the model of Independent Monitoring being 16 utilized in the Northwest Territories. This model 17 should be investigated to determine whether it could 18 be adapted to the resource development activities 19 that continue to blossom in Northern Manitoba's 20 boreal forest. 21 An independent monitoring agency would 22 serve many vital functions. Such an agency could 23 review the design of monitoring programs and examine 24 the results of the environmental management systems 25 in place, testing their ability to respond to 07348 1 problems as they arise. 2 It could also serve as a watch dog, 3 preparing an annual report of the monitoring programs 4 in place and their results and ensure that 5 information concerning the project is made publicly 6 available. In this regard, such an agency could be 7 tasked with holding regular forums to educate the 8 public about continuing developments concerning this 9 project and also elicit participation and input from 10 the public in order to enhance the development of 11 monitoring programs. This may also go to addressing 12 the issues of trust and credibility that have come up 13 during this hearing. 14 Given the concerns expressed during the 15 hearing by participants regarding the Cumulative 16 Effects Assessment, this independent monitoring 17 agency could also be tasked with preparing periodic 18 reports on cumulative effects, essentially taking a 19 longer view of environmental effects monitoring and 20 reviewing the performance of project activities as 21 compared to the predictions made in the EIS. 22 Due to the persistent concerns regarding 23 the cumulative effects assessment, the cumulative 24 effects methodology relied upon by the proponents 25 should be rigorously tested and regularly reviewed. 07349 1 This could occur as part of the independent 2 monitoring program activities. Regardless of who is 3 doing this monitoring, there should be some regular 4 reporting as to both the adequacy of the methodology 5 chosen as well as the incidence of cumulative 6 effects, the degree of mitigation required and the 7 success of mitigation measures implemented. 8 Further, Dr. Duinker, who has lately 9 become a star of this hearing, should be contacted 10 and a report based on his assessment of the 11 cumulative effects process in the EIS should be 12 requested. It would be instructive for the 13 evaluation of this project and future project 14 planning to know what praise or criticisms he had 15 concerning the methodology chosen. 16 It should also be considered whether 17 large scale land use planning is appropriate for this 18 region as it is undoubtedly going to see further 19 resource development in the future. Land use on a 20 broader scale than the resource management area may 21 need to be considered and other interests may need to 22 be invited to the discussion table. Given the 23 difficulty in determining thresholds for VECs, 24 perhaps it is wise to start developing acceptable 25 thresholds for resource development and change in the 07350 1 northern boreal region before the die is 2 irretrievably cast and some unmitigable threshold 3 crossed. Having a design incorporating the concerns 4 and advice of many stakeholders may help to control 5 the extent of environmental change in the area and 6 avoid any future problems. 7 As suggested by Dr. Shaeffer, the 8 benefits of this project should be more than just 9 economic given the environmental and social problems 10 occurring in the region due to past Hydro 11 developments. There exists an opportunity to 12 contribute to science and to further the 13 understanding of the various VECs as well as other 14 important environmental issues. Extensive applied 15 research as well as peer-reviewed research should be 16 performed. Such research should be made publicly 17 available either by the proponents, through an easily 18 accessible medium, or by an independent monitoring 19 agency. 20 And as I said, the main attraction is 21 coming. 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Does that complete your 23 presentation? Mr. Mayer. 24 MR. MAYER: Just on the issue of the 25 independent monitoring, I recognize that the system 07351 1 set up in the NWT appears to be an energy type or at 2 least a resource type monitoring system. How would 3 your client look upon an expanded role for the Clean 4 Environment Commission, with the added extra 5 resources that would obviously be necessary, as the 6 independent monitor for all projects which affect the 7 environment? 8 MR. WILLIAMS: We would have to undertake 9 an answer to that, Mr. Mayer. I see looks of neither 10 puzzlement nor bemusement back there so I'm not sure 11 we have instructions. 12 13 (UNDERTAKING CAC/MSOS 96: Advise of client's views 14 to an expanded role for the Clean Environment 15 Commission as the independent monitor for all 16 projects which affect the environment) 17 18 MR. MAYER: Just one quick follow-up 19 then. When you're considering the answer which 20 you've just undertaken to give us on your client's 21 position in that regard, you do make, on the NFAAT 22 side, a very clear recommendation that the PUB should 23 monitor the economic advantages, et cetera. And I'm 24 wondering why it would be different, on the 25 environmental side, if the CEC were put in a position 07352 1 and given the necessary resources to monitor such 2 follow-up. 3 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: I haven't addressed 4 my mind to it. 5 MR. WILLIAMS: We'll get instructions, 6 Mr. Mayer, and we'll reply in writing by the end of 7 the day. 8 9 (UNDERTAKING CAC/MSOS 97: Advise why it would be 10 different, on the environmental side, if the CEC were 11 put in a position and given the necessary resources 12 to monitor the economic advantages) 13 14 MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman 15 and members of the panel. Oh, sorry. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms. Avery Kinew. 17 MS. AVERY KINEW: Thank you for your 18 thoughtful recommendations, presentation. I'm just 19 wondering in your recommendations on the environment 20 about large scale land use planning and your 21 peer-reviewed applied research, where is traditional 22 knowledge, Treaty and Aboriginal rights? 23 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: Well, I can't speak 24 to exactly the model but I mean one would assume that 25 would be applied in terms of bringing certain 07353 1 stakeholders to the table in land use planning. You 2 would be including interested parties such as -- 3 MS. AVERY KINEW: More than stakeholders? 4 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: Yeah, people that are 5 like interested in the region. Like it's just a 6 matter of finding people that have an interest at 7 stake there and bringing them to the table to I think 8 design a plan for how that region should progress 9 instead of willy-nilly putting operations in there 10 and then finding out what happens. 11 MS. AVERY KINEW: Did your clients happen 12 to see conflict between applied research and western 13 research and traditional knowledge during the course 14 of the hearings? Did they discuss it at all? 15 MS. POLLITT-SMITH: I don't think that's 16 been addressed. But we can provide an answer to 17 that. 18 MS. AVERY KINEW: Okay, thank you. 19 20 (UNDERTAKING CAC/MSOS 98: Advise if the CAC/MSOS 21 clients happened to see conflict between applied 22 research and western research and traditional 23 knowledge during the course of the hearings, if they 24 discussed it at all) 25 07354 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. Grewar. 2 MR. GREWAR: Mr. Chairman, just a few 3 numbers to assign to keep the record straight. We 4 will assign the closing argument of CAC/MSOS Book of 5 References as CAC/MSOS 1012. 6 7 (EXHIBIT CAC/MSOS 1012: Closing Argument 8 - June 8, 2004 - Book of References) 9 10 MR. GREWAR: We'll refer to the 11 "Overview: Uncertainty" as just presented as CAC/MSOS 12 1013. 13 14 (EXHIBIT CAC/MSOS 1013: Speaking Notes: 15 Overview: Uncertainty) 16 17 MR. GREWAR: And I think for continuity 18 sake, and for the record, we could perhaps assign an 19 exhibit number to what we know is coming, which is 20 the full document on the EIS as CAC/MSOS 1014. 21 22 (EXHIBIT CAC/MSOS 1014: Written 23 Commentary on Environmental Impact 24 Statement - CAC/MSOS) 25 07355 1 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. 2 MR. GREWAR: And we have it now, Mr. 3 Chairman. So we'll have that assigned and we'll 4 distribute that document. 5 THE CHAIRMAN: We have one more closing 6 statement this morning. Because the Boreal Forest is 7 not presenting until tomorrow, perhaps we can have 8 the luxury of a little longer break. We can adjourn 9 for the break at reconvene at quarter to 11:00. 10 11 (PROCEEDINGS RECESSED AT 10:27 A.M. and 12 RECONVENED AT 10:51 A.M.) 13 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, 15 getting ready to carry on with Dr. Miller. Dr. 16 Miller, you may proceed. 17 MR. MILLER: All right. Thank you again 18 for the opportunity. You have written documents 19 there and basically, because some of the points are 20 somewhat detailed, I wanted you to have a written 21 record of this. There may be points where I skip the 22 text. And one editing principle I had was if the 23 word "gigawatt hour" appears in the paragraph, I'll 24 probably skip it, but there's one exception which is 25 to that principle. 07356 1 So TREE and RCM are non-government 2 organizations committed to the advancement of a more 3 sustainable society in which our planet's natural 4 endowments of living and non-living systems and 5 resources are valued, respected and conserved. 6 Recognizing that this natural legacy is finite and 7 subject to degradation and depletion, we promote 8 eco-efficiency, improving the ratio of social 9 benefits to environmental harms and resource 10 depletion, as an essential pillar of a sustainable 11 society. 12 In our presentation on May 13th, we 13 argued that concern for the environment and long-run 14 sustainability generate a social imperative first for 15 energy conservation and efficiency measures, and 16 second, for least-impact generation options. 17 We also noted that Canada's standing, 18 relative to other OECD countries, in per capita 19 energy consumption, 27th out of 28th -- ranked from 20 lowest to highest, Mr. Mayer -- and energy 21 efficiency, 28 out of 29, ranked from least to most 22 energy used per dollar of GDP, indicates that we are 23 global energy hogs. Canada's energy use is 50 per 24 cent higher than countries with similar climates, 25 such as Sweden. These figures intensify the 07357 1 conservation imperative and pose the question, to 2 what extent is our socioeconomic climate well-adapted 3 to promote energy conservation? 4 High energy usage should provide a 5 powerful incentive and opportunity for energy 6 conservation. But we concluded on the basis of our 7 experience in the 2002 Manitoba Hydro rate hearing 8 before the PUB that Manitoba's poor showing is not 9 simply owing to our physical climate and geography, 10 rather it is attributable in part to perverse 11 economic incentives, inadequate conservation 12 investments and regulations and policy failures. 13 To simplify somewhat, as a society, 14 instead of looking at our high usage and asking how 15 can we achieve the same social benefits more 16 efficiently with less energy consumption, we have 17 asked instead how can we keep rates low? To do this, 18 we have been prepared to divert great sums of 19 Manitoba's wealth in the form of foregone taxes and 20 allocation of export earnings to subsidize domestic 21 energy rates. Indeed, part of the Wuskwatim 22 justification is to be able to maintain that subsidy 23 in order to keep rates low. Because low rates to 24 consumers have trumped and to some extent replaced 25 energy efficiency goals, it is no wonder that 07358 1 Canada's energy profile has continued to worsen 2 relative to other OECD countries. 3 Despite the above shortcomings in 4 application, we note more optimistically that in 5 Manitoba, the social imperative to conserve is 6 enshrined in the Manitoba Hydro Act and the 7 Sustainable Development Act, as we discuss in the 8 next section. Thus TREE and RCM have intervened in 9 these hearings in response to the social imperative 10 and legal requirement to prioritize conservation and 11 least-impact generation alternatives. Our 12 determination to intervene was strengthened by 13 consideration of Canada and Manitoba's poor showing 14 in global comparisons and failures in resource 15 pricing and energy policies to promote conservation. 16 I'll now discuss that legal framework. 17 In Section 2 of the Manitoba Hydro Act, 18 which provides a legal foundation for Manitoba Hydro, 19 it is stated, 20 "The purposes and objects of this Act 21 are to provide for the continuance of 22 a supply of power adequate for the 23 needs of the province, and to engage 24 in and to promote economy and 25 efficiency in the development, 07359 1 generation, transmission, 2 distribution, supply and end-use of 3 power." 4 The Sustainable Development Act in 5 Section 2 indicates that, 6 "The purpose of this Act is to create 7 a framework through which sustainable 8 development will be implemented in the 9 provincial public sector and promoted 10 in private industry and in society 11 generally." 12 And the public sector includes, in the 13 definition following, Manitoba Hydro, the CEC and the 14 Public Utilities Board. So all have a legislated 15 obligation to assess their activities by the 16 principles of sustainability. 17 Appended to the Sustainable Development 18 Act are principles and guidelines of sustainable 19 development, two schedules. The one that may be most 20 relevant to our intervention is the guideline for the 21 efficient use of resources. Which means, 22 "Encouraging and facilitating 23 development and application of systems 24 for proper resource pricing, demand 25 management and resource allocation 07360 1 together with incentives to encourage 2 efficient use of resources; and 3 employing full-cost accounting to 4 provide better information for 5 decision makers." 6 There is a stewardship principle which 7 speaks of the long run and intergenerational equity. 8 And finally a principle of global 9 responsibility. Manitobans should think globally 10 when acting locally. 11 Take these three principles together and 12 they lead to this implication, that Manitoba Hydro's 13 energy planning should be developed against a 14 backdrop of global long-run energy scenarios that 15 include analyses of resource availability, limits and 16 constraints, environmental loadings and impacts, and 17 socioeconomic consequences of alternative paths that 18 can be taken. Planning should identify the preferred 19 sustainable futures to which the utility can 20 contribute. Efficiency improvements will be a 21 primary component of any preferred path. 22 Because ever-rising trends in energy 23 consumption and production cause incremental harms 24 and face global limits, a sustainable scenario must 25 contemplate the levelling of and possible decline in 07361 1 available energy and thus in aggregate customer 2 consumption. Therefore, we argued in our May 13th 3 testimony that it's not too soon for Manitoba Hydro 4 to sketch an end-game for the province once 5 hydroelectric potential on the Nelson is fully 6 installed. 3,700 megawatts of the existing Nelson 7 River capacity came on line in the short period from 8 1974 to 1990. A similar building binge currently 9 contemplated by Manitoba Hydro and the provincial 10 government could come close to completing the job in 11 a comparably short time. Long-range planning should 12 address that issue. 13 For these reasons, alternative resource 14 plans are to be assessed for their sustainability and 15 eco-efficiency. That is achieving the greatest 16 long-run human benefits with the least degradation of 17 resources and the environment, both locally and 18 globally. We also believe that conservation 19 alternatives hold the best prospects for long-run 20 economic stimulation and jobs and the improvement of 21 Manitobans' homes, institutions and businesses. 22 So those are the broad principles that 23 have guided our intervention. Now I'd like to refer 24 more particularly to the body of evidence that we 25 have presented and this will be done in a bullet form 07362 1 combining our various points of evidence, some 2 observations on them and conclusions. 3 We asked Torrie Smith Associates to 4 provide an analysis of the Need For and Alternatives 5 To Wuskwatim to see if a case could be made for more 6 aggressive DSM programs and policies combined with 7 distributed generation, including non-utility 8 generation, which might provide a viable alternative 9 to the Wuskwatim advancement project and would better 10 satisfy the principles of sustainability. We also 11 provided evidence from our 2002 intervention before 12 the Public Utilities Board. 13 What I've done is to try to summarize 14 various points under the headings of the NFAAT 15 analysis and sustainability, load forecasting, DSM 16 and non-utility generation analysis and programming, 17 alternatives to Wuskwatim and perverse incentives and 18 subsidies. 19 First, the NFAAT analysis. Regardless of 20 possible future energy requirements of Manitobans, 21 Wuskwatim advancement is not needed at this time for 22 domestic power supply as indeed Manitoba Hydro 23 acknowledges. 24 The need for Wuskwatim advancement, as 25 defined in the filing, is to maintain, in the face of 07363 1 rising domestic consumption, sufficient electricity 2 surplus to domestic use to supply what they call the 3 estimated on-peak export market which is represented 4 as a line of 10,500 gigawatt hours. There is my 5 exception. 6 Thus an NFAAT analysis of Wuskwatim 7 advancement should examine, compare and evaluate in 8 some depth alternative portfolios containing 9 conservation and generation options capable of 10 meeting this need, some of which might include 11 Wuskwatim and some not. 12 Manitoba Hydro, in one of its responses, 13 gave a definition of "alternatives to" and it 14 involves a demonstration that the project is more 15 beneficial than other projects, either similar in 16 nature or significantly different but in all cases, 17 serving to meet the same need. And we accept that. 18 But we claim that they haven't done that. Hence, 19 they haven't done an NFAAT analysis by their own 20 definition. 21 What they have provided instead are 22 sensitivity analyses to show that Wuskwatim is still 23 viable under a range of assumptions but that's not a 24 substitute for an NFAAT analysis that shows it is the 25 preferred option or part of a preferred portfolio. 07364 1 In the most recent Manitoba Hydro 2 rebuttal of TREE/RCM's interrogatory responses, there 3 is considerable new information and analysis but 4 there is nothing new in the thinking or approach to 5 the NFAAT question. No alternative strategies for 6 meeting the objective of Wuskwatim advancement are 7 identified or analyzed, except to the extent the 8 rebuttal does contain comments on the one alternative 9 that was put before the CEC, our illustrative 10 scenario. 11 The identification and comparative 12 analysis, including risk analysis of such 13 alternatives, should be an important element of 14 Manitoba Hydro's investment planning strategy as well 15 as the basis for the analysis of the Need For and 16 Alternatives To Wuskwatim advancement. What is 17 needed is a proactive and thoughtful approach to the 18 market, focused on the horizon, driven by the 19 Principles of Sustainable Development and informed by 20 a deep understanding of the business and 21 technological possibilities on the demand side. 22 So those are a summary of points in the 23 evidence and I've interjected a comment here. We 24 think that that critique is essentially correct, that 25 an NFAAT analysis has not been done and it is 07365 1 confirmed by the CAC/MSOS witness which presented a 2 description of the process in terms of an analysis of 3 alternative portfolios relying on a document which I 4 believe came from the B.C. Utilities Commission. 5 What we would like to add to that general 6 picture of what an NFAAT analysis is is a linkage to 7 the principles of sustainability. We remind you of 8 the earlier part of the brief that these are legally 9 mandated principles for the operation of the utility 10 and so the NFAAT analysis should be well-grounded in 11 them. 12 This should include longer range energy 13 scenarios that address limits to global energy 14 supplies, limits to Manitoba's hydroelectric capacity 15 and transitions from increasing energy consumption 16 and production trends to a more sustainable 17 containment of consumption within long-run 18 sustainable supplies. 19 We realize that you can't attach precise 20 numbers to some of these longer range things but you 21 can certainly consider them and do order of magnitude 22 estimates and do some strategic planning in terms of 23 them. 24 Moreover, Manitoba conceives that 25 Wuskwatim is the first in a series of dams to provide 07366 1 a succession of construction employment opportunities 2 which would rapidly use up the remaining sites with 3 hydroelectric potential on the Burntwood and Nelson 4 rivers. Thus, it is not too soon to ask Hydro to 5 provide an end-game analysis for energy supply and 6 demand when the feasible and economic potential is 7 exhausted. The continuous growth in energy 8 production and consumption is not a sustainable 9 trajectory. 10 Likewise, the CEC review of any 11 submission by Hydro should attend to the same 12 principles and guidelines. 13 While the export of power is contemplated 14 in the Manitoba Hydro Act, provision of power for 15 export must adhere to these same principles of 16 sustainability. And we note that the case for export 17 would be stronger if power were to be sold into 18 jurisdictions likewise committed to sustainability 19 including adherence to the Kyoto protocol for 20 greenhouse gas reduction. Otherwise, there is a 21 concern that the exported power might be incremental 22 to unsustainable fossil fuel generation rather than 23 displacing it, alleviating a potential crunch. 24 Likewise, the case for export would be 25 stronger if Manitoba Hydro increased export capacity 07367 1 was to be used to firm wind generation. Otherwise, 2 there is a concern that the exported power might 3 displace wind generation in export markets rather 4 than supporting this relatively low impact 5 technology. However, the operational design of 6 Wuskwatim precludes significant storage and thus 7 firming capacity at this site. 8 In addition, the case for providing 9 socioeconomic benefits to Manitoba through export 10 earnings would be stronger were the export earnings 11 not to be used to subsidize the wastage of energy in 12 Manitoba, which the current rate design and cost 13 allocation methods encourage. 14 For example, the largest customers pay 15 less than 2 cents a kilowatt hour for incremental 16 energy consumed as long as it does not add to demand 17 from their rate schedules. This is far from the 18 marginal cost of new generation and transmission and 19 of export earnings foregone and less than a third of 20 the 6.15 cents a kilowatt hour which Manitoba Hydro 21 values DSM savings. 22 Do we want to increase subsidies when 23 they are of that magnitude or even maintain them at 24 that level? 25 The next topic is load forecasting. 07368 1 Manitoba Hydro adopts a forecasting approach to 2 planning which extrapolates the future on the basis 3 of high level econometric trends as opposed to a 4 scenario approach based on end-use analyses under 5 varying assumptions about changing relationships 6 between trends like population GP and end-use 7 variables like how much electricity is used in a 8 manufacturing plant or to light an office. 9 The very term "load forecasting" reflects 10 the passive approach to electricity demand, something 11 to be forecast, like the weather, that characterizes 12 the traditional utility business culture. Ideally, 13 load forecasting should be based upon scenario 14 analyses as an end-use model. 15 The electricity market is in a very 16 dynamic state and once stable relations between 17 demographic and economic activity and electricity 18 demand are changing rapidly. Business planning for 19 sustainable development requires thinking about 20 alternative futures, backcasting rather than 21 forecasting, as a central element of investment 22 planning strategies. 23 The latter approach is to be preferred 24 because it is less deterministic, provides a richer 25 understanding of the factors affecting energy 07369 1 consumption and can guide energy service 2 opportunities and DSM interventions. 3 When Manitoba Hydro produces variations 4 in the load forecast, medium low and medium high for 5 example, they do so by varying the underlying 6 demographic and economic inputs to the forecast. 7 They do not look at variations in the relationship 8 between those inputs and the demand for electricity, 9 even though these variations are of equal or greater 10 importance to the economic input variables in 11 determining the final demand for electricity. 12 A low, medium low forecast is based on 13 expectations of a flagging economy, not greater 14 efficiency. 15 A basic prerequisite for improved 16 electricity demand analysis at Manitoba Hydro is the 17 development of a fully calibrated end-use model of 18 energy demand in Manitoba. It should be 19 comprehensive, including all sectors and all fuels 20 and electricity. It should be designed to support 21 both strategic planning and scenario analysis and the 22 development of integrated customer-focused marketing 23 strategies. 24 The rebuttal contains, for the first time 25 from Manitoba Hydro, a detailed subsector breakdown 07370 1 of the 2002 load forecast. While this is the first 2 step toward an end-use analysis of the load forecast 3 and to the development of alternative scenarios of 4 future electricity demand, Manitoba Hydro has not 5 taken those next steps. Instead the subsector 6 disaggregation is used only for a defence of the 7 status quo, the same old approach to load forecasting 8 and the same old assumptions about indefinite growth. 9 There is nothing in Manitoba Hydro's 10 rebuttal that refutes our conclusion that the 2002 11 General Service Mass Market Forecast, which is all 12 the commercial and industrial customers minus what 13 they call the top customer group, the really heaviest 14 users, is relatively high given the economic forecast 15 that is driving it. Manitoba Hydro would have 16 conceded this point if they had tried to do a 17 complete end-use calibration of this forecast. They 18 would have found, as TSA did, that the load forecast 19 is high for the level of activity in the economic 20 forecast. Unless commercial and institutional floor 21 area suddenly starts growing faster than output, 22 combined with a simultaneous reversal in the 23 long-term trend to higher electricity productivity in 24 general manufacturing, the level of electricity 25 demand in the 2002 basic forecast does not correspond 07371 1 to the demographic and economic growth assumptions 2 that are driving it. 3 One of the central reasons for presenting 4 the adjusted load forecast was to illustrate the 5 sensitivity of the final demand for electricity to 6 changes in the assumed relationships between economic 7 activity and electricity demand. While Manitoba 8 Hydro's medium low forecast is driven by a fairly 9 strong negative economic projection, an equally low 10 future demand for electricity could come about 11 without assuming an economic slowdown but by making a 12 few modest, and we would argue, justifiable changes 13 in the activity and energy intensities of the 14 commercial and general manufacturing sectors. 15 The point is not whether the particular 16 assumptions made in our illustrative scenarios are 17 precisely correct, the point is that any attempt to 18 produce an end-use calibration of Manitoba Hydro's 19 load forecast will lead to the conclusion that the 20 2002 load forecast is relatively high for the level 21 of economic activity assumed. This in turn leads to 22 the conclusion that the size of the projected export 23 gap that Manitoba Hydro has put forward as the 24 underlying justification for Wuskwatim advancement 25 has been overstated. 07372 1 Now I'll skip to my comment. The load 2 forecast is the most contentious and technical point 3 of divergence between Manitoba Hydro and Torrie Smith 4 Associates. Unfortunately, we have been unable to 5 resolve these difficulties. Mr. Torrie notes that 6 Manitoba Hydro's second rebuttal brings to bear new 7 data subsequent to the integration of Winnipeg Hydro 8 and there are also dubious mathematical methods and 9 assumptions in the new material that are untested in 10 the CEC process and which we are not in a position to 11 thoroughly analyze. 12 So I wish we could have a stronger 13 conclusion there but that's our current assessment of 14 where the situation lies. 15 On to DSM analysis and programming. 16 There are more technically feasible economic 17 opportunities than Manitoba Hydro has captured in its 18 analysis of DSM economic potential because, first, a 19 higher threshold price than 6.15 cents per kilowatt 20 hour for conservation measure is warranted because of 21 ancillary benefits of DSM. And secondly, because 22 savings are cost -- additional savings are cost 23 effective even at the 6.15 cent threshold. 24 The gap between the economic DSM 25 potential and what Manitoba Hydro deems to be 07373 1 achievable reflects a large pent-up opportunity for 2 more aggressive state-of-the-art DSM programming that 3 could achieve several times the energy savings 4 projected in the current resource plan. 5 Contrary to the implication in Manitoba 6 Hydro's rebuttal to TREE/RCM interrogatories, the 7 TREE/RCM analysis takes full account of the impact on 8 DSM potential of adjustments to the business as usual 9 or reference projection. Higher demand in the 10 reference projection also means higher DSM potential, 11 providing a dampening effect of load forecast 12 adjustments. In other words, their model does adjust 13 the DSM estimates as the basic forecast goes up and 14 down. 15 State-of-the-art or third generation 16 demand-side management programming has the following 17 features and is elaborated in the indicated 18 interrogatory replies. Manitoba Hydro's commitment 19 is compared to other North American utilities. In 20 their rebuttal, Manitoba Hydro argues that recent and 21 projected increases in their DSM programming should 22 be compared with the commitments made by other 23 utilities in 2000 and earlier. But clearly, 24 comparisons will be more meaningful when data for the 25 same years are compared as was done in our TREE/RCM 07374 1 NFAAT-9. 2 The spending on DSM in the leading North 3 American utilities has been steadily increasing but 4 the year 2000 was the most recent for which 5 comprehensive comparative statistics were available. 6 Skip the gigawatt hours. 7 The deployment of the maximum economic 8 potential for electricity efficiency improvement is a 9 fundamental prerequisite for any sustainable energy 10 future. Yet Manitoba Hydro is seeking permits to 11 expand on the supply side without committing to 12 development of the full economic potential for DSM in 13 Manitoba and without offering any formal assurances 14 or convincing arguments that there could not be 15 another ebb in the utility's commitment to DSM after 16 the dam is under construction and more is known about 17 the timelines of other developments in the power 18 market. Even the incremental updating of the Power 19 Smart plan is not scheduled for completion until 20 later this summer. 21 At the same time, the announcement of 22 Efficiency Manitoba has introduced significant 23 uncertainty with respect to the future structure of 24 public investment, business organization and delivery 25 channels for DSM in Manitoba. For example, 07375 1 Efficiency Manitoba has a mandate to deliver an 2 integrated program of resource conservation and 3 efficiency and there are strong arguments for folding 4 at least some aspects of the current Power Smart 5 program into this new approach. While this may be a 6 desirable structure for public investment in 7 demand-side management, the transition from Hydro to 8 Efficiency Manitoba holds the potential to be 9 disruptive of DSM delivery capacity in the short 10 term. 11 In addition, long-term business planning 12 at Manitoba Hydro will be or should be profoundly 13 influenced by the definition of the relationship 14 between the utility and Efficiency Manitoba. And 15 until that definition is made clear, it represents an 16 impediment to business planning for Manitoba Hydro. 17 One approach to the problem of Manitoba 18 Hydro's failure to specify the level of contribution 19 of DSM or to explore scenarios for maintaining export 20 capability with increased reliance on DSM would be 21 simply to wait for that analysis to be done. If the 22 update Power Smart program is on schedule for 23 completion in August, which itself is a test of the 24 seriousness of Manitoba Hydro's commitment, then it 25 will soon be possible for the CEC to assess the 07376 1 quantitative role of DSM on the Need For and 2 Alternatives To Wuskwatim advancement. The DSM 3 resource option could be protected from the 4 downgrading it has received in the past from Manitoba 5 Hydro by making Wuskwatim advancement conditional on 6 a binding commitment to specified DSM investment and 7 performance targets and timetables. 8 In addition to the analysis of potential 9 electricity savings and their costs, it is also 10 important to examine the social aspects of DSM 11 programming. These include the employment 12 opportunities from energy retrofits, the changes in 13 quality of life from living in an energy efficient 14 home rather than one that is cold and draughty and 15 the barriers to assessing DSM programming for various 16 constituencies, including renters, Northern 17 Aboriginal communities and the poor. At present, 18 there is, in practice, little or no Power Smart 19 programming appropriate for First Nation communities 20 and low income communities. 21 Recent Hydro-funded research initiatives 22 such as Healthy Housing in West Broadway are 23 important first steps to examine these issues but 24 these need to guide much more extensive and 25 appropriately tailored conservation opportunities for 07377 1 the poor. While Manitoba Hydro has several energy 2 saving programs aimed at residential consumers in 3 general, many of these programs are not effectively 4 reaching community groups and low income earners in 5 First Nation communities or inner city 6 neighbourhoods. 7 I'll add some comments to these points. 8 In its two rebuttals, Hydro has given the 9 strongest defence of its programming that we have 10 seen far beyond the perfunctory treatment in the 2002 11 PUB hearing. And that pleases us that there are so 12 many measures recently adopted or under consideration 13 and hope that the momentum will not again be lost as 14 it was in the early 1990s. We are disappointed that, 15 after all these years, so few houses are constructed 16 to the cost effective R2000 standard and lament the 17 many lost opportunities in new construction. 18 Visible signs of a longer range corporate 19 and provincial commitment to DSM, and many of these 20 remarks apply to provincial policies, would be first 21 an investment in training for the building trades to 22 conduct retrofits comparable to the level of training 23 investment for Wuskwatim. And two, an investment in 24 innovation design and demonstration for 25 cost-effective conservation measures comparable to 07378 1 the engineering investment in Wuskwatim. We haven't 2 seen these signs yet. 3 There follows, in bullet form, a list of 4 actions that Hydro could take to improve the 5 acceptance and utilization of DSM programs. I'll 6 just leave those for your attention. They had been 7 reiterated a number of times in the evidence. 8 A related topic is non-utility 9 generation. We were looking at DSM and wind. Most 10 of our focus has been on the DSM issue but we tried 11 to attend to what was being said about the NUG, the 12 non-utility generation options including wind. 13 And given that 99 megawatt is right there 14 in the verge of being built and that the estimates 15 have been conservative and looking at the Minnesota 16 experience and the growth in wind developments in 17 other places, we don't think it's unreasonable to 18 contemplate five times that Sequoia development, 500 19 megawatts over the next decade. We are not 20 predicting it but in planning future scenarios, it's 21 not an unreasonable scenario to include. 22 We note that the CAC/MSOS witnesses were 23 critical of the idea of Hydro investing its own 24 money, or our money, however you want to look at it, 25 in wind. And presumably there are certain 07379 1 advantages, tax advantages or otherwise. I mean if 2 we're not paying taxes in our utility, that's part of 3 the subsidy, then there wouldn't be the same tax 4 advantages I suppose. So they recommended that Hydro 5 not undertake wind development themselves. But they 6 did not recommend against adding wind to the Manitoba 7 system. And in fact, encourage Hydro to develop a 8 wind development plan in corresponding detail to the 9 DSM planning process. 10 They also acknowledge that corporate 11 learning regarding wind generation would be valuable 12 and could be accommodated through a joint venture 13 arrangement with a private sector which would reduce 14 Hydro's risk exposure. 15 And we also heard the presentation from 16 MIPUG indicate they were looking somewhat jealously 17 at the arrangements that Sequoia had with the utility 18 to buy it at export-related prices whereas they only 19 get for their non-utility generation the tailblock 20 rate which, as we've already indicated, is heavily 21 subsidized at less than 2 cents. So it's not 22 economic at that price. But if they could be offered 23 a price closer to what the wind generation folks are 24 being offered, it might prove attractive. 25 This is a direct link between subsidies 07380 1 and non-utility generation, just as there's a link 2 between subsidies and DSM. What's cost effective 3 from the standpoint of the customer depends on the 4 rates they are paying. 5 Next, alternatives to Wuskwatim. In 6 various combinations with each other and with the 7 adjusted load forecast, a number of plausible 8 resource portfolios exist to supply the estimated 9 on-peak export market of 10,500 gigawatt hours. 10 And this would be during the period of 11 Wuskwatim advancement and before because you can 12 launch your DSM initiatives much before the period is 13 when the dam would start generating. 14 So there are alternatives that have not 15 been identified and analyzed in Manitoba Hydro's 16 proposal. 17 These alternatives have a number of 18 advantages over the construction of Wuskwatim, the 19 value of which can only be properly assessed in an 20 integrated scenario analysis. Of particular note in 21 comparison to Wuskwatim advancement is the ability of 22 the scenarios to deliver results beginning 23 immediately as compared with a lengthy construction 24 period for Wuskwatim, during which time it has only 25 negative cash flow for the utility. Because of the 07381 1 present value of the DSM distributed generation based 2 alternatives, they compare favourably with Wuskwatim 3 advancement even at levels smaller than Wuskwatim's 4 output. 5 The TSA, Torrie Smith Associates, 6 scenarios are, as have been indicated a number of 7 times, illustrative and basically do demonstrate that 8 plausible alternatives exist. But it's up to the 9 corporate resources of Hydro in its modelling to 10 develop these scenarios in full and provide the 11 comparative analyses. 12 I'll simply comment that the readjustment 13 of Mr. Torrie's baseline for its reference scenario, 14 this is in response to the most recent rebuttal for 15 Manitoba Hydro, may reduce somewhat the surpluses 16 achievable for export from the original estimations 17 that were made. There is a need to re-estimate 18 these, which we are unable to do, and that our 19 undertakings 84 and 85 illustrate possible adjustment 20 downwards of the existing resources after subtracting 21 400 gigawatt hours from the baseline in their 22 original adjusted forecast. And so that gives you a 23 partial somewhat adhoc analysis. And basically at 24 this point, we were out of resources and that's as 25 far as we could take it. 07382 1 Finally, I want to address the topic of 2 perverse incentives and subsidies which has been 3 mentioned several times and which are the topics of 4 our interventions before the Public Utilities Board 5 in 2002 and currently. And I'll simply make the 6 point that subsidy is counter -- subsidizing rates, 7 unless you do it in the right way, is counter to 8 conservation objectives. It's part of that climate, 9 that social climate, that economic climate that is 10 hostile to conservation that may be a contributing 11 factor in explaining our level of energy usage and 12 wastage. 13 It is possible to stop subsidizing 14 wastage of energy while still trying to reduce 15 customer energy costs. Two principal ways of doing 16 this are to redirect subsidies from rates to 17 conservation measures and from tailblock rates to 18 initial block rates and fixed charges. It is thus 19 possible to do this in a revenue neutral way that 20 will lower the bills of conservers, raise the bills 21 of larger consumers, bring tailblock rates closer to 22 the marginal cost of energy and thus increase the 23 incentives and cost-effectiveness to consumers of 24 conservation measures. 25 So those are a series of observations 07383 1 drawing on the evidence, and in some cases, with 2 additional comment. 3 Finally, our recommendations. First, 4 ensure that the principles and guidelines of 5 sustainability are integral to the Manitoba Hydro 6 mandate in all resource planning and operations. 7 These should guide the formulation of corporate and 8 program goals, strategic planning, investments and 9 performance measures. As we indicated, this should 10 lead to an examination of long-range global energy 11 futures and Manitoba Hydro's role and 12 responsibilities in contributing to the more 13 sustainable of these. 14 In particular, Manitoba Hydro should 15 address the challenge of converting ever-rising 16 consumption and production trends to a course that 17 reflects the limits of renewable and non-renewable 18 energy supplies. 19 The NFAAT exercise, which Manitoba Hydro 20 failed to conduct for these hearings, should become 21 an integral part of resource planning, whether or not 22 it must be defended in a formal hearing. 23 Proper resource planning requires 24 appropriate models and databases with as much end-use 25 data for various energy sources as possible to 07384 1 integrate forecasting and scenario creation, 2 strategic planning, DSM programming and 3 sustainability review. 4 Manitoba Hydro should continue its recent 5 development of initiatives to create state-of-the-art 6 DSM programming with more ambitious targets that 7 reflect the urgency of getting rising consumption 8 trends under control and generate the accompanying 9 social and economic co-benefits. 10 Manitoba Hydro should also create a 11 detailed wind and NUG development plan with 12 appropriate policies and incentives attractive to 13 potential investors, as recommended by CAC/MSOS and 14 MIPUG. 15 As noted in earlier testimony, one 16 feature of the Wuskwatim project that RCM and TREE 17 applaud is the partnership with Nisichawayasihk Cree 18 Nation, past hydroelectric projects which benefitted 19 southern communities with energy, had 20 disproportionate negative impacts on northern 21 Aboriginal communities and ecosystems located near 22 projects, a partnership that exercises greater care 23 over local ecosystems and promises a share in the 24 dividends is certainly an improvement over the past. 25 At the same time, we note that 07385 1 partnership in dam building is a divisive issue 2 within and between Aboriginal communities. We 3 believe that partnerships and training opportunities 4 built around community building and conservation 5 projects provide an alternative and less divisive 6 foundation for community development and improved 7 relations. 8 In any case, there is a need for more 9 effective targeted programming to benefit a variety 10 of customers who are unable to avail themselves of 11 current DSM programming. 12 Finally, it is important to stop 13 subsidizing the waste of energy in Manitoba. Proper 14 resource pricing and incentives are an integral part 15 of sustainability strategies which have not yet 16 penetrated deeply into energy policy in Manitoba. 17 Now, these hearings are about Wuskwatim, 18 so I can't avoid saying something about that topic. 19 There is a lot of unfinished business 20 before Wuskwatim could proceed, even if it were 21 approved by this Commission. There is need for 22 further collar data on the caribou range in areas 23 potentially affected by the dam and transmission 24 corridors. There are needed consultations and 25 negotiations with a variety of affected communities 07386 1 including those centred at South Indian Lake and the 2 Manitoba Metis. There is still a need for NCN to 3 decide if they wish to proceed and the federal and 4 provincial governments must complete their 5 constitutionally required consultations with affected 6 Aboriginal peoples. 7 Our evidence and arguments, and those 8 from the Consumers and Seniors as well, have also 9 indicated deficiencies in resource planning and the 10 absence of a proper NFAAT analysis. Thus our 11 position is that while the unfinished business in 12 consultation and environmental assessment is being 13 completed, the unfinished business in resource 14 planning and NFAAT analysis should also be done and 15 reviewed by the CEC later this year. The analysis 16 should incorporate as many of the elements of 17 recommendations 1 to 7 as possible and update the 18 planning of additional transmission and intertie 19 capacity, because that 10,500 gigawatt hour figure 20 was a defining limit to this process. 21 There are also appended a few other brief 22 comments from Mr. Torrie which we take to be more by 23 way of argument than evidence because he didn't do 24 recalculations and so on, but is addressing some of 25 the points in the rebuttal that he was unable to do 07387 1 on the stand when he was here. 2 So with that, I conclude my testimony or 3 argument. 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Miller. 5 Mr. Mayer. 6 MR. MAYER: Mr. Miller, firstly, thank 7 you for the presentation and thank you for proving 8 that you don't need a lawyer in order to properly 9 present a closing argument. 10 I am a little bit mystified, however, by 11 your comment on page 5 which says the operational 12 design of Wuskwatim precludes significant storage, 13 and thus firming capacity. You're not recommending 14 the high head proposal, are you, that would in fact 15 provide the storage and firming capacity that you say 16 is missing? 17 DR. MILLER: No. I think my concept of 18 eco-efficiency, the concept of eco-efficiency would 19 preclude that if you may gain additional 20 hydroelectric benefits but there would be a 21 significant environmental cost and it may not be 22 worth that cost. 23 MR. MAYER: But your discussion talks 24 about using hydroelectric power to firm and shape 25 wind energy and there's a lot of evidence before this 07388 1 Commission about that. In your suggestion that you 2 need a storage facility in order to do that as 3 opposed to a run-of-the-river or even in this case a 4 modified run-of-the-river facility, have you 5 considered the possibility that Wuskwatim generation 6 displacing generation from facilities that have 7 storage capacities such as Grand Rapids and Kettle 8 Rapids, for example, which I believe not to mention 9 Lake Winnipeg Regulation, but have you considered 10 that in your whole process of using Hydro power to 11 firm and shape wind generation? 12 DR. MILLER: I would simply defer to 13 Hydro's experts on that and indeed I may get a 14 comment in their closing. 15 MR. MAYER: I have nothing further. 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Miller. We 17 thank you for a well-presented closing statement. 18 This concludes the final presentations for this 19 morning. We see ourselves as a bit ahead of time 20 here but I guess that doesn't mean that lunch is 21 available. So I guess we will reconvene at one 22 o'clock. But before we leave, Mr. Grewar, you have 23 some filings to do? 24 MR. GREWAR: Yes, Mr. Chairman, one or 25 two. First of all, for the record, the closing 07389 1 statement of TREE and RCM regarding the Need For and 2 Alternatives To Wuskwatim Advancement as TREE/RCM 3 1011. That's TREE/RCM 1011. 4 5 (EXHIBIT TREE/RCM 1011: Closing 6 Statement from TREE and RCM Regarding the 7 Need for and Alternative to Wuskwatim 8 Advancement) 9 10 MR. GREWAR: In addition, Mr. Chairman, 11 there were two documents that were supplied by the 12 Manitoba Metis Federation yesterday. They were in 13 response to undertakings. I did check the record, 14 though, and no undertaking numbers were assigned to 15 either one of these items. These were items that 16 were requested and MMF agreed to provide them to the 17 panel. One is the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation 18 v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority. It's 19 a citation. It appears to be an Internet or an 20 electronic version of the document. But this is the 21 decision of the Federal Court of Appeal. And that 22 would be MMF 1005. That was referred to during the 23 presentation on May 14th by the Manitoba Metis 24 Federation. 25 07390 1 (EXHIBIT MMF 1005: Athabasca Chipewyan 2 First Nation v. British Columbia (Hydro 3 and Power Authority) 2001) 4 5 MR. GREWAR: And finally as MMF 1006 6 would be the excerpt from the Aboriginal Plant Use in 7 Canada's Northwest Boreal Forest. This is the book 8 that was presented to the Commission. And the 9 reference is a particular outline of the content of 10 the book and the table of contents and the specific 11 plants presumably that are discussed in the book. 12 And that would be MMF 1006. 13 14 (EXHIBIT MMF 1006: Aboriginal Plant Use 15 in Canada's Northwest Boreal Forest 16 (excerpt) Robin J. Marles, Christina 17 Clavelle, Leslie Monteleone, Natalie 18 Tays, Donna Burns. Natural Resources 19 Canada) 20 21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. That completes 22 your comments, Mr. Grewar? 23 MR. GREWAR: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank 24 you. 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Therefore, we 07391 1 will adjourn and be back to continue at one o'clock. 2 3 (PROCEEDINGS RECESSED AT 11:47 A.M. 4 AND RECONVENED AT 1:00 P.M.) 5 6 THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, 7 if we all find our places we will be able to 8 proceed with this afternoon's presentations. 9 I call upon Mr. Baker. You are going 10 to be making the presentation -- or closing 11 statement, I should say. 12 MR. BAKER: This is the 13 O-Pipon-Na-Piwin closing remarks to the Clean 14 Environment Commission with regards to the 15 Wuskwatim Generation and Transmission projects. 16 Good afternoon to Chairman Lecuyer, Commissioners, 17 Ms. Kinew, Mr. Nepinak, Mr. Mayer and 18 Mr. Sargeant. It has been an interesting journey 19 we have shared since these hearings began on 20 March 2nd. 21 First, let me recognize the 22 Nisichawayasihk Cree sovereignty within their 23 traditional lands, which are today known as their 24 Resource Management Area. While we respect the 25 Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation's right of self 07392 1 government, their sovereignty, their economic 2 development ambitions, and their right to decide 3 what is best for their future; no one's 4 sovereignty should negatively impact on that of 5 another. 6 During these hearings we have taken 7 the opportunity to inform the Commission and those 8 interested in these proceedings of our 9 relationship with the proponents. We have also 10 advised you of our concerns with the Environmental 11 Impact Statement and provided you with a summary 12 of our unique community history, socioeconomic 13 situation, and the culture of the O-Pipon-Na-Piwin 14 Cree Nation. 15 The manner in which the Government and 16 Manitoba Hydro have treated our Cree Nation 17 community is certainly not one of the good news 18 stories in Manitoba's history. The bottom line is 19 that we are fully committed to our objectives of 20 having our Cree Nation Government recognized and 21 our long outstanding reserve established, and we 22 are certainly not moving away from South Indian 23 Lake. 24 We would truly like to redirect the 25 considerable energy we currently expend seeking 07393 1 our formal recognition to the social economic 2 development of our community. While we proceed 3 through the final steps of this frustratingly slow 4 process of recognition, we firmly believe that the 5 respect for our Cree Nation community should not 6 be a future event that will only start on some 7 magical day when the Minister of Indian Affairs 8 signs his Ministerial Order. 9 We believe it is time to turn over a 10 new leaf with Manitoba Hydro and develop a new 11 relationship. It is the only way. After all, 12 they are not leaving either, so we shall be 13 neighbors forever. The big challenge is how to go 14 about accomplishing a more positive relationship? 15 If Manitoba Hydro is sincere with its 16 stated intentions to enter into relationships with 17 Northern Cree Nations regarding future hydro 18 development, it is only logical that this begin 19 with the Cree Nation community that lives on the 20 reservoir that supplies the water to drive their 21 turbines. If not, the whole approach lacks 22 credibility, and will not become the priceless 23 relationship they hope it to be. 24 The concept of Cree Nation communities 25 benefiting directly from the profits produced by 07394 1 Hydro developments sure sounds a lot better than 2 their past way of doing business. 3 O-Pipon-Na-Piwin Cree Nation supports economic 4 development. 5 If Hydro's intentions with the 6 Wuskwatim Power Development Agreement is to offer 7 the people of South Indian Lake the opportunity to 8 become business partners, their approach needs to 9 be rethought, because that objective will not be 10 realized through Manitoba Hydro/Nisichawayasihk 11 Cree Nation partnership. 12 What has been presented and described 13 is a proposed partnership between Manitoba Hydro 14 and the people of Nelson House. To know in your 15 hearts that our people in South Indian Lake will 16 not realize any beneficial effects; but to mask 17 this reality by including South Indian Lake in a 18 Local Region, and then concluding that the 19 beneficial effects will be felt evenly throughout 20 the Local Region is wrong. It simply adds to our 21 people's mistrust. 22 So how does the O-Pipon-Na-Piwin Cree 23 turn over a new leaf and develop a new 24 relationship with Manitoba Hydro? 25 Well, first we believe that a new 07395 1 relationship must be built on mutual respect. 2 Second, we believe it must recognize 3 the severe harm that the Churchill River Diversion 4 caused to our lake, ecosystem, and people, and 5 take positive action to heal and mitigate the 6 damage. The needs of our environment cannot 7 simply be ignored. That will not result in our 8 people trusting Manitoba Hydro enough to develop a 9 positive future relationship. 10 Third, a new relationship must ensure 11 that the future projects do not adversely affect 12 our lives again. This requires proper analysis; 13 not a socioeconomic study that essentially ignores 14 our community and our people's perspective and 15 culture, by amalgamating us